In hypermodernity, the technological Other becomes more West than West, removing the Trans-Pacific encounter. Only by critically embracing our signifier-as-futurity can we circumvent Western modernity.
Roh et al. 15, David Roh is Professor of English at the University of Utah. He holds a BA in English from the University of California, Los Angeles, an Ed.M in Educational Technology from Harvard University, and an MA and Ph.D in English from the University of California, Santa Barbara. He is author of Minor Transpacific: Triangulating American, Japanese, and Korean Fictions (Stanford University Press, 2021), Illegal Literature (University of Minnesota Press, 2015), and coeditor of Techno-Orientalism (Rutgers University Press, 2015). His work has appeared in Law & Literature, MELUS, Journal of Narrative Theory, and Verge., (“Technologizing Orientalism”, Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media, Rutgers University Press) //CHC-DS 🐱👤
While Orientalism as a critical lens describes how Western discourse discursively catalogues or frames the East, it has always been trained on domestic— that is, Western or U.S.—configurations against the Orientalized Other. Edward Said notes his “real argument is that Orientalism is—and does not simply represent—a considerable dimension of modern political-intellectual culture, and as such has less to do with the Orient than it does with ‘our’ world” (12). Techno-Orientalism, with a vision of the future that is global in scope and reach, adds a wrinkle to the critical commonplace that Orientalism actively produces and reproduces an oppositional East to cement Western hegemony. Particularly within the realm of SF, techno-Orientalist tropes have been absorbed, reenvisioned, and replicated by other sites of cultural production, with interesting geopolitical implications.8 For example, Sato writes that Japan’s entry into cyberpunk SF reinvigorates nihonjinron, the idea of an essentialist Japanese superiority that was integral to its imperialist project. With Japan’s surrender in 1945, however, the idea of nihonjinron lost currency— that is, until it was reenabled by cyberpunk fiction in the 1980s. Sato observes that it was cyberpunk that resurrected the idea of Japanese essentialism: “This proud announcement of revived Japaneseness requited through the cutting edge of American culture means that the two separate histories of the West and Japan—the former modernizing, the latter behind—coincide in the discovery of Japan in American cyberpunk” (346). That proves troublesome, she argues, because it assumes Japanese essentialism as the primary reason for Japan’s economic and technological achievements. For example, two paradigmatic cyberpunk works, Ghost in the Shell (1995) and Chōhei Kambayashi’s novel Yukikaze (1985), have strong female cyborg leads paired with weaker, male companions. While Western cyberpunk seeks to claim liberal humanist subjectivity and modernity, having a female cyborg subject allows Japan to circumvent the question of subjectivity and modernity altogether. In both works, the male (Western) subject is deflated and removed from the center, while the cybernetic female embraces technology over humanity, allowing the insertion of Japan-as-signifier of futurity based on the constructed image of the West’s Othering of technology and Asia. In other words, a Japan manufactured by the West can further ethnocentric or nationalist projects on both fronts. Techno-Orientalist discourse, in this case, has been reified in another nationalist context, further demonstrating its discursive hegemony as it serves a site other than its point of origin.
The Western fixation on Asian futurism indicates just how important it is to approach techno-Orientalism from several vantages. William Gibson is perhaps the most renowned exemplar of the West’s fascination with the technologized Asian subject, evident in his unapologetic rhapsodizing in a 2001 issue of Wired, but even he merits a second look: “Dining late, in a plasticdraped gypsy noodle stall in Shinjuku, the classic cliché better-than-Blade Runner Tokyo street set, I scope my neighbor’s phone as he checks his text messages. Wafer-thin, Kandy Kolor pearlescent white, complexly curvilinear, totally ephemeral looking, its screen seethes with a miniature version of Shinjuku’s neon light show. . . . Tokyo has been my handiest prop shop for as long as I’ve been writing: sheer eye candy” (Gibson, “My Own Private Tokyo”). Gibson’s meditation touches upon the multipronged reach of techno-Orientalist discourse—he references the dystopic, Asianized cinematic vision of Los Angeles; he admits drawing upon Tokyo’s luminescence for his literary well; and it is the “ephemeral looking” mobile phone that inspires him to imagine new media, as he did with cyberspace in Neuromancer. Essentially, Gibson admits that the futurism he reads in Tokyo is largely superficial (“sheer eye candy”); the phone appears to be futuristic simply because of its alien surroundings, and his own somewhat tautological belief in Tokyo as his futuristic “prop shop.”
But more interestingly, Gibson credits Japan’s encounters with the West as the central reason for its present status as a site of the future. He explains, “[T]he nation of Japan [swallowed] whole the entirety of the Industrial Revolution. The resulting spasms were violent, painful, and probably inconceivably disorienting. The Japanese bought the entire train-set: clock-time, steam railroads, electric telegraphy, Western medical advances. . . . The result of this stupendous triple-whammy (catastrophic industrialisation, the war, the American occupation) is the Japan that delights, disturbs and fascinates us today” (Gibson, “Modern Boys and Mobile Girls”). That is, to understand Japan as the site of the future, one must first read its historical introduction to technology by (and, to the Western eye, its embrace of ) the West. In a wonderfully circular way, Gibson touches upon the tautological aspect of techno-Orientalism: the Japanese are technologically advanced and therefore culturally fascinating now because of past Western modernizing interventions in the Eastern sphere. In Gibson’s history, the West has created a hyperfuturistic Japan; and in this vision, Japan is now, in a sense, more West than the West, a simulacrum that threatens the foundational fiction of the West as Future.
It would be easy to dismiss Gibson’s liberties with Japanese culture as a symptom of his misreading of his muse, but our instinct tells us that would be too simple. Instead, we are interested in the potentials for contrapuntal dialogism in such engagements. Parodic and reciprocal appropriations of technoOrientalism in Asian cultural productions, for example, have opened up spaces for artistic and intellectual critique. Yet some remain skeptical of the effects of such appropriations. Ueno regards techno-Orientalism as a metanarrative that has become “an epistemological apparatus for Japanese to misunderstand themselves, and for Westerners to misunderstand others” (qtd. in Oda 250). Elaborating on Ueno’s skepticism, artist and cultural anthropologist Masanori Oda observes in an essay on what he calls “the present Post-Orientalist moment,” “Japanese anime, manga, and games are becoming a kind of ‘contact zone’ for the West to meet the latest Japan/ese. What is different from the old Orientalism is that both parties ( Japanese and Occidental) hold a kind of reciprocity. This means that the Japan/ese often appear as ‘as you like,’ selffashioned figures to the West, not only to satisfy their own gaze, but to disguise the real portrayal of their own nature or desires, as if to say, ‘This figure is not so bad for me’” (250). Oda’s skepticism rests chiefly with the mediatory capacity of techno-Orientalist discourses. “There may be a contact between both parties,” he cautions, “but there is never an encounter, much less an uncanny experience. Thus, mutual misconceptions accumulate” (251). Indeed, numerous examples of Oda’s notion of “contact without encounter” are identified and critiqued in the essays collected in this volume. It is this effect of “contact without encounter” produced by techno-Orientalist discourses that our volume seeks to call out and counteract. If technology has come to mediate “contact” between East and West through techno-Orientalist discourses, how, then, might we fashion representational technologies that engender “encounter” rather than empty contact?