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The resolution invokes the technological sublime, where we become obsessed with violent imagery of modern warfare. This imagery is an aesthetic imagination that props up Western heroic narratives against the savage Orientalized enemy, securing anxieties of White masculinity.

Roh et al. 15, David Roh is Professor of English at the University of Utah. He holds a BA in English from the University of California, Los Angeles, an Ed.M in Educational Technology from Harvard University, and an MA and Ph.D in English from the University of California, Santa Barbara. He is author of Minor Transpacific: Triangulating American, Japanese, and Korean Fictions (Stanford University Press, 2021), Illegal Literature (University of Minnesota Press, 2015), and coeditor of Techno-Orientalism (Rutgers University Press, 2015). His work has appeared in Law & Literature, MELUS, Journal of Narrative Theory, and Verge., (“Chapter 1: Demon Courage and Dread Engines”, Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media, Rutgers University Press) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

While Japan’s march toward world power status was generally celebrated in America, it was also filtered through the West’s complex emotional response to race and emergent technologies, and infused with trepidation over an Asian power dominating a white one. Some Americans found this turn of events inspiring. “White supremacy is getting a terrible black eye in and about Manchuria and Mukden,” wrote the Seattle Republican in March 1905, one of many African American newspapers that saw Japanese victory as a subversively powerful triumph for racial equality in an age of Jim Crow and lynching (qtd. in Kearney 35). Even W.E.B. Du Bois became a “Japanophile” approving the “fear of colored revolt against white exploitation” that Japanese victories produced (Kearney 19, 30, 38, 168).

White Americans’ assessment of Japan’s rise was more ambivalent. Concerns about “race decadence” bumped against the technological sublime, a state of awe attached to the creations of modern science. Enlightenment thinkers like Immanuel Kant and Edmund Burke had posited that confrontations with terror in the form of great natural forces could elevate observers to a “heightened awareness of reason.” With the advent of the Machine Age, some felt that a similar astonishment from encounters with emerging technologies might lead to society’s betterment. In fact, David Nye sees American culture’s celebration of nature-controlling technologies, in awe-inspiring shared experiences like the completion of the transcontinental railroad, as central to the narrative of American greatness from the nineteenth century onward, forming unities across political, religious, regional, and class divides (3, 6–9, 22, 27).

War was another fraught activity that could potentially unify Americans in purpose, and the experience of modern warfare at the turn of the twentieth century supplanted nature as “the exemplary object or trigger of the sublime” (Ray 134). Likening the horrors of war to the “cunning of nature,” Kant acknowledged that “war has something sublime about it” and experiencing its surprises and cruelties might spur humanity toward transcendence. Alleging that both savage and civilized peoples held “superior esteem for the warrior” whose heroism “does not yield to danger but promptly sets to work with vigor and full deliberation,” Kant also allowed that the sublime experience of battle could forge national or racial unities as well as strengthen a nation’s commitment to moral freedom (Neculau 36–38; Licht 23–25)

The harnessing of the war sublime (which complements and exhibits aspects of the technological sublime) for ideological purposes has been an enduring factor in American history. Looking at the recent war in Iraq, François Debrix notes how Orientalism and confrontation with violent imagery continue in America’s “aesthetic imagination” of war as mobilizing factors in the quest for public approval: “This sublime aesthetic of war, relayed by contemporary media and popular cultural forms . . . consists of producing spectacular, violent and shocking images of ‘others’ in distress or harm’s way in places where America’s wars are being fought. . . . [I]t is an ideology that postulates that only Americans (even if they are soldiers) are equipped to provide hope, morality, and humanity to the Middle East” (767). Moreover, Debrix sees the imagination of war-borne terror as essential to America’s heroic narrative: “An ideology of America at war is enabled through a visual experience that consists of forcing the spectator’s imagination not only to go through unbearable and shocking images but also to transcend this initial painful experience by discovering beyond it readily available reasons and larger-than-life truths than can make sense of it all and justify those horrific scenes . . . towards some ideas that supposedly can provide solace, understanding, and ultimately pleasure to the spectator” (771).

This ideology epitomized American conflicts waged a century before the Iraq War’s technological “shock and awe,” and the view that combat with a savage, Orientalized enemy would “help democracy and peace and justice rise in a troubled and violent region” (Bush). Both the Spanish-American War (1898) and the subsequent Philippine-American War (1899–1902) were technologydriven events, fought with Gatling guns, Krag-Jørgensen rifles, steel battleships, and American soldiers, whom Secretary of War Elihu Root appreciated as part of the “great machine which we call military organization” (Simon 47). Beyond proving American ability in battle, and its industrial strength and capacity to make war, proponents felt these wars were essential markers of American modernity. Theodore Roosevelt reasoned their prosecution was “one of the great tasks set modern civilization,” bringing blessings of American democracy to the world’s backward peoples, and benefiting the domestic sphere by inoculating white manhood against the decline of civilization and alleviating residual sectionalism (Roosevelt 11; Bederman 187; Ninkovich 18–19).

With an ideology that combined technology, war, and race under the banner of civilizing imperialism, the United States entered the twentieth century seeking a “new international identity” (Ninkovich 47, 91–92). New liberating technologies, like wireless transmission and air travel, supported this identity and fostered America’s transnational connections. Yet, technology acted as a double-edged sword, increasing encounters with global dangers, and giving rise to a host of new worries about American power. This included the Japanese invasion sublime, a hybrid of the technological and war sublime, and America’s agitated view of Asians in the early twentieth century; this fear exaggerated the threat of Japanese militarism and concluded that a conquest of the United States was its ultimate goal. By envisioning Japanese ascendency primarily through a military domination of the Pacific, the Japanese invasion sublime operated as an early form of techno-Orientalism. Embedded within the sublime was also a drive to find a Western technological solution to the menace of Japanese military supremacy.

The Russo-Japanese War was the genesis event because it introduced a modern vision of the East effectively wielding technology against the West. After the war grew a suspicion that Japan, emboldened by its victory over Russia, would strike the United States with a Port Arthur–like sneak attack. The panic was enough to derail the U.S. Navy’s plans for a “great western base” in the Philippines, with Japan’s hard-won siege of Port Arthur still burning in the minds of American leaders (Challener 182; Edward Miller 79).

Yet, the Japanese invasion sublime was not merely a hopeless resignation to Japanese aggression. Prodded by the outcome of the Russo-Japanese War to confront the unpleasant image of Japanese hegemony, the American military slowly constructed a path around its immobilizing fears: War Plan Orange, America’s first and most detailed official imagination of future war prior to World War II. From its genesis in 1907, Plan Orange’s many authors “never wavered in their innermost minds” that a complete and utter destruction of Japan was the ultimate goal. Though the plan was endlessly revised, its basic structure yielded the strategy with which the United States triumphed in Pacific War of 1941 to 1945. Yet, no matter how triumphantly it imagined a final victory over Japan, the Orange Plan in each version assumed the Americans would suffer some form of catastrophic defeat to Japan at the conflict’s onset (Edward Miller, 347, 363).

The Japanese invasion sublime, fueled by fearful images of Japanese domination powerful enough to undermine American security and triumphalism, shared the yellow peril’s “kaleidoscope of apprehensions” that concurrently bedeviled the Western mind (Richard Thompson ii; Sharp 6). Both projected nightmarish images of Asians and fear that “the West could be overpowered and enveloped . . . by the forces of the East” (Marchetti 2). Unique, however, is the origin of the Japanese invasion sublime in a specific context and event. Unlike yellow peril’s representation of Asian acrimony toward the West as being ancient, occultish, immortal, and divorced from definite grievances, it was the high-tech modernity exhibited by Japan in the Russo-Japanese War that launched the Japanese invasion sublime and gave it potency (Iriye 7).

Rotem Kowner contends that a “historiographic amnesia” erased Western memories of the Russo-Japanese War within a few years of its conclusion, yet the Japanese invasion sublime served as the West’s anamnestic repository for the war—it was mythologized as a prelude to a U.S.-Japanese conflict, and exemplified as a warning of Japanese technological aggression for succeeding generations (Impact 2–3). Almost immediately after Russia’s defeat, a menacing, technologically adept Japan became the focus of yellow peril media, until the end of World War II (Franklin, War Stars 36, 39).

The perception of the Russo-Japanese War as watershed moment was synchronous with the Victorian and Edwardian fixation on race, gender, and national strength. As the United States pondered its vulnerabilities, it developed an incongruous image of Japan: technologically adept, modern, chivalrous, and civilized, yet savage and ultimately an existential threat to the West. This knotty conception largely projected anxieties over decaying white masculinity, through nervous disorders like neurasthenia and declining birth rates, which Roosevelt termed “race suicide” (Bederman 199–200). Such worries underscored “silent invasion” rhetoric about Japanese immigrants; when Los Angeles’s Japanese Chrysanthemum Club began raising donations for Japan’s war effort, the Los Angeles Times accused them (and by implication all Japanese Americans) of being clandestine soldiers disguised as gardeners: “Under this euphonious name, which suggests quaint tea gardens, dancing Geisha girls, and flower bedecked booths and jinrikishas, there creeps the dominant idea of grim visaged War. . . . [U]ntil all the Japanese on the Pacific Coast have been brought within its influence and placed in readiness to respond to any call for aid from their island home” (“War Spirit in Sweet Names” 1). Nourishing these suspicions were reports of Japanese soldiers masquerading as Chinese peasants to elude the Russians in Manchuria (“Plays Waiting Game” 1). Scuttlebutt that secret Japanese armies existed on American soil awaiting instructions from Tokyo gained traction after the war. In 1907 William Randolph Hearst’s San Francisco Examiner claimed “Japanese troops in the guise of coolies” were covertly maneuvering throughout California (qtd. in Daniels 110). This bogey had a surprising longevity, and suspicions of a Japanese American fifth column undergirded the drive for internment more than three decades later.

Existing apprehensions of white male deterioration coalesced around the Russo-Japanese War’s disturbing visuals of modern war and Asian ascendency, giving rise to the Japanese invasion sublime. However, just as Roosevelt and other imperialists believed brutal race wars could strengthen American civilization, the sublime of an exaggerated Japanese menace might also be “a healthy shock, a temporary dislocation of the sensibilities that forced the observer into mental action” (Nye 6). Processed through this perspective, Japan’s combination of technology, civilization, and primitive savagery to defeat a decrepit Russia served as a unifying call to arms and a potential solution to perceived American weakness.

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