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a) We control uniqueness, debate’s oversaturated with perspectives—preparing for this inevitably requires filtering out arguments whether we do it consciously or not—only a mandated focus on controversy can effectively narrow this down. There’s no offense—it’s T, not framework—we’re not a universal standard for every debater to meet, we’re a reasonable metric for judging the deliberative value of speech acts—they can critique our interpretation, but they can’t win without a clearly-defined method of assessing the relative worth of proposals under theirs.

Hansen, 17—Danish School of Media and Journalism (Ejvind, “Aporias of courage and the freedom of expression,” Philosophy & Social Criticism, October 2, 2017, dml)

In the following we will pursue the idea that current discussions of the (negative) freedom of expression should be supplemented with discussions of how we achieve making the public spheres more open to courageous truth-tellers. The main argument for going this way is a worry that with the enormous growth in the number of those projecting their expressions into the public spheres, without a similar growth in the span of attention, we may end in a situation in which the public exchanges become as ineffectual as in the pre-Enlightenment times. It is thus necessary that we evaluate the public spheres not only in terms of their permission for an unlimited number of voices, but also in terms of the mechanisms in place that allow attention to be attached to courageous expressions.

The relationship between the number of active participants in public sphere discourses and the span of our attention entails that a certain screening of information and expressions will happen whether we do it actively or not. The traditional idea of the freedom of expression as just the absence of external constraints is thus in a certain sense a naïve approach to achieve diverse public spheres inasmuch as expression does not necessarily translate into discussion or any larger social focus.

The same applies to our suggestion based on both negative and positive notions of freedom. Even though we argue that public spheres that favour courageous truth-telling are democratically preferable to those that do not, to think of our argument as a framework to articulate some clearly defined criteria that must be met by discourse participants misunderstands its nature. Such scenarios, as we know, put the political order on a path that does not evoke pleasant historical memories. On the one hand, our proposal is mainly a suggestion of how to assess the democratic worth of expressions – certainly there are other legitimate reasons to participate in public discussions. Second, even for the evaluation of the democratic value, we will argue that the quest for courageous truth-telling functions as a critical, counterfactual ideal – an ideal that is itself open for public discussions.

This is not to say that a counterfactual ideal is without actual relevance in society. If the suggested account of a positive freedom of expression is credible, it can serve as an implicit reference or standard from which to judge, on the one hand, deliberative discussions of actual expressions in the public spheres and, second, deliberations of the relationship between concrete, prevailing interpretations of the ideal and the actual society.

The main aim with the ideal is thus not to suggest a norm that unequivocally determines whether or not actual expressions are of democratic worth in the public sphere. In order to have practical worth the ideal must, admittedly, be able to serve as a paradigm for the articulation of rules and values against which actual expressions can be evaluated. More importantly, however, the ideal is something that we can, and should, argue about. If a speaker is criticized for not being a courageous truth-teller, she or he [they] can either respond to the critique by showing that the expression is actually courageous according to the existing norms for courage, or can challenge the norms as being inadequate.

This definitely opens the way to a certain amount of unavoidable relativism, since the articulated ideals could otherwise serve repressive interests by preventing expressions of views. The relativism is, however, conditional. In the challenge of existing norms of courage it will still be necessary, in order to be counted as a relevant voice in the democratic public sphere, to substantiate an alternative suggestion as to how the notion of courage should be conceived. In doing this, one will partake in a democracy-enhancing discussion.

We will return to this discussion in section VI in which we argue that on this aspect the deliberative understanding of communication and democratic will formation (as articulated in Cohen, 1989, 1997; Habermas, 1992, 1996; Rawls, 1999[1971]) bears some important insights. Our account of deliberative reasoning is, however, furthermore inspired by poststructuralist accounts in which it is taken seriously that deliberative exchanges to a large extent have to focus on issues that are by their very nature impossible to agree upon – because the crucial social challenges are aporetic in nature and thus any articulated account will be inadequate. This is where ideals of courage come in, courageous truth-telling being the practice of risking our lives in order to attain some higher goal. The ideals of deliberation and courage indeed carry some tensions (aporias), but these tensions should not lead us to reject the ideals – the tension is, as it were, a product of two mutually dependent and opposing ideals. In our case this will be a tension between the quest both for deliberative consensus and courageous challenging. However, in order to understand the structure of such paradoxes, we must turn our attention to Derrida’s notion of aporia.

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