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No Baltics invasion AND other areas thump.

Rostoks and Vanaga ’18 [Toms and Nora; November 2018; Senior Researcher at the Centre for Security and Strategic Research at the National Defence Academy of Latvia, Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of Latvia; Senior Researcher at the Centre for Security and Strategic Research at the National Defence Academy of Latvia; Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, “Creating an effective deterrent against Russia in Europe: Military and Non-Military Aspects of Deterrence,” https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/baltikum/14866.pdf]

Up to now, when Russia has used force in its own territory or against other countries, it has been in the name of protecting important interests. In the case of the war in Chechnya, it was the territorial integrity of the country. Regarding Georgia and Ukraine, Russia wanted to prevent the expansion of NATO, and in Syria it was to extend help to an important ally and affirmation of Russia’s return on the world stage as a player with a global reach (Lukyanov 2016). None of this is the case with the Baltic countries. They have long since become EU and NATO member states, and it is important to remember that in international politics it is easier to prevent something from happening than to undo a done deal. With regard to the question of protecting the rights of Russian speakers, both Russia’s intentions to resolve the issue in keeping with its interests and the legitimacy of putting pressure on the Baltic countries from the point of view of the current context of international rules and regulations are doubtful. In other words, the Baltic countries are accorded such an insignificant space in Russia’s foreign policy that it is difficult to imagine a reason that would be important enough to use military force against them. Since the results of using force usually come at a cost, it is difficult to find arguments for launching such an aggression, for the gains would be unlikely to counterbalance the costs. Authors who have been writing about Russian foreign policy and have tried to explain it in recent years are therefore quite certain that the Baltic countries have little reason to be concerned about their security. Dmitry Trenin writes that ‘Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland are safe, however, even if they do not feel that way: the Kremlin has no interest in risking nuclear war by attacking a NATO member state, and the sphere of Russian control to which Putin aspires certainly excludes these countries’ (Trenin 2016, 29). Stephen Kotkin is of a similar opinion: he thinks that Russia’s interest in its sphere of infl uence in the post-Soviet space does not include the Baltic countries (Kotkin 2016, 8). Researchers are not always right, yet in this case their opinions clearly point to Russia having no serious interests vis-à-vis the Baltic region. Since countries usually use force to protect important interests, the nonexistence of such interests in the Baltic region allows us to speculate that a military conflict in this region is unlikely. Russia is deterred by its lack of significant interests in the Baltic region. Before we analyse other elements of deterrence it is worth looking at one argument in favour of Russia’s threat to the Baltic countries turning out to be rather important after all. The idea is that Russia may want to do to the West what it experienced at the beginning of the 1990s, when the collapse of the Soviet Union turned the hitherto bipolar world into a unipolar one. In the current situation, where Europe has become bipolar, Russia may attempt to split the NATO alliance, thus becoming the ruling country in the European security system and reclaiming its sphere of infl uence that was lost when the USSR collapsed. In this scenario the Baltic countries would be accorded an important role, whereas Russian actions would be based on the assumption that NATO is nothing but a ‘paper tiger’, i.e. it looks dangerous but will collapse like a house of cards if Russia is to act quickly and decisively. Russia might try to split NATO if it were to assume that the military preparations of alliance members is inadequate to extend a helping hand if one were needed by one or more member states. In such a case an attack on the Baltic countries would exacerbate the existing disagreements among NATO members, cause lack of unanimity, delay decision making and make timely arrival of help impossible. Russia would thus kill two birds with one stone: it would destroy NATO (for there would be no point in its existence if the members cannot help each other when facing dangerous threats) and reclaim the Baltic countries, which were lost with the collapse of the USSR. NATO would cease to exist because for the fi rst time in its history, as a member faced an existential threat, the alliance would prove ineffective and incapable of providing the necessary help. The other member states would conclude that there is no point to NATO and consequently NATO would cease to exist. On the one hand, such an argument seems convincing, because the essence of defensive alliances is to make a positive contribution to the security of member states. If it’s not done, then other countries have to reckon with the possibility that they will not receive help if the need arises. By joining an alliance, countries have made the decision that they will generate only a part of the necessary military capability because the other members will take care of the rest. If other allies cannot be trusted, then the point of the existence of the alliance is lost and countries must generate the lacking military capability themselves or change their relationship to the adversary, i.e., bandwagon with the source of threat. Mutual distrust and differing interests can thus bring the alliance to collapse. On the other hand, the argument that alliances unravel when facing decisive action on the part of the adversary does not seem convincing. Aggressive behaviour by the adversary undoubtedly increases the feeling of threat, thus it is equally possible that countries will try to deepen their cooperation when external threat is on the rise. With the level of threat rising in the international system, countries will try to find collective solutions. Under such circumstances, cooperation will be possible not only among countries which are already on friendly terms, but also countries whose relations have been neutral or even hostile. The alliance between the Soviet Union and the United States (and Great Britain) during the Second World War is evidence that, when facing an external threat, cooperation between countries increases and not vice versa. Thus Russia has to realize that in case it engages in military aggression against the Baltic countries, the threat it represents will only act to consolidate the ranks of the NATO member states and heighten US interest in strengthening European security. NATO has taken steps to deepen the cooperation, both after the Russian-Georgian war and after Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine in 2014, supporting the argument that the increase in the intensity of external threat causes balancing attempts on the part of the countries under threat (Walt 1990). It can be concluded that the possibility of military aggression on the part of Russia is diminished both by its lack of interest in the Baltic countries and by its disinclination to consolidate NATO even more by launching an aggression against one of the alliance members.

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