Russia won’t pass redlines.
Frederick et al. 17 – Bryan Frederick, Political Science PhD from Johns Hopkins University. Matthew Povlock. Stephen Watts, Government PhD from Cornell University, formerly in the State Department's Office of Policy Planning. Miranda Priebe, Political Science PhD from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Edward Geist, History PhD from the University of North Carolina. [Assessing Russian Reactions to U.S. and NATO Posture Enhancements, RAND Corporation, RR-1879-AF, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1879.html?adbsc=social_20171018_1878401&adbid=920665026620301317&adbpl=tw&adbpr=22545453]//BPS
Furthermore, there is currently little evidence that Russia is interested in a direct military conflict with the United States. Russia does not appear to count any current NATO territory, including the Baltic States, within the sphere where it is willing to use force to preserve its influence. Although Russia has used military force in post-Soviet states over the past two decades and has conducted numerous lower-level provocations involving NATO allies (including limited cyber attacks), it has taken no actions that approach announced U.S. or NATO redlines for invoking Article 5. Moreover, in the operations that Russia has undertaken, such as in Ukraine, Russia’s behavior appears to have been highly sensitive to military costs. A direct attack on a NATO member in response to posture enhancements currently in progress would represent a level of cost and risk acceptance that has no precedence in prior Russian behavior. Further enhancements could send a stronger signal of U.S. and NATO willingness to defend Alliance members and could alter Russian calculations regarding what immediate military aims it could achieve through aggression, but under current strategic and Russian domestic conditions, such benefits are likely to be marginal.