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NATO isn’t entrapping – their explanation is endogenous which means the aff could never solve

Lanoszka 17 – Alexander Lanoszka, International Relations Professor at the University of Waterloo. [Tangled up in rose? Theories of alliance entrapment and the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, Contemporary Security Policy, 39(2), December 2017, Taylor & Francis]//BPS

Critics charge that NATO has been reckless in its outreach to countries like Georgia and Ukraine. In so doing, it has encouraged those countries to behave more aggressive towards Russia, risking war in such a way that implicates NATO members against their own interests. The dangers of entrapment abound.

This article analyzes the different causal pathways and variables that scholars have invoked to describe how entrapment risks arise. According to the international relations literature, four broad sources of risk exist. The strength of the commitment given to the ally—actual or potential—is an institutional source. The greater the commitment, the more perverse incentives it creates for the ally to behave recklessly. System polarity and the offense-defense balance are systemic factors insofar as no one country can manipulate them. Multipolarity raises the value of allies for maintaining the balance of power, whereas the offense-defense balance affects how a defender might manage its ties with its ally. Reputational sources of risk arise when an ally exploits the defender’s interest to defend its commitments for intrinsic reasons. Finally, entrapment risks can have ideological sources: An ally strategically appeals to the ideological prejudices of its defender, thereby reshaping the defender’s own sense of strategic interests on favorable terms. Some of these arguments regarding how entrapment unfolds have already been subject to criticism on empirical and logical grounds. Besides organizing these arguments typologically, I demonstrate how uncovering clear evidence of entrapment is a difficult enterprise, even when the theories themselves seem straightforward.

The main problem concerns counterfactuals. The factors that allegedly generate entrapment risks can be so wide-ranging that imagining a world in which they operate differently would require changing other variables, which in turn can make war more or less likely. Alternatively, they might not exclude other factors that could lead to the same violent outcome. After all, conflict drives both alliance formation and the likelihood of war. States join alliances because they assess that the possibility of war is non-trivial. Similarly, a defender might be receptive to the overtures of an ally precisely because it has a pre-existing desire to see conflict with the adversary of that ally. In social scientific parlance, endogeneity problems are pervasive when trying to understand whether entrapment has occurred or is at risk of occurring. The case of the 2008 Russo-Georgian War is instructive by revealing these ambiguities. Many NATO members—especially those in Western Europe—were lukewarm towards Georgia’s bid to become a treaty ally, arguably because they recognized that Georgia posed certain entrapment risks. The United States was the most supportive of Georgia, but it might have overstated its support to Georgia in order to gain a bargaining chip with Russia. It might have even done so because Western European countries were so hesitant, thereby ignoring Saakashvili’s non-democratic tendencies. But by this very token, the United States limited its response to the outbreak of hostilities between Georgia and Russia in August 2008. The Georgian case suggests that states do not forge alliances mindlessly nor do they follow their allies off the cliff thoughtlessly. One cannot by definition want to be entrapped.

The Russo-Georgian War of 2008 illustrates the need to disentangle the factors that push states to fight wars and to seek alliances while carefully investigating the mechanisms through which alliances fuel wars. As noted, some baseline probability of war had already existed between the two former Soviet republics when Saakashvili became President. Their conflict centered on an unresolved dispute regarding the political status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Neither could commit to a durable settlement. Moreover, territorial concessions and submission to salami tactics could have signaled Georgian weakness, thereby encouraging new or more assertive territorial demands. Georgian leaders might have also faced domestic incentives to stand firm towards Russia—incentives that would have existed independent of NATO. To the extent that alliance politics mattered from Georgia’s perspective, Saakashvili might have cherry-picked information that confirmed his beliefs regarding Western support. Nevertheless, these factors are idiosyncratic because they stem directly from his personality. In a counterfactual world where NATO was not a factor, he could have had these and other cognitive biases that would have elevated the likelihood of war.

By undertaking this sort of counterfactual analysis, scholars thus must take care to isolate the effect of an alliance commitment—to the degree that it exists—from the underlying propensity of war. Georgia bears a methodological and analytical lesson for thinking about entrapment: Just because NATO was an issue for Georgian security in 2008 does not mean the alliance was causally responsible for the war. Future research on alliances and war must not only identify correlations between alliances and conflict, but also sort out various causal mechanisms that connect different causal factors with war.

Carefully disentangling the factors that could lead to entrapment matters not only for theory and methodology but also for policy. If entrapment concerns are real, then defense planners must have a clear idea as to where they come from. Some entrapment risks can be attenuated with active policy measures. Conditioning a political or military commitment when dealing with a risk-acceptant ally is one example. But doing so might not matter if we have reason to think that systemic forces make that ally more aggressive. Strong commitments could even make seemingly jumpy allies more secure. And so, armed with a better understanding of what drives entrapment risks, defense planners would be more confident in modulating political and military commitments appropriately. As such, critics of NATO expansion and American foreign policy may be overstating their case. NATO might bear some indirect responsibility for the Russo-Georgian War, but its culpability lessens when we consider the other factors that increased the likelihood of war: misperceptions, overconfidence, and the commitment problems underlying the territorial disputes themselves. If anything, the key policy challenge is for NATO to determine whether prospective partners like Saakashvili have psychological traits or cognitive biases that would make them unjustifiably optimistic about the level of support that they would receive.

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