Entrapment is wrong – keeping conditions vaguer solves.
Rapp-Hooper 20 – Mira Rapp-Hooper, Political Science PhD at Columbia University, Senior Research Scholar in Law at Yale Law School, Senior Fellow at Yale's Paul Tsai China Center, Senior Fellow at Yale's Paul Tsai China Center. [Shields of the Republic: The Triumph and Peril of America’s Alliances, Harvard University Press, ProQuest Ebook Central]//BPS
If America’s Cold War alliances involved serious entrapment costs, the historical record would include cases in which the United States had been dragged into conflicts and crises despite having no direct stake in them. There are few such cases. American allies have proven no more likely to become engaged in conflicts with adversaries than are other states, suggesting that US security guarantees have not provoked adventurism.13
True, during the Cold War, the United States faced serious national security challenges in allied territory, including the Berlin Crisis and the Taiwan Straits Crises. But as we saw in Chapter 2, the strong US stand over Berlin was not a product of beneficent obligation to West Germany; US policymakers saw US national interests at stake. Alliance with Bonn helped to make the US commitment to West Germany more credible, but it did not entangle the country in an uninvited fracas. Likewise during the 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis, Washington had an independent interest in averting a conflict between Taipei and Beijing; it was not simply ensnared in an ally’s woes.
The United States also entered two major wars during the Cold War, in Korea and Vietnam. But in neither case was its participation a result of alliance commitments. The United States could not have been entangled by alliance with South Korea because the two did not have an alliance during the war. The dynamic arguably was just the opposite: Washington was dragged into war because it failed to commit to Seoul in early 1950. The United States later dangled the prospect of an alliance in order to win the South’s support for an armistice. Vietnam, the most flagrant American military blunder of the Cold War, also was not provoked by alliance obligations. SEATO, the US defense pact in Southeast Asia, did not include Vietnam as a partner. Indeed, most of America’s allies opposed the US war in Vietnam, and some worried that they would be entrapped.14 South Korea and Australia did enter the fray, sending large numbers of troops to assist the United States, even though their own publics opposed the war. The United States fought in Vietnam because of its own perceived national interests and arguably paid lower, if still considerable, costs in blood and treasure than it would have if not for allies.15
In the first few years after the Cold War, the United States participated in two more major conflicts, in the Middle East and the Balkans. The Gulf War was precipitated by Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, with which the United States did not have an alliance. The George H. W. Bush administration committed troops to repel a violation of the UN Charter—not because it was obligated by treaty to protect Kuwait. Alliances played a greater role in the decision to take part in conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, as the United States sought to keep the North Atlantic Treaty relevant after the Cold War. But the Clinton administration also identified humanitarian interests and aimed to establish the United States’ newfound global primacy through leadership in the Balkan conflicts. Neither Bosnia nor Kosovo were NATO members.16
Given the scholarly conventional wisdom that alliances cause entrapment, why is it so hard to find cases of American entanglement? There are several reasons. First, the United States has designed its alliances with terms that reduce its exposure to risky commitments.17 Second, when it does commit to an ally, the United States tends to construct its treaty obligations vaguely, giving itself ample room to support its allies without entering conflicts.18 And third, Washington has been selective with its alliance partners, rejecting requests for security pacts when it judges the associated commitments too dangerous.
A clear example of Washington’s care in crafting treaty language is the 1954 agreement with Taiwan. Policymakers worried that Chiang Kai-Shek would exploit a US security guarantee, shrouding himself in American protection while launching attacks on mainland China. To guard against this, the United States gave itself an escape hatch in case Taiwan used force offensively. According to language attached to the treaty, Taipei needed to get Washington’s agreement before any such use of force. That meant Chiang could not take just any aggressive action he wished and expect American support.19 The alliance treaty also deliberately excluded several islands whose status Chinese communists and nationalists disputed. The United States opted to back Chiang through tensions over Quemoy and Matsu in 1954 and 1958, but Washington was not legally obligated to act as it did. During the first crisis, the alliance was still in draft form. During the second, Washington engaged because policymakers thought it wise to deter Mao’s China. The United States was not legally compelled to take any specific action.
To the contrary, American treaty promises are designed to leave Washington with room to maneuver. Most US alliances are triggered by an “unprovoked attack” on the ally, but no language spells out what constitutes unprovoked attack. Treaties, moreover, do not indicate what the American response will be in case of attack. Recall that in 1948 NATO allies sought a treaty provision that would require the United States to automatically enter a war if Western Europe was attacked, and Washington declined. The North Atlantic Treaty and all subsequent treaties promise American consultation if allies are victims of attack, but the nature of defensive aid is not specified.
Ambiguous commitments give Washington flexibility in times of crisis. When Taiwan and China became locked in an escalating standoff in 1958, the United States made public statements on Taiwan’s behalf, moved forces into the region, and provided naval convoys for Taiwanese ships. This was a nimble response short of war, enabled by Washington’s freedom to design its action as it saw fit. In 1956 the United States used its leeway to stay out of a crisis altogether. Late that year two of the closest US allies, Britain and France, joined Israel in an invasion of Egypt. They hoped to regain the Suez Canal after Egypt’s president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, nationalized it. But President Eisenhower opposed the intervention. Washington felt no obligation to participate, placing the United States in fleeting alignment with the Soviet Union and against its allies for the sake of preventing escalation.20
When the risks of entrapment run high, American leaders may never ally at all. US policymakers have made careful decisions about which international partners they should support, rejecting even close friends that pose excessive danger. Israel may be the most prominent example. Though a longstanding confederate on defense and intelligence issues, Israel is not a treaty ally. This is no accident. During the Kennedy administration, Israel requested a formal security guarantee from Washington. From 1961 to 1963, US policymakers seriously considered the idea. The prospect of alliance was attractive in no small part because US officials thought they could persuade Israel to abandon its nuclear program in exchange. But while Kennedy’s team wanted very much to stop Israel from going nuclear, it felt it could not offer a guarantee without risking entrapment. A particular concern was the tension between Israel and Egypt, a country the United States did not count as an adversary. Ultimately the United States chose not to pursue the alliance. Today it is America’s Middle Eastern partners—Israel and several Arab states—that are most often accused of “reckless driving,” but none of them are treaty allies.21 Formal US allies have records of highly responsible behavior.