Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Opening Word document…

An improvement in missile defense still won’t be effective- chances of nuclear weapons hitting are high and outweigh

Grego, 18 – (Laura Grego- Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at MIT's Laboratory for Nuclear Security and Policy, on leave from the Union of Concerned Scientists' Global Security Program, where she is senior scientist and research director, "US Ground-based midcourse missile defense: Expensive and unreliable", 6-28-2018, Taylor & Francis, https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2018.1486592)//mishelle

Where dissuasion is concerned, many factors inform a country’s decision making about whether to develop ICBM technology, and at what cost. But a strategic missile defense system would have to be very effective to alter an adversary’s cost-to-benefit calculation. A marginally effective missile defense system, or a system of unknown effectiveness, may well create an incentive to build more, or more sophisticated, missiles than states would otherwise build. No evidence suggests that building or improving the GMD system has had or will have any appreciable effect on potential adversaries’ decisions to develop long-range missiles. The dramatic increase in tempo in North Korea’s missile testing program happened after the GMD’s nominal deployment and development. Similarly, Iran has continued to develop its long-range missile technology, launching four small satellites into orbit between 2009 and 2015 and developing its more capable Simorgh booster. What about deterrence? The primary way a missile defense system helps deter an attack is by creating uncertainty in the adversary’s mind about whether that attack would succeed in achieving its goals. Under Cold War thinking, if a peer adversary such as the Soviet Union (or Russia) contemplated a carefully planned strike against hardened US military targets, and if effective missile defenses existed, the adversary might be uncertain how much of the US retaliatory force would remain intact after the attack. According to this logic, missile defense would help deter an adversary’s nuclear first strike. The same logic does not apply to an attack that a country such as North Korea, Iran, or even China might consider. These countries’ missile arsenals are too small and inaccurate to mount an effective counterforce strike on hardened US military targets; they would necessarily target cities and civilian infrastructure. Central in deterring North Korea from launching nuclear weapons against the United States is the certainty of a devastating US response. The presence or absence of US missile defense has no meaningful effect on the deterrence already afforded by US offensive nuclear and conventional forces. That brings the discussion to defense against a missile attack. While North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests of the last few years indicate that Pyongyang is within reach of the ability to build a nuclear-armed missile that can reach the United States, these missiles are and will remain relatively inaccurate – whether or not North Korea ceases its test program. North Korean missiles cannot be used to credibly threaten hardened targets such as US nuclear command and control or missile silos, and would instead be targeted on larger, less protected sites, such as cities. For this reason, the GMD system would need to be very effective if it were to influence US decision making, as even one nuclear-armed missile could devastate a city. Reliably defending against an all-out assault is not feasible. While President Trump stated on television17 last October that “We have missiles that can knock out a missile in the air 97 percent of the time,” testing data show there is no basis for expecting interceptors to work more than 40 to 50 percent of the time, even under the easiest and most generous conditions.18 Using multiple interceptors against each target can improve these odds, but this approach does not fundamentally change the situation; the chance of a nuclear weapon getting through would still be dangerously high. Consider an attack with five missiles.19 Using four interceptors against each target, each with a kill probability of 50 percent, the odds that one warhead would get through are 28 percent – or higher, if the failure modes are not independent of each other (for example, if the guidance systems of all the interceptors are faulty in the same way). The odds may yet be worse if the adversary uses numerous credible decoys that the GMD system cannot distinguish from legitimate targets, and so must engage. Thus, while the GMD system may provide some defense against the simplest threats, it cannot provide the type of robust defense necessary to substantially change decision making calculus.20

Sign in to recut, update, or save this card.