Deeply buried facilities, mobile strategic systems, improved defenses, and increased proliferation means counterforce is a fantasy
Gallagher and Cevallos 21 [Mark, [School of Engineering Management, Air Force Institute of Technology WPAFB OH], Michael [School of Engineering Management, Air Force Institute of Technology WPAFB OH] “What Threat Do China’s New Missile Silos Pose to the US?“, Journal of Military Studies, 08-10-2021, Available Online at https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jms-2021-0012#, mysoor)
Abstract: A counterforce attack intends to disable an opponent’s nuclear arsenal to limit potential damage from that adversary. We postulate a future when harden- ing and deeply burying fixed sites, transition to mobile strategic systems, and improved defences make execut- ing a counterforce strategy against an adversary’s nuclear forces extremely difficult. Additionally, our postulated future has multiple nations possessing nuclear weapons. Consequently, each country needs to consider multi- ple actors when addressing the question of how to deter a potential adversary’s nuclear attack. We examine six nuclear targeting alternatives and consider how to deter them. These strategies include nuclear demonstration, conventional military targets, and attacks consisting of communications/electronics, economic, infrastructure, and population centers that a nation might consider strik- ing with nuclear weapons. Since these alternative strikes require only a few nuclear weapons, executing one of them would not significantly shift the balance of nuclear forces. The attacking country’s remaining nuclear forces may inhibit the attacked country or its allies from respond- ing. How can nations deter these limited nuclear attacks? Potentially, threatening economic counter-strikes seems to be the best alternative. How might escalation be con- trolled in the event of a limited attack? Other instruments of power, such as political or economic, might be employed to bolster deterrence against these types of nuclear strikes. 1 Introduction Nuclear deterrence is based on the threat of retaliation if attacked (Lieber and Press 2017). Mazarr (1991) states ‘one of the crucial aspects of nuclear deterrence is a strategy for targeting a retaliation to achieve the greatest deterrent effect.’ Gray (2007) concludes ‘there has to be a nuclear strategy’ indicating the intended response to a nuclear strike to deter an adversary. The goal of counterforce attacks is to disarm the adversary’s nuclear forces. The United States and the Soviet Union transitioned from targeting cities to a coun- terforce strategy during the Cold War as weapon delivery accuracy improved and weapon yields increased. Argu- ments for a counterforce strategy include limiting nuclear retaliation by destroying an adversary’s offensive nuclear capabilities. Ewers (2016) contends, ‘The United States should maintain a counterforce targeting strategy to hold the nuclear forces at risk and provide restraint from esca- lation with the peers and near-peers.’ Additionally, attack- ing an adversary’s nuclear weapons is considered a more moral approach than targeting cities. A common current nuclear approach contends that adversaries are deterred from attacking a country with nuclear weapons because the attacked country could respond with any of their surviving nuclear weapons (Ewers 2016). In other words, if an adversary cannot execute a counterforce strategy that completely cripples their target’s nuclear capabilities, they will not attack with nuclear weapons. This article challenges the notion that a counterforce strategy, which targets an adversary’s nuclear capabilities, effectively deters all nuclear attacks. Consider a hypothetical situation where two coun- tries each have over a thousand nuclear weapons. One country attacks the other with a single nuclear weapon. Would the attacked country strike back or be deterred by their adversary’s remaining arsenal? What if the nuclear attack caused significant economic damage but didn’t directly kill anyone? Would the attacked country strike back against the other’s population? If neither side can destroy the other side’s nuclear weapons, what types of targets might they attack? This paper examines targets that do not fall under the current counterforce strategy, not as advocates of these targets, but to ensure that all types of nuclear attacks are deterred. Before discussing possible attack and appropri- ate responses, we first examine three trends which may undermine a country’s ability to execute a counterforce strategy, improved weapon system survivability, enhanced defences, and expanded proliferation (Gallagher and Sorice 2014). 1.1 Survivability States with nuclear weapons have improved the surviv- ability of their nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems in case of an adversary attack, even with nuclear weapons. The initial efforts included reinforcing fixed sites to withstand nuclear blasts. These efforts have expanded into creating deeply buried facilities. Another approach has been to increase the mobility of strategic nuclear delivery systems, thus ensuring that they are challenging to find and target. For example, aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons have always been mobile targets that could shift from one airfield to another to reduce the chance of being destroyed. Additionally, land-based ballistic missile launchers are being deployed on either trucks or trains to make them difficult to target. The sea-launched ballistic missile submarines have combined mobility and hardening; the submarine’s strength to withstand water pressure is also effective pro- tection against nuclear blast overpressure and dynamic pressure. Additionally, these submarines operate in the world’s largest thermal sink, which reduces their suscep- tible range to thermal effects. Hence, submarines are not only challenging to find, but they are also highly resistant to nuclear weapon effects should they be detected. While decreasing their nuclear forces in total numbers, the United States and Russia have steadily increased the percentages of their nuclear forces that are survivable through mobility. Lieber and Press (2017) and Long and Green (2015) contend that improvements in intelligence technology will eventually track and target current mobile delivery methods; however, future sensing capabilities may be rapidly overwhelmed with decoys and other new countermeasures. We also presume that a country initiating a strike would expend their vulnerable weapons and maintain their more survivable weapons in reserve. For this article, we postulate a future where hard- ening, mobility, deception, and other means will con- tinue to make targeting an adversary’s strategic systems increasingly much more difficult. 1.2 Defences Nations are also increasing their defences to reduce any adversary’s ability to penetrate to their targets. Defences are not new (Cimbala and McDermott 2015). Countries threatened by adversaries attacking with bombers and cruise missiles have established air defence networks. For a while, stealth technology mitigated the advances of air defences; however, the improved sophistication of integrated air defence networks may significantly reduce the ability of bombers and cruise missiles to penetrate to targets. Along with enhanced detection, the range of inter- ceptor missiles has dramatically increased. Local area defences against ballistic missiles have existed for decades. Recent trends have indicated an increase in the size of the defended area and the effective- ness of the interceptors (Lowther and Cimbala 2017). For example, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (2019) in the 2019 Missile Defense Review states, ‘The United States is protected against a limited ICBM [inter-continental bal- listic missile] attack.’ One possible counter to improved defences is faster penetrators, such as hypersonic weapons. A few weapons with such advanced penetrative capabilities may even be able to assist in deterring an attack from a country with an extensive defence network. Zala (2019) concludes the ‘new non-nuclear weapon technologies – such as bal- listic missile defense, anti-satellite weapons, and pre- cision-strike missile technology – will make nuclear deterrence relationships that were once somewhat stable less so.’ 1.3 Proliferation Proliferation is another challenge to a counterforce strat- egy (Mazarr 1995; Jo and Gartzke 2007). During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union only had to be concerned about the size of their arsenal relative to their single adversary. Now, each country must also consider its nuclear arsenal relative to all potential nuclear-armed adversaries and coalitions. An extensive exchange between two countries might leave the third country with the most remaining nuclear weapons (Kristensen and Norris 2018). 1.4 Study assumptions For this discussion, we postulate a future world where the following holds. Multiple states have nuclear weapons. No state or coalition of states can execute a counterforce first strike that sufficiently eliminates an adversary’s nuclear weapons to not be concerned about a nuclear counter-strike in response. No countries have an effective global defence system, rendering all vulner- able to strategic attacks. Each nation needs to consider multiple adversaries. Contrary to our assumptions, Lieber and Press (2017) contend that ‘hardening and concealment—have been undercut by leaps in weapons accuracy and a revolution in remote sensing’ and further ‘countries that have considerable resources can buck these trends and keep their forces survivable, albeit with considerable cost and effort.’ In contrast, Mazarr (2007) states that the United States cannot achieve any of its counterforce goals.