Tech has changed counterforce calculations – nuclear capability alone is insufficient
Andrew Futter and Benjamin Zala 21 – Professor of International Politics at the University of Leicester, Honorary Fellow at the Institute for Conflict, Cooperation, and Security at the University of Birmingham, member of the Cyber-Nuclear Threats Task Force run by the US-based Nuclear Threat Initiative; Research Fellow in the Department of International Relations at the Australian National University, tanton Junior Faculty Nuclear Security Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs in the Kennedy School at Harvard University; “Strategic non-nuclear weapons and the onset of a Third Nuclear Age;” February 2021, European Journal of International Security, 6(3), 257-277. doi:10.1017/eis.2021.2
We stand on the cusp of a Third Nuclear Age. If this new era comes to pass, the main characteristics of the global nuclear order are likely to see considerable challenge.1 This shift is being driven by the development of a suite of strategic non-nuclear weaponry (SNNW)2 and enabling technologies, in conjunction with a fundamental political shift relating to perceptions of nuclear threats and debates about how they should be addressed. Together, these trends fundamentally challenge the canon of academic and policy thinking about nuclear weapons and nuclear stability, and mean that decision-makers must contemplate new risks of inadvertent escalation, miscalculation, and nuclear use, and the possibility of counterforce missions unencumbered by the political and moral restraints associated with the nuclear taboo.3 Essentially, we are set to move from a global nuclear order based on the assumption that developments in nuclear weapons are the primary driver of stability and instability, to one in which non-nuclear capabilities play an equally, if not more important role. Thus, the defining feature of the Third Nuclear Age will be that nuclear geopolitics, risks, crises, deployments, postures, balances, arms control, and non-proliferation will all be shaped as much by developments in SNNW capabilities as by nuclear weapons.
We argue that a Third Nuclear Age will be a product of that which has preceded it: Second Nuclear Age thinking about the benefits of deploying SNNW combined with the return of the kind of major power competition associated with the First Nuclear Age, is likely to make the Third Nuclear Age a highly dangerous one. While we may only be on the cusp of this transition it could hardly be timelier to begin thinking about the impact of these dynamics on the management of the global nuclear order. This is important given that, as we argue further below, there is nothing preordained or irreversible about the onset of a Third Nuclear Age. This new era will be one of our own making.
This article builds on recent work by focusing on the strategic implications of the development of various SNNW systems and advances in sensing and reconnaissance but makes a more ambitious argument about the political and strategic impact of SNNW.4 We argue that five factors have been either ignored or underappreciated in the existing literature: First, while leading scholars have recognised the challenges posed by individual SNNW, the combination of these technologies and the considerable influence on policy has been largely overlooked in current analyses. Second, we go beyond recent arguments about nuclear counterforce options,5 to suggest that the non-nuclear components of these new capabilities are as important, if not more important, than developments in nuclear forces. Third, while much focus has rightly been placed on the United States, we suggest that the SNNW phenomenon is, or at least will become, truly global and is intrinsically tied-in with shifts in polarity, regional dyads, and interstate power balances. Fourth, the impact is more far-reaching than a challenge to secure second-strike nuclear forces, and instead will impact all aspects of the global nuclear order. This is because the challenge is not simply technological but is fundamentally co-constitutive with a change in how decision-makers and analysts think about the management of nuclear threats. Therefore, we should expect the politics of arms control and multilateral cooperation on nuclear issues to play out in new ways. Lastly, when it comes to the timing of the impacts of SNNW deployments, we argue that perceptions of what may be developed or deployed, or worst-case scenarios of how they might be used, are equally, if not more important than the purpose or the capability of the systems deployed today, when it comes to real-world policy impact.