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China’s missile modernization means counterforce fails

Ian Bowers ’22, Associate Professor at the Centre for Joint Operations, Royal Danish Defence College. “Counterforce Dilemmas and the Risk of Nuclear War in East Asia”, Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament: Volume 5, 2022, pp. 6-23 // gbs

China’s emphasis on rapid and significant improvements in its missile capabilities is driven by the strategic desire to hold at risk US and allied naval forces throughout North and Southeast Asia. China’s so-called anti-access/area-denial strategy seeks to deny the United States and its allies the secure use of the sea and reduce their operating capacity on land (Congressional Research Service 2022, 4). Conceptually, this would allow China to rapidly achieve military objectives while holding off immediate efforts to counter them. The range of these missile systems would include the East and South China Seas (the first Island chain) and arguably extend into the Western Pacific in the open seas between Japan and Guam. To enact such a strategy, China must have the ability to overwhelm missile defenses and still disrupt significant facilities such as airfields, C4 ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers [C4] Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance [ISR]) nodes, ports, and ships at sea. The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Forces’ (PLARF) conventional missile capabilities, therefore, provide Beijing with either a powerful tool to shape the operational picture should war break out or a potent first-strike capability aimed at degrading the enemy’s capabilities before they can respond. China’s current phase of modernization seems to have made substantial inroads into undermining traditional areas of US military strength. Numerous reports now suggest that China has attained the capability to overwhelm US naval platforms and facilities in Japan and the ROK, potentially destroying capabilities before they are deployed (Shugart and Gonzalez 2017; Townshend, Thomas-Noone, and Steward 2019). Targeting moving naval vessels is a harder proposition. However, China now possesses increasing numbers of advanced sensors capable of covering multiple domains, including over-the-horizon radar and surveillance satellites that, when networked with other capabilities and effective data processing and analytics, provide near-constant coverage of strategically important areas such as the East and South China Seas and the Western Pacific (Bowers and Kirchberger 2021, 629). China’s military modernization over the preceding 20 years has resulted in rapid developments in its missile and rocket capabilities. China reportedly possesses a potent array of intercontinental, intermediate, medium, and short-range ballistic missiles alongside a large inventory of air-, sea-, and ground-launched cruise missiles. One analysis suggests that these numbers have risen significantly over the past fifteen years (US Department of Defense 2019a, 47). Numerical growth is only one element of China’s missile modernization. Recently introduced capabilities include multiple and maneuverable terminal stages/warheads, deep penetrating warheads, and increased accuracy (Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment 2018). China’s inventory of SRBMs (short-range ballistic missiles) include the DF-11, DF-12, DF-15, and DF-16 family of missiles, with ranges between 250 and 1000 km. These missiles are capable of carrying multiple types of warheads, and incremental developments indicate a focus on increased accuracy (later models of the DF-11 and −15 may have a circular error probability of 50 m), maneuverability, and stealth (Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment 2018). The medium-range DF-21 series has also seen substantial development since its introduction in 1991. The DF-21C introduced in 2006 reportedly possesses greater accuracy and greater range than the original missile. The 1500-km range DF-21D is an anti-ship ballistic missile that has attained some notoriety in US defense and media circles, gaining the moniker “carrier killer” due to its suspected mission of targeting US aircraft carriers operating in waters proximate to China (Missile Defense Project 2016). Similarly, the DF26, which entered service in 2015, has a range of 3000– 4000 km. It is the first conventional Chinese missile to be able to target Guam and, if deployed at Chinese facilities in the South China Sea, US facilities in Australia (Gomez 2017). It has been reported that in the summer of 2020 China successfully tested the DF-21D and the ASBM variant DF-26B against a moving target in the South China Sea (Kaziani 2020). Importantly, the DF-26 is capable of both nuclear and conventional capabilities; some analysis suggests that DF-26 units in the field have both warheads available to them (Pollack and LaFoy 2020). Exactly why China would do this is impossible to fully explain. One possible reason is to hide the number of nuclear missiles that China has, in a form of shell game. A second is protection: To reduce the risk of US attack, a dual capability puts doubt in the minds of opposition tactical planners about the nature of the target and the potential of uncontrolled escalation from conventional to nuclear war (Pollack and LaFoy 2020). This would make a conventionally armed DF-26 more survivable in any conventional war-fighting scenario as targeting it would be fraught with potential risk.

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