Tracking weapons is impossible. Countermeasures, weather, and coverage gaps.
TEL = transporter-erector launcher vehicles
Thomas D. MacDonald 21, a fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He has an interdisciplinary scientific background which he applies to interesting technical problems which are interwoven with political concerns. June 2021, “Hide and Seek: Remote Sensing and Strategic Stability,” Massachusetts Institute of Technology, accessed online via UMich libraries
Based on this analysis, I offer some assessments and recommendations surrounding the competition between TELs and remote-sensing. Tracking TELs requires the development of critical technologies. There are currently gaps where extant remotesensing systems are not capable of tracking TELs, namely at night and during periods of bad weather. If a state wishes to develop the capability to track TELs, they should focus their efforts on technologies which address those gaps. Similarly, when evaluating emerging remote-sensing technologies, the focus of analysis should be on the technology’s ability to close those gaps. Analysis of critical technologies should focus on countermeasures. When evaluating the potential effects of an emerging technology, analysis should focus not only on the effectiveness of that technology, but also the existence, effectiveness, and availability of the countermeasures. Broad endeavors such as tracking are only as strong as their weakest link. Critical technologies are a naturally attractive target for countermeasures as they present a single point of failure. SBR is not a promising means of tracking TELs. While SBR has the elements of a critical technology, and the ability to operate under conditions where other deployed modalities do not have tracking capability, SBR is vulnerable to simple countermeasures. While some countermeasures, such as RCSR with RAM, would require significant research and development effort, effective countermeasures such as decoys are technologically simple and should be deployable at scale for relatively low cost. Some countermeasures, such as jammers and ASAT weapons, are already in deployment as they serve other purposes, so SBR, if pursued, would be deployed into a hostile environment. Electronic warfare and ASAT weapons also present the risk of escalation through entanglement, so states should expect a decrease in their security if they choose to deploy an SBR system with capability to track (permissive) TELs. Modest SBR capability should not undermine strategic stability. One key finding of this work is that a seeker’s uncertainty in a TELs position grows during gaps in coverage of sufficient length. For the case of tracking TELs, if shelters are kilometers apart, regular gaps of length on the order of a few to ten minutes are sufficient to prevent tracking. Concern has been raised in the literature that the relatively modest collection of fewer than two dozen SBR satellites deployed by countries around the world would be sufficient to undermine the survivability of TELs [9]. Even if all deployed SBR satellites were utilized as a cohesive constellation (it is unclear if this is possible), there would be an average gap of more than twenty minutes between overflights [9].7 The U.S. collection of six SBR satellites would present more than 90 minute gaps between overflights. These gaps are sufficiently large that a motivated hider could easily exploit them. The deployment of modest numbers of SBR satellites (e.g. twenty to thirty) should not undermine TEL survivability nor provoke escalatory countermeasures on the grounds of TEL survivability. Fears that remote-sensing will inevitably undermine TEL survivability and damage strategic stability are overblown. Tracking with remote-sensing is potentially more challenging than is widely understood. In a game of hide-and-seek, the seeker does not contend with what that hider does, but what they could do. The hider does not need to be passive in the competition, as they can actively interfere with remote-sensing through countermeasures. The hider also has the advantage of being able to be reactive, they do not need to deploy countermeasures until after the seeker has committed to developing a particular remote-sensing system. That said, history has shown that countermeasures can sometimes be hard to leverage, and survivability can be undermined. Degradation of survivability is not inevitable, however. Which way the balance will tip depends on the specific technologies in question, and in the case of SBR, the advantage lays with the hider.