b. Mobile Jammers.
Thomas D. MacDonald 21, a fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He has an interdisciplinary scientific background which he applies to interesting technical problems which are interwoven with political concerns. June 2021, “Hide and Seek: Remote Sensing and Strategic Stability,” Massachusetts Institute of Technology, accessed online via UMich libraries
Mobile Jammers The other method for employing jammers to shield the movement of TELs is utilizing mobile jammers. Mobile jammers are already part of the electronic-warfare arsenal of Russia, includes the Krashuka-4 mobile jammer system. The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has assessed that Russian mobile jammers have the capability to deny SAR observations as well interfere with satellite communications [121]. While mobile jammers could be utilized to transiently set up a jammer array in an area, this would be inefficient compared to a static jammer array (though more flexible). For example, to create an area of uncertainty 10 shelters in extent would require 10–61 mobile jammers for a linear or gridded road system, respectively. A more efficient method for utilizing jammers would be in exploiting their mobility. A mobile jammer creates a moving blind spot for the seeker. By moving a TEL alongside the jammer, the hider can mask TEL movements. To cover a shelter-to-shelter movement, the jammer would need to approach the shelter containing a TEL, and move with it to another shelter where the TEL could encamp. The hider would be unable to determine if a TEL was present, or moved at all. So, if a mobile jammer passed through any TEL’s area of uncertainty while operating its jammer, that TEL’s possible positions would be spread over every shelter the jammer subsequently passed