No Chinese innovation – party constraints and economic realities of Chinese markets make it impossible.
Regina Abrami 14, Director of the Lauder Institute's Global Program and Head of its International Studies faculty at the University of Pennsylvania, “Why China Can’t Innovate”, https://hbr.org/2014/03/why-china-cant-innovate //lenox
Innovation from the Bottom Up There are limits, though, to what even so muscular and motivated a government as China’s can mandate when it comes to innovation. Against the government’s intentions and national resources run powerful currents that originate in China’s Communist system and ancient culture. Consider how those forces can constrain the entrepreneurial creativity bubbling up in China. In the early 1990s Edward Tian (Tian Suning), a U.S.-educated entrepreneur, founded the telecom start-up AsiaInfo (now AsiaInfo-Linkage), which within three years grew into a thriving company of 320 people with revenue of $45 million. In 1996, frustrated with the slow pace of technological change in China’s telecommunications industry, then–vice premier Zhu Rongji convinced Tian that it was his duty to leave AsiaInfo in order to lead a new company, China Netcom, as it set out to build a fiber-optic network linking some 300 cities. When one of us (McFarlan) visited the company, in 2001, it was an innovative firm with an open, creative culture, despite the fact that it was jointly owned by four government agencies. In 2002, when the telecommunications giant China Telecom was broken apart by the government, its 10 northern provincial markets were integrated into China Netcom. Overnight, Tian became responsible for an organization of 230,000. The culture clash between the two organizations was extraordinary. Tian was seen by many China Telecom employees as an American outsider trying to reform a state-owned enterprise in unacceptable ways. Six months after the merger, McFarlan presented our case study on China Netcom to 70 senior Chinese executives, including 20 from the telecom industry. Rather than draw lessons from the case about the relationship between organizational change and business success, the group attacked Tian for his “un-Chinese” ways of managing—and then charged McFarlan with incompetence for presenting Silicon Valley culture in China in such a positive light. Tian soon stepped down from his CEO role and later from the China Netcom board. To outsiders, China Netcom eventually looked like a modern telecom firm, with the governance structures needed to be listed on international stock exchanges. But it remained at heart a state-owned enterprise. When we teach our current case on China Netcom, we ask MBA students to scour the company’s board for the real boss. Where, we ask, is the party secretary? The Communist Party requires a representative to be present in every company with more than 50 employees. Every firm with more than 100 employees must have a party cell, whose leader reports directly to the party in the municipality or province. These requirements compromise the proprietary nature of a firm’s strategic direction, operations, and competitive advantage, thus constraining normal competitive behavior, not to mention the incentives that drive founders to grow their own businesses. But even if the government were to disband party cells and instead redouble its efforts to encourage breakthrough innovation, there remains an even stronger disincentive: the economic realities of the markets in which Chinese companies operate. Why go to the trouble to pioneer innovative offerings when the rewards and growth prospects for incremental improvements are so vast, both at home and abroad? Consider the B2B portal Alibaba, which in 2001 was so shaky that we feared it would go bankrupt. But by creatively adapting foreign technologies to the needs of developing markets, Alibaba now serves 80 million customers in nearly 250 countries. The success of its auction website, Taobao, eventually forced eBay out of China. Or take Baidu, the Chinese search engine leader, which has grown massively in its home market with an offering that breaks no technological ground and does not challenge political orthodoxy. Having tailored its product, organization, and processes to the needs of China’s patchwork of regional markets, Baidu now has an 80% share of what has become the world’s largest search market. Just as Japan caught up with the United States technologically in many industries during the three decades after World War II, China is now doing the same through incremental innovations. Adapting technology has become a standard and highly lucrative practice. Getting that technology through acquisitions, though, is an important new trend.