US-China war would draw in Russia – making the conflict even more severe
Gompert et al 16 [David C. Gompert, Astrid Stuth Cevallos, Cristinia L. Garafola, 2016, <<David is a an American government official and former diplomat>>, <<Astrid is a Project Associate at the RAND Corporation with a MPhil in IR @ University of Oxford and AB in East Asian Studies @ Princeton University>>, <<Cristinia is an associate policy researcher @ the RAND Corporation>>, “War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable,” RAND Corporation, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1140.html]\\pairie
Overall, the decline in U.S. warfighting advantages does not mean China can win a war that the United States is willing to fight. By 2025, a war could be a military standoff, with major weapon-platform losses on both sides, in addition to losses in cyberspace and space. Yet neither side would fare so much worse than the other that it would feel compelled to concede, raising the probability that a war would be both severe and long. Such a war could be decided by economic costs, domestic political effects, and international responses. Japan’s
[Table 3.7 Omitted]
entry could offset the decline of U.S. military superiority, especially in a prolonged conflict. All these factors, taken together, would strongly favor the United States.
Recall the earlier observation that war between China and the United States could be worse than the long, severe case, as described here. In the 20th century, two great-power wars became world wars, and a third could have followed the same course, or even worse. The possibility of a Sino-U.S. war drawing in other powers and many states cannot be excluded: In addition to Japan, perhaps India, Vietnam, and NATO would be on the U.S. side; Russia and North Korea would be on China’s side. Fighting could spread beyond the region. War aims could expand, and as they did, so would the costs of losing. Even if nuclear weapons were not used, China might find other ways to attack the United States proper. Use of space and cyberspace could be severely curtailed. As long as fighting remained inclusive, destruction and hardship could fuel determination and further mobilization. In sum, both the duration and severity of war could exceed the upper case used here for purposes of analysis. If so, losses and costs would be even greater for both sides and the world, and the outcome would be no more favorable for China, despite the expansion of its power.