Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Opening Word document…

Social science, leaders convincing the population, fog of war, and the precedent is broken – all proves the taboo is not durable

Rebecca Davis Gibbons and Keir Lieber ’19. Rebecca Davis Gibbons is an assistant professor at the University of Southern Maine and formerly a postdoctoral research fellow with the Belfer Center's Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program. Keir A. Lieber is the GOAT. “How durable is the nuclear weapons taboo?”, Journal of Strategic Studies, 42:1, 29-54, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2018.1529568 // gbs

There are good reasons for analysts to question the strength and prevalence of an international norm against nuclear use, but here we highlight several reasons why the durability of a moral-based nuclear taboo is dubious. First, the comparable case of strategic bombing does not support hypotheses about how and when norm-violation should strengthen morally-based taboos. Second, recent survey and social science research challenges the durability of a moral taboo. For example, surveys indicate that a majority of Americans, who are supposed to have internalized the nuclear taboo, would be willing to use nuclear weapons against terrorist adversaries or Iran. Furthermore, experiments in psychology tell us that leaders can encourage their population to make tragic trade-offs through their framing of choices. The strategic bombing case illustrates one such trade-off: General Eisenhower siding with strategic bombing proponents to facilitate a quicker end to World War II. Opposition to the use of nuclear weapons in the abstract does not guarantee opposition in times of crisis. Finally, precedent logics – not moral logics – appear to more commonly underlie taboos in warfare. Once the bargain against bombing civilians broke down, there was little moral compunction leading countries to stop pursuing this strategy. Furthermore, the survey literature referenced above suggests that respondents’ reluctance to have the United States employ nuclear weapons stems from a concern about precedence, not moral authority. If the nuclear taboo is based upon concern for precedent and not moral opprobrium, then resuscitating the taboo after an incident of nuclear use may be unrealistic. These findings point to a number of policy implications. Most importantly, policy-makers should be aware of the challenges to the norm against nuclear use after a future violation. Both the moral logic and precedent logic cause reason to be skeptical that the norm would remain durable. As a result, preventing nuclear use in the first place is paramount. The United States should continue to seek to strengthen the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, a major challenge at a time when NPT member states are so divided over nuclear disarmament.86 U.S. leaders should refrain from making casual nuclear threats against adversaries and should encourage other leaders to follow suit. Moreover, in its declaratory policy, the United States should restrict the intended use of its nuclear weapons to deterring nuclear attacks. If the United States or its assets were attacked with a nuclear weapon, leaders would have to strongly consider whether responding in kind would do more harm than good. Fortunately, U.S. conventional superiority means that the U.S. military would have many non-nuclear means to respond. Finally, because we find that the precedent logic to be more compelling in explaining non-use, the United States should consider ways in which it can affect whether future nuclear use is perceived as successful and how it can lead the international community in bringing about a strong sanctioning response against those responsible for such an attack. If nuclear use is perceived as unsuccessful or the attacker is meaningfully punished, the precedent is more likely to be re-established.

Sign in to recut, update, or save this card.