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No China-Russia alliance – identity and border disputes outweigh regional security concerns

Elizabeth Wishnick 22; PhD; Professor of Political Science at Montclair State University; “The Paradox of Sino-Russian Partnership: Global Normative Alignment and Regional Ontological Insecurity”. In: Yoder, B.K. (eds) The United States and Contemporary China-Russia Relations. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. 2022 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93982-3_7

Lack of Regional Integration: Explanations and Examples If Chinese exhortations about “win–win” cooperation on the regional level fall flat, it is because China and Russia lack a shared sense of regional identity, leading to incompatible security interests, at least where identity issues are concerned. This means that even projects that provide mutual benefit may raise challenges to Russia’s identity, undermining its commitment to regional integration (Russo and Stoddard 2018, 34). Jennifer Mitzen argues that states seek identity security, not just physical security. In fact, Mitzen argues that states may be willing to forego cooperation and tolerate interstate conflict if the price is greater stability in their identity (Mitzen 2016, 342). Security dilemmas may emerge when a group’s action, taken to secure its identity, cause a reaction in another group, thereby resulting in the insecurity of both (Olesker 2011, 382).

The Sino-Russian Border Regions While Chinese officials and experts may be frustrated by what they call “China threat” views—regarding their country’s purported intentions to take over neighboring lands and encourage migration there, China, too, has its own identity concerns with respect to its neighbors on the Steppe. Historians explain how China’s identity was formed in opposition to these neighbors who are portrayed as starkly different, despite commonalities (MacKay 2016, 472–473). In the neighboring countries, narratives of history and memories of border displacements create dissonance with Chinese interpretations and underlie suspicions of China’s current intentions.

For Russia, identity is rooted in a geopolitical space, a conceptualization that has led to misunderstandings with the EU and its conception of borderless Europe (Akchurina and Della Sala 2018, 1651) as well as with China. Place names became flashpoints in relations with China, as residents of the Russian Far East see territorial ambitions in the persistence in China of Qing era names for Russian cities (Wishnick 2014, 54).5 Border demarcation agreements, which involved some give and take of territory, were negotiated and announced with little transparency in all involved countries, fueling suspicions, heightened by widespread corruption in China and its neighbors.

The changes in China’s borders with Kazakhstan and Russia in the nineteenth century reflect China’s declining fortunes in the Qing dynasty.The codification of these borders in twentieth-century border demarcation agreements, as China began its resurgence, represent a necessary but bitter pill for Chinese leaders. As S.C.M. Paine points out, the SinoRussian border represents for China “the failure to fend off the predations of European civilization” (Paine 1996, 9). Russians, in particular, question whether Chinese leaders have ever abandoned the hope of retrieving territories lost in the Qing era. Deng Xiaoping told Gorbachev in their historic meeting in 1989 that they must “close the past and open the future,” but in a less quoted passage, he went on to discuss the unequal treaties that support the relationship he just agreed to normalize.

Deng Xiaoping: Now I would like to express my thoughts on two issues: first, to touch on the question of the losses, inflicted on China by a number of powers, and, second, to say from where China was threatened in the last thirty years.

Then [Deng Xiaoping] named, among countries who inflicted damage on China, first and foremost Great Britain and Portugal, because they first occupied the Chinese territory, created concessions, captured Aomen (Macao). He spoke at length about the losses inflicted by Japan, tsarist Russia, which obtained the largest gain from China, and about the Soviet Union. With this he had in mind that Russia, up until the October revolution, had a sphere of influence in Northeastern China, centered on Harbin. And in general, [Deng Xiaoping] stressed, Russia, through unequal treaties, received more than 1.5 million square kilometers of Chinese territory. And already after the October revolution, in 1929, the Soviet Union captured the islands on the Amur and Ussuri rivers near Khabarovsk]... (www.wil soncenter.org n.d.)

In this statement, Deng highlights the importance of Chinese territorial integrity, which succession of Chinese leaders have since identified as a “core” nationalist interest. At the same time, over the past several decades, Chinese officials also have sought to promote various cross-border integration schemes, most recently under the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In this situation, China promotes a vision of borders as bridges (Foot 2016, 5). Instead of insisting on borders as fixed barriers, protecting the national interest, the BRI, for example, promotes a more fluid vision of a transnational space involving civilizational, rather than interstate, connections. (Summers 2020, 812; Grant 2018, 400). It is the latter that worries Russia.

COVID-19 and Sino-Russian Relations COVID-19 has highlighted the anemic state of Sino-Russian cross-border exchanges. (chinasresourcerisks.com 2021) Although Russia and China share a 4000 km shared border, there were relatively few cases of COVID19 in the Russian border regions in the first few months of the pandemic, attesting to the overall weakness of Sino-Russian regional relations, rather than to the effectiveness of Russian public health measures. Indeed, the virus appears to have traveled more circuitously to Russia from China to Europe and then to European regions within Russia (Zuenko 2020). The Russian government closed the land border with China on January 30th, 2020, followed by border crossing points (February 1) and rail traffic (February 3). As of September 2021, the Sino-Russian border is still only open to cargo.

In bilateral talks, Putin and Xi Jinping have expressed mutual support and pledged to cooperate against the pandemic (Weitz 2020) but reactions across Russia’s regions were mixed. Some Russian regions bemoaned the loss of Chinese visitors (meduza.io 2020) while others quarantined them or monitored them using facial recognition technology, prompting protests of ethnic profiling (Light 2020; Sixth Tone 2020). A February 2020 poll by Ipsos-MORI found that 37% of Russians polled said they would avoid individuals with a Chinese appearance (Beaver 2020). Once the pandemic was under control in China later in the spring of 2020, this time it was the Chinese government that shut down border crossing points on its own side of the border. This move ended up stranding Chinese nationals seeking to return home and created new health risks for the Russian Far East, where infected visitors faced 28-day quarantines (Shah 2020).

Although most experts argue that the pandemic was most likely transmitted by a bat to a wild animal sold in China (McKay et al. 2021) in an effort to raise questions about the pandemic’s origin in China, Chinese officials have claimed that the virus can be transmitted by frozen food, including fish from Russia (as well as Maine lobsters!) (Hernández 2021/Woodcock 2021). Since approximately 60% of Russian fish, mostly from the Russian Far East (Russian primamedia.ru 2021) is exported to China, this has crippled Russian fish exports. China has refused to accept imported Russian fish since COVID-19 traces were found on frozen fish imported from Russia to Jilin, China. This has forced Russian fish exporters to seek out other markets in Southeast Asia and even in Africa, as officials try to negotiate an end to the Chinese ban (Solovieva 2021). China’s eagerness to uncover a foreign origin for the pandemic has created a new irritant in Sino-Russian regional relations, always the weakest link in their partnership.

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