No war from tech race – robust studies prove deterrence is credible – even when asymmetric
Kyungwon Suh 22; Syracuse University, PhD Student, BA in Political Science from Sungkyunkwan University and MA in Political Science from Yonsei University; “Nuclear balance and the initiation of nuclear crises: Does superiority matter?” Journal of Peace Research. May 2022. doi:10.1177/00223433211067899
Discussion and conclusion Does achieving nuclear superiority lead to a reduced risk of nuclear crisis? This article finds that there is no statistical evidence for this proposition: a favorable balance of nuclear forces fails to produce the predicted effect on the probability of the initiation of nuclear crises. These null results are not artifacts of using a particular measure of the nuclear balance and a specific model specification; even after using alternative model specifications and new indicators of nuclear superiority that capture important dimensions of nuclear capabilities that the total warhead count cannot capture, those results remain unaltered. Furthermore, more qualified hypotheses that posit the conditional effects of nuclear superiority also do not find empirical support. By directly testing a key prediction of the nuclear competition school in a new empirical context, this article attempts to shed new light on the theoretical debate over the political benefits of a superior nuclear arsenal. Although my article does not conclusively disconfirm the validity of the nuclear competition school as a whole, it encourages researchers to reconsider the benefit of maintaining a favorable nuclear balance of power, which has been argued by the nuclear competition school.
This article also engages with a broader discussion on quantitative studies on nuclear weapons by acknowledging the importance of improving empirical measures of important variables. While previous quantitative studies substantially advanced our knowledge on nuclear weapons, they are not free from criticisms. For instance, several authors note that statistical analysis on nuclear weapons must carefully code theoretically important variables and take into account important issues such as heterogeneity among cases and the small-N problem (Montgomery & Sagan, 2009; Gavin, 2014). Others also point out that several findings of quantitative research on nuclear weapons are not as reliable as originally believed, demonstrating the significant methodological challenges scholars on nuclear security are facing (Bell, 2016; Winter & Lenine, 2020). Improving our measures of key variables using various open-source data on nuclear weapons is one way of addressing those challenges. By employing multiple measures of the nuclear balance of power, this article attempts to minimize the effect of the imperfect nature of those measures on the validity of statistical inference.
With mixed evidence regarding the political impact of the nuclear balance, one of the potentially important questions that future study can explore is to find conditions under which the balance of nuclear forces meaningfully shapes the outcomes of the interaction between nuclear-armed states. Instead of simply asking whether the nuclear balance matters at all, we could enrich our knowledge about the dynamics of crises between nuclear-armed states by examining what factors could potentially influence the effect of military nuclear advantage on political outcomes.
Another area for future research is to develop a coherent theoretical explanation for how the nuclear balance of power affects different stages of nuclear crises. I have demonstrated that nuclear superiority does not significantly reduce the risk of nuclear crisis initiation. However, Kroenig (2013; 2018: 119) finds that nuclear superiority contributes to favorable settlement of nuclear crises, and that states possessing nuclear superiority have never been targets of MCTs by nuclear inferior opponents, while several MCTs have been issued against states having inferior nuclear capabilities. These empirical patterns raise the need for further research on theoretical mechanisms through which the nuclear balance influences state behavior at different stages of nuclear crises. When and how does the nuclear balance of power have an impact on states’ decisions to initiate a crisis, send escalatory threats, and make concessions against other nuclear-armed opponents? Answers to these questions would advance the literature on the merits of effective nuclear competition.
Does the United States need to maintain nuclear supremacy over its nuclear rivals, including Russia and China? Since 1945, US policymakers have continuously pursued meaningful military nuclear advantages over nuclear-armed competitors. Recently, the Trump administration made several decisions to pursue a more competitive nuclear policy. For instance, it announced the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, in which it strongly argued for modernizing and adding new forms of delivery systems to the United States’ already massive nuclear arsenals to cope with the nuclear force modernization of Russia and China (US Department of Defense, 2018). It also declared a withdrawal from the INF Treaty. The Biden administration extended the New START Treaty for another five years, but at the time of writing it is too early to know which nuclear modernization programs from the Trump administration will be continued under Biden. From the perspective of the nuclear competition school, the Trump administration’s approach to nuclear issues reflects the continuous emphasis on maintaining US nuclear primacy and strengthening the deterrent power of US nuclear arsenal. Indeed, a leading advocate of the school claims that ‘the goal of US nuclear strategy should be to reduce US vulnerability to nuclear war to the greatest extent possible, while simultaneously maximizing adversary vulnerability’ (Kroenig, 2018: 199).
This article shows that empirical support for this claim is not as strong as argued by the nuclear competition school: the history of nuclear crises demonstrates that there is no strong evidence indicating a link between a favorable nuclear balance of power and the likelihood of nuclear crisis. Accordingly, the United States may not necessarily need to devote valuable resources to a nuclear arms race with other nuclear-armed major powers in order to deter potential challenges from them. Although the deterrent power of the superior US nuclear forces is not as strong as it is often expected to be, potential adversaries would not be emboldened even if their nuclear arsenals became superior to the US nuclear forces – putting aside the question of whether it is a realistic scenario that potential nuclear-armed rivals would gain nuclear supremacy over the United States. The nuclear balance of power between the United States and a potential aggressor would not play a significant role in determining whether Washington would be able to dissuade the aggressor from challenging its security interests. Unless a potential adversary can launch a successful nuclear disarming strike, which is almost impossible in the foreseeable future given the survivability and sheer size of the US strategic arsenal, the United States can have strong confidence in its ability to deter nuclear armed adversaries regardless of the nuclear balance of power. In the equation of deterrence between nuclear states, the balance of nuclear forces may play a far smaller role than many believe.