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China war is inevitable – it’s only a question of when

Brandon Yoder 19; Ph.D., Department of Politics, University of Virginia, Research Fellow at the National University of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Centre on Asia and Globalisation, January 28th, 2019, “Uncertainty, Shifting Power and Credible Signals in US-China Relations: Why the “Thucydides Trap” Is Real, but Limited”, Journal of Chinese Political Science, Volume 24, Issue 1, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11366-019-09606-1

This logic has not been well-recognized by either US foreign policymakers or scholars of US-China relations, however. On economic issues, the US adopted a strategy of unconditional cooperation for the first two decades of China’s rise. This strategy was not necessarily misguided. However, absent any degree of hedging by the US, China’s cooperation with the US-led economic order should have been seen as largely non-credible. A rising China had strong incentives to misrepresent any hypothetically-revisionist intentions it might have held, as long as doing so would elicit continued US accommodation that facilitated China’s rapid power gains. Yet many China experts took China’s cooperative behavior during this period at face value, ignoring its incentives to misrepresent and drawing overly optimistic conclusions that China truly shared American preferences for the international order [29, 32, 56, 61]. Even more troublingly, the Trump administration has recently expressed confident beliefs that China’s intentions are hostile, and consequently begun to implement policies of escalating economic containment toward China. Yet this conclusion is also unwarranted: China’s revisionist behavior has been generally limited to its territorial disputes in the South China Sea, whereas its economic and institutional actions are either ambiguous or supportive of the US-led liberal order [31]. Ironically, the Trump administration’s emerging strategy of economic containment, which has been adopted due to ill-formed pessimistic beliefs about China’s intentions, lends considerable (though incomplete) credibility to China’s cooperative signals on economic and institutional dimensions. To the extent that China continues to defend and advocate a rules-based liberal economic order in the face of Trump’s economic containment, this is a much more credible signal of China’s benign intentions than its previous cooperation under unconditional US accommodation. Thus, current US foreign policy turns the logic of hedging on its head: rather than hedging due to uncertainty and updating their beliefs in response to China’s subsequent behavior, policymakers have assumed China’s hostility and are initiating what appears to be a strategy of unconditional containment. Power Shifts, Uncertainty, and US-China Relations The Thucydides trap is not a new concept – it is fundamentally equivalent to what Jack Levy referred to more than three decades ago as the preventive motivation for war [9, 42]. When a declining state knows that its preferences conflict with those of a rising state, war can occur due to the well-known “commitment problem,” which refers to a rising state’s inability to commit to not use its future power gains to exploit the declining state [13, 54]. Under complete information, there is always a range of peaceful bargains that both the riser and decliner would prefer to war, if the bargain could be guaranteed to endure into the future. However, as the rising state gains power its bargaining leverage would increase, giving it an ex post incentive to revise the settlement in its own favor at the decliner’s expense. Thus, when the power shift is sufficiently large, the declining state prefers a winner-take-all war in the present to the eventual settlement the riser will impose in the future if the decliner were to acquiesce to the power shift. Note, however, that the commitment problem obtains only when the rising and declining states have sufficiently divergent preferences over the shape of the international order. If the rising and declining states have highly compatible preferences, the decliner sacrifices little by allowing the riser to gain power. This “benign” riser (from the decliner’s perspective) would simply use its power to maintain the same order that the decliner prefers. Conversely, however, if the riser’s preferences are highly incompatible with the decliner’s, then it will use its power gains to radically revise the international order in ways that are at odds with the decliner’s preferences. It is with this sort of “hostile” rising state that commitment problems obtain under complete information, yielding strong incentives for the decliner to initiate preventive war. Commitment problems do not obtain when the rising state is known to be benign ([36]:119; [67]). This raises the question of what the decliner should do when it is uncertain about the compatibility of the rising state’s preferences with its own. As discussed below, this is the situation that characterizes contemporary US-China relations. It is this sort of uncertainty that lies at the heart of the security dilemma, the phenomenon by which conflict can occur even between states with mutually-compatible preferences due to misplaced (but rational) distrust of the other’s intentions. Under the combination of shifting power and uncertainty, commitment problems potentially obtain if the rising state turns out to be hostile. In this case, the decliner may not be willing to risk accommodating the rising state if the consequences of exploitation by a hostile riser outweigh the benefits of cooperation with a benign one. Instead, the decliner would initiate preventive conflict. Yet because there is some probability that the rising state is actually benign, this opens up the possibility of “tragic” conflict between truly compatible states. If uncertainty about the riser’s intentions cannot be overcome, or at least mitigated, a sufficiently large power shift would produce war even between rational states whose interests do not conflict at all. A prominent subset of realist scholars has compellingly argued that this is often the case: large power shifts engender formidable barriers to the credibility of rising states’ cooperative signals, such that uncertainty about others’ intentions is intractable and declining states must make worst-case assumptions about rising states’ intentions [9, 12, 45, 53]. This is because hostile rising states have strong incentives to misrepresent their intentions while relatively weak, by mimicking the cooperative behaviors of benign risers and refraining from attempting to revise the international order. These realists argue that for hostile risers the costs of foregoing immediate revision are outweighed by the prospects of avoiding opposition from the decliner and attempting revision under a more favorable distribution of power in the future. As such, if cooperative signals are likely to be sent by both benign and hostile risers alike, such signals are non-credible, and declining states should remain highly uncertain about any rising state’s future intentions. This exacerbates the security dilemma, and gives declining states strong incentives to take preventive action even against risers that have exhibited cooperative behavior. This barrier to credible signaling during power shifts has also been applied to contemporary US-China relations. For many realists, it is entirely possible that “China is just practicing common sense and behaving itself until it is a more powerful and consolidated entity” ([33]:203), and “pursuing a peaceful policy today in order to strengthen itself to confront the United States tomorrow” ([40]:14). As such, a common conclusion has been that “we cannot tell much about China’s future behavior, because it [currently] has such limited capacity to act aggressively” ([46]:385).

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