War inevitable – Modernization
Cunningham ’21 [Fiona S; 06-17-2021; Scholar in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Ph.D. at the Political Science Department at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, fellowships at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Stanford University, Harvard University and Renmin University of China, assistant professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, former assistant professor of political science and international affairs at the George Washington University; “Cooperation under Asymmetry? The Future of US-China Nuclear Relations” in The Washington Quarterly, Volume 44, 2021 – Issue 2, p. 159-180, DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2021.1934253] Accessed – 7/11/2022, WWIS
China and the United States are both in the midst of modernizing their nuclear arsenals and adding capabilities that concern the other. In the early 2010s, the United States embarked on a US$1.2 trillion nuclear modernization program over the next three decades. More recently, the United States has enhanced its non-strategic nuclear weapons, primarily to deter a perceived Russian willingness to use nuclear weapons first in a limited manner. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review called for low-yield, submarine-launched “supplemental capabilities” to enhance US options for limited nuclear strikes.17 The United States has also enhanced its missile defense capabilities, primarily to counter North Korean nuclear missiles. It plans to increase the number of its ground-based mid-course interceptors for homeland missile defense from 44 to 64, indicated that it would study options for space-based missile defense, and tested its SM-3 Block IIA interceptors on an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) for the first time.18 The US modernization plan, supplemental capabilities, and growing homeland missile defenses are frequently cited by Chinese experts as evidence of a destabilizing US pursuit of nuclear superiority.19
Five aspects of China’s nuclear modernization, coupled with a perception of more assertive Chinese behavior, generate concern in the United States. First, China has deployed two new ICBMs, the DF-41, China’s first road-mobile missile armed with a multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV), and the DF-31AG, a delivery system with improved mobility that is believed to carry a single warhead. Second, China has fielded a new, more accurate and mobile intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), the dual-use DF-26. The US government also worries that China is exploring the option of fielding low-yield nuclear warheads in the future.20 Third, China is moving toward a full nuclear triad for the first time, although its air and sea legs are much less survivable than its land-based missile force.21 Fourth, the Pentagon estimates that China’s current stockpile of 200–300 nuclear warheads will at least double as these new delivery systems are fielded. Fifth, China is acquiring capabilities that could enable it to shift to a launch-on-warning alert status in the future. It has received Russian assistance with its early warning system and is building out a space-based early warning architecture.22 US reports and officials indicate that China might already keep some portion of its nuclear force on day-to-day alert.23
Five aspects of China’s nuclear modernization generate concern in the US
These capabilities developments are fueling concerns that China is moving away from its nuclear no-first-use policy and retaliatory posture because they give Beijing better options to threaten nuclear first use. But many aspects of China’s arsenal modernization pre-date Beijing’s more ambitious foreign policy in recent years and reflect concerns about the adequacy of China’s retaliatory force five to ten years ago.24 Other developments, such as its intermediate-range DF-26 missile and nuclear-capable bombers have a range of applications, which include conventional and nuclear retaliatory strikes,25 as well as limited nuclear first use. Organizational efficiencies and inter-service competition also play a role in China’s pursuit of these new systems.26