Counterforce can thwart nuclear superiority, empirics prove – the US dismantled Soviet command and control systems.
Lieber and Press, 20 (Keir A. Liber and Daryl G. Press, 2020, Associate Professor of Political Science, Faculty Fellow at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, and Faculty Fellow at the Nanovic Institute for European Studies at the University of Notre Dame, associate professor of government at Dartmouth, “The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution,” https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Myth_of_the_Nuclear_Revolution/2gK0DwAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=0//mahimahi)
One might think that only weak countries need to worry about an adversary “escaping stalemate”; surely, powerful countries have the resources to thwart any adversary’s efforts to attain nuclear superiority. But history is not reassuring. In the Cold War, once the Soviet Union had built robust nuclear retaliatory forces, many observers assumed that stalemate could not be undermined and that U.S. leaders would recognize and respect the “objective” reality that mutual assured destruction was a permanent fact. Instead, American officials constantly sought counterforce weapons and technologies to gain a disarming first-strike or significant damage-limitation capability—such as more accurate missiles, missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV), sensors for hunting mobile missiles at sea and on land, and a variety of weapons and innovations designed to undermine Soviet command and control and early warning systems. By the end of the Cold War, Soviet leaders had little faith in their own retaliatory capabilities.