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Must act now – new tech developments will undermine second strike

Andrew Futter and Benjamin Zala 21 – Professor of International Politics at the University of Leicester, Honorary Fellow at the Institute for Conflict, Cooperation, and Security at the University of Birmingham, member of the Cyber-Nuclear Threats Task Force run by the US-based Nuclear Threat Initiative; Research Fellow in the Department of International Relations at the Australian National University, tanton Junior Faculty Nuclear Security Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs in the Kennedy School at Harvard University; “Strategic non-nuclear weapons and the onset of a Third Nuclear Age;” February 2021, European Journal of International Security, 6(3), 257-277. doi:10.1017/eis.2021.2

The combined effects of SNNW and the implications for the Third Nuclear Age The move towards a Third Nuclear Age has four significant technological developments, each facilitated by the latest information technology revolution and by enormous shifts in computing, processing, and sensing power. Taken together, these dynamics are continuing to push the policy focus away from nuclear punishment towards non-nuclear denial, blurring the distinction between offence and defence, and creating a more fluid, complex, and potentially dangerous nuclear order.

The first key component of the Third Nuclear Age is the growing perception that strategic forces and population centres could be protected against nuclear attacks with missile defences. While the pursuit of missile defences can be traced back to the 1940s, it has only really been in the last twenty years that the technology has matured to a point whereby interception by conventional hit-to-kill technologies might credibly be deployed against certain types of threats, and that the political debate that surrounds the use of anti-missile defences has become normalised.36 The US, Russia, China and India have all deployed or are in the process of deploying ballistic missile defences.37

The second set of dynamics is the maturation and spread of non-nuclear weapons that might be used to threaten an adversary’s nuclear and associated systems. Historically this was a mission that could only be carried out – or at least was most efficiently carried out – through the use of nuclear weapons. But major advances in precision, tracking, sensing, and processing power has meant that these tasks can now potentially be undertaken with non-nuclear weaponry. In the short term, this raises the possibility of a state conducting, threatening (or at least being misperceived as threatening), a non-nuclear disarming first strike against another, especially against states with smaller and less sophisticated nuclear arsenals (for example, North Korea). It also creates greater chances for states to misperceive that such an attack is imminent. In the medium to long term, it could include all nuclear-armed states. These systems include: various conventional precision/prompt strike weapons, including cruise and boost-glide hypersonic weapons,38 some of which might be capable of targeting mobile missiles;39 new methods of tracking and attacking nuclear-armed submarines,40 long seen as one of the least vulnerable nuclear delivery systems due to their ability to hide in the ocean and remain undetected41 (whereas silo-based missiles and aircraft can normally be located); and counter-space and kinetic and non-kinetic anti-satellite (ASAT) technologies42 (while ASAT are not direct counterforce weapon they pose an indirect threat to nuclear relations, particularly given the reliance of leading nuclear powers on space for early warning, communications, and intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance).43

The third technological driver of the Third Nuclear Age is the emergence of unconventional capabilities that provide new means of defending against or attacking an adversary’s nuclear systems. These include various types of computer network operations (CNOs), or what are often loosely refer to as ‘cyber-attacks’. The challenges posed by CNOs are diverse, and include compromising sensitive nuclear secrets, exaggerating the risks associated with disruption of the nuclear-supply chain, the possibility of interfering with early warning and communications, and the danger that hackers might break into nuclear command and control systems directly.44 But while much of the more popular concern about cyber-attacks and nuclear weapons focus on those that would seek to enable nuclear systems – that is, cause a launch/ explosion – of primary interest to us here are those which seek to disable them – that is, prevent nuclear weapons from being used or reduce confidence that these systems will work as intended when required. These attacks might be carried out directly against nuclear systems – through hacking into command-and-control apparatus and preventing launch orders – or indirectly by interfering with or spoofing early warning systems so that they either see nothing or are bombarded with false attack information. While nuclear weapons systems have always been vulnerable to attackers, as well as open to computer-induced mistakes, these challenges are expanding in the current digital age. In fact, the US has begun planning for the use of cyber-attack capabilities against enemy missile and nuclear systems as part of a full spectrum missile defence or ‘left of launch’ programme.45 Given the intangible nature of these capabilities, they are a grave concern for all nuclear-armed states. In particular, the belief that some systems may not work when needed severely undermines the notion of a secure, second-strike capability.

The fourth element is a new real-time digitised environment in which global nuclear politics will play out, characterised by improvements in the ability to target, track, and monitor an adversary’s nuclear capabilities, increasingly driven by artificial intelligence (AI). Essentially, the latest information technology revolution is changing both the methods and the context within which nuclear operations are managed, and a greater reliance on sophisticated technologies is creating more challenges and risks that must be understood and addressed. The major change here is in the technology available to support non-nuclear operations against nuclear weapons.46 Perhaps most notably the potential to incorporate AI into both weapons platforms and remote sensing for reconnaissance and tracking of enemy nuclear forces or in managing more autonomous weapons systems.47 While AI remains in its infancy, it could be used to help track, locate, and target enemy forces in a way not possible before, and to facilitate greater autonomy in nuclear/SNNW systems and provide better situational awareness.48 More broadly, an ever more pervasive and complex digital context-or ecosystem49-within which nuclear operations are carried out also increases the chances of accidents, miscalculation, and possible inadvertent escalation in the Third Nuclear Age.50 This in turn means that current moves towards nuclear modernisation and greater incorporation of AI are likely to create more problems in the years ahead,51 albeit that the challenge will be different for different actors and systems.

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