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The Aff’s speech act around the securitization of NATO and the West is empirically used to justify militarization and endless violence—NATO relies on narrative and threat construction to justify its existence.

Benjamin Herborth and Gunther Hellman 17, Professors at the University of Groningen and Goethe-Universitat Frankfurt am Main, 1-2017, "(PDF) Uses of the West: Security and the Politics of Order", ResearchGate, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/314217000_Uses_of_the_West_Security_and_the_Politics_of_Order //AW

Debates over the future of NATO easily transform into debates about whether ‘Western civilization’ and ‘the West’ as a whole might be in decline or whether they are the winner of the Cold War’s ideological battles (cf. Huntington, 1993; Fukuyama, 1989). Compared to NATO, however, a Western security community seems to be quite prosperous despite continuing conflicts between NATO members (Cox, 2005; Pouliot, 2006). In this chapter I have tried to show that a transatlantic alliance was (re-)constituted via the mobilization and re-articulation of foundational narratives by the allies in order to justify the existence, continuity, and transformation of NATO. Foundational narratives, then, direct our attention exactly to the politics of security and identity where political subjects are formed in the first place and help to understand how security communities are constituted instead of postulating that they are already existing (Adler and Barnett 1998, p. 3; contrary: Deutsch et al., 1969). In conclusion, I want to highlight how NATO’s re-constitution relates to the overall theme of this volume, ‘the West’. It is not surprising that NATO allies often referred to ‘democracy’, ‘individual liberty’, or ‘the rule of law’ in order to justify NATO as a geo-political community of solidarity with defensive and peaceful intentions. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the Soviet Union was repeatedly accused of modernizing its military capacities, harboring expansionist intentions, and being an aggressive opponent in an ideological struggle between ‘freedom’ and ‘communism’. This rather plain self/other construction, however, was quickly modified in the early 1990s by declaring an ‘end of the Cold War’, invoking the CEE as a distinct political subject, and by focusing on new risks and challenges different from the past focus on territorial defense. Moreover, NATO had ‘gone global’ in order to ‘bring stability to other parts of the world’ (Daalder and Goldgeier, 2006, p. 105; Brzezinski, 2009). While this global NATO is depicted as a result of changing security politics, in particular as a consequence of globalized terrorist threat, it is short-sighted to argue that these transformations are merely a reaction to external pressures. Grand narratives about a ‘Cold War’ and a ‘War on Terrorism’ are as much produced by a transatlantic security discourse intended to make sense of the world as they serve to justify political decisions. It is a moot question whether the global projection of power by ‘the West’ caused violent opposition around the globe or whether ‘new wars’ and terror networks caused a transformation of NATO. It is puzzling, though, that NATO has managed to secure its survival and to transform. I have argued that the creation and repetition of foundational narratives – in particular the invention of a geopolitical community of solidarity and a political community according to Article 4 of the Washington Treaty – made sucha two-sided re-constitution of continuity and transformation possible. This also implies that NATO will persist and at once change as long as the allies carry on re-articulating this foundational narrative. Such a foundational narrative serves its integrating function only against the background of ‘the West’ as a shared yet unspecified signifier, which is implicitly represented as a threatened referent object of security. ‘Europe’, the ‘transatlantic area’, respectively ‘the West’ are the endangered subjects of NATO’s strategic discourse justifying a durable and institutionally dense military cooperation of its member states and a nuclearizaiton of its defense strategy. Whenever allies pursued ( national) security policies without consultation, conflicts and crisis within the alliance were foreseeable. It was only through NATO that ‘the West’ could utilize its power position through a specific form of self-authorization. NATO< respectively Western states, presented ‘democracy’, ‘human rights’, the ‘rule of law’, and ‘market economy’ as normatively unquestioned principles they had already realized. Others had only one choice: to comply or to resist. The normative attractiveness of ‘the West’, thus, also implies the temptations of self-authorizing and securitizing practices where a culture of legal formalism is marginalized (Wæver, 1995; Koskenniemi, 2001). Yet ‘Others’ might only be known as defectors to a Western project of modernization and democracy.

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