National security threats suggested by the state are amplified and presented as facts by the media --- Iraq war proves that the media fails to check the government or present anti-war viewpoints because of their desire for profit
Robert Bejesky 15, has an M.A. in Political Science as well as Applied Economics from the University of Michigan, an LL.M. in International Law from Georgetown Law, and has taught American government and constitutional law courses for Alma College, business law courses at Central Michigan University and the University of Miami, courses for Western Michigan University Thomas M. Cooley Law School, and classes for the Department of Political Science at the University of Michigan, 2015, “HOW SECURITY THREAT DISCOURSE CAN PRECIPITATE A PRESS CLAUSE DEATH SPIRAL”, Drake Law Review, Vol. 63, No. 1, p. 1-108 /lg
From the media entity decision equation, U(v) = X (r, + nal) - [(1 - (c + f,)], ri is a composite for viewer emotion and is comprised of patriotism, security threat perceptions, and humanitarian justice; nal is perceived utility in attacking a security threat first; c, is the media's perceived current period loss for inaccurate reporting or for not providing diversity; f, is the possible future loss for biased and inaccurate reporting; and X is the likelihood that the Executive's security threat advocacy is real.365 The equation probes potential discord between constitutional aspirations for the news media as a purveyor of political discourse and corporate media profitability obligations to shareholders and suggests that a media entity could view departing from the industry status quo and investigating and challenging the government's security threat allegations as a move that risks losing viewership-which it must avoid at all costs.3 66
Prior to the 2003 Iraq War, top Bush Administration officials proffered hundreds of unequivocal threat claims in the media, and the media broadcasted allegations as fact while ignoring antiwar positions and dissent.3 67 Media positions of advocacy and repetition of official and quasiofficial sources' arguments converged and drowned out alternative views to generate an extremely pervasive prowar bias in the news media.368 Rhetoric and polls intimated that nal and ri were positively related and high and that the perceived cl was low due to median viewer perceptions. 369 Media entities may have individually assumed that they would earn a higher utility payoff by declining to challenge threat allegations or provide more diverse viewpoints.
After the invasion of Iraq, it became clear that there were no chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons and no connections between al-Qaeda and Hussein's regime-and that the Bush Administration's intelligence estimates about Iraq were thoroughly wrong, unreasonably relied upon, and based on details and sources hidden by White House classification prerogatives. 37° Many news entities and journalists acknowledged the American media's poor performance, particularly for uncritically accepting the Executive's security threat proclamations and the unverified accounts of Iraqi defectors.3 71 The nearly diurnal government message was unequivocal and false (X was 0). If the news media had been held accountable, the cost side of the equation, [(1 - X)(cl + fn)], could have imposed enormous consequences for conforming to the Bush Administration's expectations and uncritically reporting on its unsubstantiated security threat allegations-but that was not the case.
The news media refused to impose any reverberating cost on the Bush Administration and largely accepted the shift from justifying the invasion of Iraq on the basis of security threats to Americans (Hl) to justifications based on liberating Iraqis (u) and blind patriotism (a). 372 Further, the news media was complicit in generating ambiguities through participation in the embedded reporter program, where reporters endeavored to be the first to announce that prohibited weapons had been discovered but rarely followed up to dispel false positives 373 and through reliance on military analysts kept on a short leash by the Bush Administration, who provided patriotic, prowar commentary disguised as impartial sourcing.374 After the invasion, the effect on the composite emotion variable (ri) was that 11 dropped because there was no verified security threat, while patriotism (a) and humanitarian justice (u) were elevated with the ex post facto liberation rationale.
Perhaps confirming the logic behind the model interaction, the American media coalesced again at uncritical reporting during the invasion and occupation;375 for this, the future cost (fn)-after the security threat perception (X) was finally disproved-was citizens' profound irritation aimed at the entire news media industry. Media entities experienced the repercussion of a share in a temporary loss of trust in the entire industry. 376 Consider this: a poll conducted during the post-Watergate 1970s-a time of near-peak cynicism-indicated that about 25 percent of the American public trusted the media.377 In 2005, after the media's failure to investigate and defuse the Bush Administration's false security threat allegations, only 12 percent of Americans had confidence in their news media.378
Citizens would assuredly not favor false information saturation over truthful and trustworthy information,3 79 but given the possibility that news media entities' reporting could span a spectrum that included the extremes of being lapdogs for the Executive or watchdogs as the Framers intended,3 0 could President Bush have been able to anticipate the news media's obeisant performance when choosing to initiate an agenda-setting blitz in September 2002, or even prior to his State of the Union Address in January 2002?81 This analysis suggests it is highly probable. A media system with dominant corporate conglomerates that amplify the same general "facts" in a comparable manner across national, regional, and local media sources is apt to beget uniformity in perspective and may utterly fail to check the government. Profitability interests may accordingly restrict dissent and curtail, chill, or silence speech that should be promoted in the public interest. This failure may be even more likely in a national security threat scenario due to concerns about appearing sufficiently patriotic and informational asymmetries that result when the evidentiary bases of security threat allegations are classified. It is not clear that there are currently any viable catalysts that would goad the media to perform differently in a security threat scenario; if, in a similar situation in the future, a scofflaw regime without firm factual justifications to substantiate its policy agenda chooses overly aggressive security threat agenda setting, the outcome-American use of military force in costly, debilitating, and illegal ways-might be predictable or even inevitable.