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The K turns the Aff – alarmist narratives in the 1ac is the CAUSE of the US-China confrontation – by securitizing AI, the Aff produces the real threat.

Jinghan Zeng, 8-1-2021, "Securitization of Artificial Intelligence in China," OUP Academic, https://academic.oup.com/cjip/article/14/3/417/6352222#303568932//jc

First, a highly securitized AI sector will affect the flow of foreign AI labor and capital to China’s AI industry. To make it attractive to global talent and capital, a booming AI industry requires an outward-looking, open-minded, and international socio-politico-economic environment. However, the securitization trend is pushing in the opposite direction by producing a rising nationalistic, inward-looking, security AI discourse. This is counterproductive to China’s AI ambitions, because it puts China at a disadvantage in the global market. More specifically, there is a global shortage of AI talent and, as previously mentioned, China is short of 5 million or more qualified AI industry workers. This has led to fierce global competition in the AI industry for qualified workers, to the extent where Chinese tech companies offer extremely—or unreasonably—high salaries.126 Such financial attraction, however, could be offset by an unfavorably nationalistic domestic environment. Second, the securitization trend could hinder economic efficiency. As previously discussed, it contributes to the rise of a self-reliance discourse on technology whose creation is often at the cost of economic efficiency. Precisely because China is lagging behind in AI development, it needs to make use of the global AI supply chain to catch up. However, the self-reliance discourse considers the risk of relying on foreign technology too high, and thus focuses on “Made in China.” Such self-reliance is difficult (if not impossible) to realize in the short run, and hinders China’s ability to benefit from the global AI market and thus maximize industrial efficiency. Similarly, the securitization of AI in the United States also undermines the appeal that America holds for Chinese national AI talent, capital, and technology. Growing tension between China and the United States has, moreover, undermined Chinese companies’ willingness to invest in the United States. In the long run, therefore, securitization is detrimental to the competitiveness of the American AI industry. Third, in connection with the above paragraph, the domestic inward-looking nationalistic trend that securitization has created hinders China’s realization of global leadership. To lead AI in the global arena, China must provide public goods and win support from others through successful partnerships. It must play a key role in promoting global governance and, as a global leader, act according to common interests rather than solely national interests. However, a security-focused, inward-looking, nationalistic AI discourse is helpful to neither global governance nor common interests. For example, it can foster the rise of inward-looking national AI policies that prioritize national interests over those of the globalized world. This is in direct contrast to global governance goals, i.e., to build a shared future through global solidarity. Indeed, many of the problems that AI has created, such as those relating to ethics, represent collective challenges to humankind that require a globally concerted response. Inward-looking national AI policies may contribute to a fragmented global governance structure, and thus obstruct concerted global actions to address AI problems. Fourth, the securitization trend has reinforced technological rivalry at the expense of the potential for global AI cooperation, and will likely exacerbate the United States–China confrontation. This is not to deny the existence of United States–China cooperation in the field of AI. However, by speaking of AI in the language of security and a global race, the relevant security AI discourse emphasizes competition over cooperation and destruction over creation. This may produce a real security threat, and perhaps an actual global AI race, thus undermining the space for cooperation from which both the United States and China can benefit. In other words, the rivalry discourse adopts a zero-sum geopolitical angle for understanding AI innovation that is inevitably to the latter’s detriment in both countries.127 More importantly, securitization may push AI further into the hard security area by virtue of its military applications. The securitizing actor tends to exaggerate the security threat to achieve a successful securitization, so enhancing the strategic risks of AI military practices and increasing the likelihood of war, and of escalating ongoing conflicts. In this regard, a highly securitized AI politics may set China and the United States on a dangerous path towards a catastrophic confrontation that imperils everyone’s interests and security. In the worst case scenario, as in all arms races, blithe assertions about the inevitability of AI-enabled war are a self-fulfilling and self-defeating prophecy. In this regard, the aforementioned Fu Ying’s call to regulate AI’s military application merits more attention. Lastly, by strengthening state involvement in China’s AI industry, securitization may undermine the interests of Chinese AI companies. The boundary between the state and the market is always far less defined in China than in other countries, due to China’s political environment. Making AI a national security matter justifies the necessity for heavier state involvement, if not control. Although a blessing in the Chinese domestic market, close ties with the state are a burden on the global stage. Take the aforementioned civil-military integration as an example. Although helpful in gaining China’s AI companies and research institutes more state funding, it undermines their global access. Close relations with the Chinese government have caused certain Chinese AI companies, including members of the “national AI team of China,” to be subjected to punishment, in the form of the aforementioned American sanctions. In this regard, securitization could hinder the access of China’s AI companies to the global market, and hence their future development. It also remains to be seen whether heavier state involvement in the AI industry hinders market efficiency.

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