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Biological weapons framed as a security issue- countries produce biological weapons to inherently protect themselves

Saunders-Hastings, 14 --- (Patrick Saunders-Hastings- s an epidemiologist risk scientist working with Accenture. With expertise in pandemic preparedness and response, " Securitization Theory and Biological Weapons", Jan 8 2014, E-International Relations, https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/45317)//mishelle

Securitization theory is a constructivist approach informing how certain issues become framed through a security lens6 . It offers a useful analytical framework for understanding how, why, and what issues come to be viewed as security threats. Securitization is an active process wherein a securitizing actor, in this case the American government, presents and addresses an issue as an existential threat to a particular group, or referent object7 . In these situations, emergency response measures and extensive resource commitments are considered justified7 . Securitization theory generally promotes desecuritization as preferable because it avoids the negative consequences of securitization, including a heavy-handed state response, reduced democratic accountability, and the narrowing of public choice8 . However, it also recognizes that securitization is sometimes appropriate. Recent considerations of securitization theory identify three criteria that, if fulfilled, justify securitization: an objective, existential threat, a referent object whose protection promotes human well-being, and a response appropriately measured to the particular threat6 . In the case of bioweapons securitization, the second criterion is less controversial, given that the referent object is human population; thus, any harm to the referent object would directly reduce a human well-being. However, the question of whether securitization of biological weapons meets the other two criteria is more contentious. Skeptics may point to Colin Powell’s 2003 address to the United Nations as a case where the biological weapons security threat may have been exaggerated and securitization was promoted for political ends, thereby calling into question the legitimacy of the securitizing actor, the U.S. government. In his speech, Powell made the case for an invasion of Iraq by claiming Iraq had capabilities to produce biological weapons of mass destruction, including mobile bioweapons labs, a claim that later turned out to be false9. Critics also target the policies resulting from securitization, arguing that the capacity of aggressors to carry out large scale attacks causing mortality has been overestimated, calling into question whether an existential threat truly exists and whether the response has been appropriately measured10. Government funding may be seen as unjustifiably skewed in favour of biodefense, defined as the capacity to respond to a biological weapons attack, to the neglect of other key areas, such as endemic and pandemic diseases. For instance, Klotz calculated what is referred as the “likelihood-adjusted mortality” for biological weapons, pandemic diseases, and endemic diseases by multiplying the probability of occurrence by an estimate of mortality were an event to occur11. By comparing these values with government funding allocated to each category, he demonstrated that biodefense receives more funding than its likelihood-adjusted mortality estimate would suggest is warranted11 . However, objections have been raised to this argument. Supporters of biodefense prioritization point to the fact that focusing solely on potential fatalities ignores other issues, such as the negative social and economic fallout from an attack12. Additionally, they point to the possibility that it is more expensive to combat intentional threats, where there will be an explicit effort to circumvent current practices by exploiting weaknesses12. It should also be considered that the probability of one attack is not independent from another, and that an increasing probability of success may elicit more attempts12. To follow will be an examination of whether government spending and policies constitute a justified response to the threat of biological weapons. Securitization is relevant in that it was a way for decision-makers to implement the policies they want and is justifiable to the extent that the programs themselves are necessary and appropriate. Despite other consequences of securitization, such as public fear, political manipulation, and a heavyhanded response, which may give the impression of an overreaction, the reality is that securitization was a means of enabling the implementation of certain policies and programs necessary to respond to the threat of biological weapons.

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