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Rhetoric of Chinese as subversive authoritarians locks in violent policymaking and Sinophobia—security concerns conflate business motives with existential threats.

Igor Rogelja ‘20, Max Weber Fellow at the European University Institute and a Teaching Fellow at the Lau China Institute, King’s College Londo, 2-17-2020, "Narrating the China Threat: Securitising Chinese Economic Presence in Europe", OUP Academic, Vol 13, Issue 1, https://academic.oup.com/cjip/article/13/1/103/5739302?login=true //AW

The third discursive pillar in the construction of Chinese FDI as a threat concentrates on the authoritarian polity of the PRC. Of course, the CCP’s authoritarian rule, its poor human rights and civil liberties record, and the subordination of the judiciary and legislative branches to the executive are the defining characteristics of the PRC’s political system that render it the precise opposite of ‘Europeanness’. At the international level, as Holslag has eloquently described, the EU’s liberal agenda and China’s state-centred foreign policy-making have led to a ‘normative incongruence’ between China and Europe which has affected their strategic cooperation.83 The ‘authoritarian other’ logic, however, assumes that China’s behaviour on the international scene could never be compatible with the interests of liberal, democratic European states, or the EU as a whole. We need to point out that the GPPi–MERICS report is the most explicit effort so far to use identity as a basis for threat construction, and serves as the main point of reference in this section. This report stands out as an illustrative example of the erroneous assumptions and potentially harmful implications that ‘othering’ can have in the context of understanding Chinese investment in Europe. We concentrate on this case because we would like to record the transition from a fact-based approach to a discourse of securitising everything—and everyone—Chinese. The most basic function of ‘othering’ in the GPPi–MERICS report is to establish China as a threat not because of what it does but for what it is. This crucial element of the securitising discourse deflects attention from an evidence-based discussion towards a vague interpretation of ‘motives’ based on the CCP’s essential characteristics as an authoritarian entity. In turn, this interpretation provides the prism whereby various incidents can be reconstructed as a threat. It is a tactful logic, which gives an aura of credibility to an essentially non-falsifiable argument that can be summarised as follows: China is an authoritarian state, so whatever it does is potentially harmful. Let’s consider the following passage: … from the perspective of liberal democracies, all areas of interaction with China are potentially problematic and deserve scrutiny. After all, China’s political model is based on an authoritarian regime intent on strengthening a deeply illiberal surveillance state at home while also exporting—or at least trying to popularise—its political and economic development model abroad.84 Ergo, all areas of Europe’s interaction with China have strong political undertones. This ‘othering’ is distinct from recognising what has been described as ‘pluralisation and diversification of the global ideoscape’85—China’s normative impact at a global level. For the authors of this report, China is a threat because of its domestic politics, which the CCP is allegedly exporting. Being deprived of agency, according to the first discursive pillar, and with their economic activities presented as a threat to EU unity, according to the second, Chinese actors are now villainised as possible tentacles of authoritarianism. This is a key step in the process of reframing Chinese investment as an existential issue which requires extraordinary action. But assigning ulterior, dark motives to Chinese actors on the basis of the PRC’s authoritarian system of government is not confined to SOEs, as the report unfolds a logic of limitless securitisation. Indeed, in their effort to substantiate ‘authoritarian advance’, GPPi–MERICS target not just the activities of Chinese intelligence services or companies, but also that of Chinese think tanks, scholars, students, and associations, all of whom are treated as ‘influencing’ tools.86 In doing so, the report makes the dubious leap of assuming perfect success rates for any of the Chinese government’s campaigns aimed at its citizens abroad. Although the report warns in its introduction against ‘a campaign targeting Chinese citizens’, its framing of the problem and suggested policy solutions achieve exactly that: the creation of an environment of suspicion that can legitimise future extraordinary action against individuals. Constructing Chinese activities as a threat is pursued through the instrumentalisation of institutional initiatives and individuals. The activities of Chinese think tanks are discussed under the label ‘Tool 1: China sets up research exchange mechanisms and think tanks in Central and Eastern Europe to influence perceptions and agendas’.87 The first example is the creation of SiLKS (Silk Road Think Tank Network) by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, a network engaging European think tanks that includes, among others, Chatham House, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), the France China Committee, the Fundación Alternativas, the Institute of Development Studies, and the Development Centre of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The report does not explain how the creation of a loose network will influence the research impartiality and integrity of these reputable institutions, nor why engagement of this type is a source of concern. After all, interactions between think tanks from democratic and authoritarian states are neither new nor a China-specific phenomenon. What is more, the institutional affiliations of Chinese think tanks are well-known and taken into consideration by European counterparts when developing joint projects. The example of SiLKS is followed by a consideration of the China–Central and Eastern European (China–CEE) Institute, a think tank known for openly promoting China’s BRI in the 17 + 1 framework. The authors of the GPPi–MERICS report claim that the China–CEE pursues ‘track 1.5 exercises’, involving ‘exchanges tak[ing] place behind closed doors’. The lack of evidence to substantiate the effectiveness of these activities and the presentation of routine public diplomacy as harmful to EU interests demonstrate that these reports offer a discourse for policy consumption, rather than fact-based analysis. Similarly, the section on knowledge production and lobbying (‘Tool 2’) uses random examples that fail to amount to more than a set of standard practices, such as employing lobbyists and local ‘experts’ to promote Chinese interests in the EU’s multifarious policy-making process. In an effort to provide some evidence to support their discourse, the authors refer to events organised by the Chinese Mission to the EU, the annual Europe–China forum, and the involvement of China Daily in broadcasting them.88 However, once again the reader needs to try hard to discern how these activities, involving official actors openly affiliated to the Chinese government, constitute anything more than standard public diplomacy efforts similar to those undertaken by many third countries within the EU. The third institutional tool, titled ‘China shapes academic programs’, discusses the CCP’s alleged determination to ‘control how China is taught and studied in Western academic institutions. The authors refer to controversies surrounding Confucius Institutes (CIs hereafter) in the US and Europe, particularly their clumsy censorship attempts. The problematic nature of the CIs is a well-discussed topic that has indeed drawn considerable criticism. Many studies have shown significant variances of experience as regards the operation of CIs, and that attempts to use them as anything other than their stated role have met with recipient universities’ determination to protect academic freedom,89 particularly when CIs have been egregiously ham-fisted, as was the case at the European Association for Chinese Studies (EACS) conference in Portugal in 2014.90 As Hartig91 has argued in his examination of CIs in Europe, Oceania, and Africa, by attempting to project a state-sponsored image of China, CIs are compromising their effectiveness in increasing China’s soft power. Hubbert,92 in an ethnographic study of CIs as soft power tools, reaches the same conclusion; when teachers side-lined official teaching guidelines and material, putting aside propaganda content, they were more effective in communicating an appealing image of China. Put differently, the more political CIs are, the less effectively they operate as soft power mechanisms. Yet, the GPPi–MERICS report makes no mention of these important findings in relation to CIs, as this would weaken the sense of urgency it aims to create. ‘Othering’ is ultimately extended to Chinese nationals (the fourth ‘tool’), particularly university students, who are identified as potential agents of the CCP. The report concentrates on the activities of the Chinese Students and Scholars Associations (CSSAs), a network developed under the auspices of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office that has gained visibility in the US and Australia with high-profile (counter-) protests during visits of the Dalai Lama, the 2008 Olympic torch relay, and demonstrations by dissidents on minority rights.93 The authors employ the same tactic of lumping together non-EU related examples with certain minor incidents within EU member states to create an exaggerated sense of imminent threat. Characteristically, they confound probability with intent: While there have not been as many cases of CSS-related retaliation in Europe as in the US, it is possible that this trend might feature more prominently at European institutions in the future. These incidents represent an escalation of Chinese government tactics … 94 These descriptions are accompanied by a map titled ‘The CCP Could Mobilise a Critical Mass of Europe-Based Nationals Organised in Chinese Students and Scholars Associations’ that shows the number of CSSAs in European countries, essentially instrumentalising members of these associations as CCP tools. We are not oblivious to the fact that the CSSA has been involved in controversial activities. However, such examples are scarce (very few have taken place within the EU95) and cannot justify the exaggerated threat perception advocated by the authors of this report. What is more, research on the role of Chinese students’ associations as ‘soft power’ mechanisms96 demonstrates that they face significant limitations, similar to those of CIs. However, GPPi–MERICS operates under the assumption that Chinese nationals have a significantly enhanced potential for political action compared to others. This is evident in the polemic language used, with references to China’s assumed ‘retaliation’ and ‘escalation’, especially since 2012. The authors do not take into consideration that many student societies are formed on the basis of nationality, and engage in political activities on European campuses, even in coordination with their respective embassies. GPPi–MERICS imposes the authoritarian other lens that renders even inconsequential acts—for instance, Chinese students formally complaining about an invitation to a Falun Gong practitioner and Human rights activist to give a talk at Durham97—as evidence of China’s authoritarian advance. Under such an interpretative context, providing evidence of the actual influence and effectiveness of these ‘tools’ becomes unimportant. Lastly, ‘othering’ is also applied in relation to European actors: governments, businesses, news agencies, academic and research institutions, and individuals. As early as 2009, the first version of the ‘China Audit’ ECFR reports categorised EU governments according to their China-policy preferences,98 while the recent GPPi–MERICS study identified ‘willing enablers’ within European elites and opinion setters.99 These references include justified criticism against populist politicians who use China to legitimise their illiberal views, but they also target European newspapers and agencies as vehicles of Chinese propaganda, accusing them of carrying content that is ‘prepared and controlled by China’s party-state media’, thus ‘spread[ing] China’s concept of journalism’.100 The evidence provided is, once again, incoherent, including lists of European media carrying the supplement ChinaWatch, and various media forums organised on a national basis. The authors represent every instance of engagement as evidence of China’s instrumentalisation of European media, disregarding their critical reporting on China’s domestic affairs. Going a step further, the Association for International Affairs (AMO) study, funded by the National Endowment for Democracy, presents a ranking of domestic ‘opinion setters’ in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary, including journalists, political scientists, economists, businessmen, business analysts, artists, publicists, translators, and sinologists, according to their positive or negative attitudes towards China.101 But whereas elected politicians and businessmen need to be scrutinised, the targeting of non-political and non-business actors as pro-China opinion setters raises concerns about the perceptions created, including potential damage to one’s professional reputation. This labelling, the ultimate practice of ‘othering’ is a worrying development that we expect to see in a more intensified form as Chinese FDI in Europe is increasingly discussed in security terms. Lastly, the GPPi–MERICS’s continuous distinction between ‘independent’ and ‘dependent’ China expertise in Europe creates the impression that sectors of the academic and research community on the continent perform propaganda functions.102 Having neglected to provide any further justification for this claim this repeated statement casts an unacceptable shadow of suspicion over the entire scholarly community of Chinese Studies in Europe. Taken as a whole, the othering discourse on China’s institutional initiatives glues together incidents of limited importance, disregarding both their actual (in)effectiveness and the resilience of European democracy. Ultimately, there is no justification for such an alarmist tone. On the contrary, we are concerned that if othering practices are adopted widely, they may fuel Sinophobic policies and social attitudes that will challenge the already repeatedly questioned liberal foundations of the EU and limit the debate on EU–China relations to a speculation regarding the motives of the involved parts. For the time being, the vast majority of think tanks examined are careful in this regard. However, the GPPi–MERICS and AMO cases demonstrate that the transition from fact to extreme discourse-based policy discussion is simple once the securitising prisms are applied. Indeed, considering the hardening political discourse of (mainly north-) European leaders in the past few years, it is not difficult to imagine that ‘othering’ will be used more extensively in efforts to securitise Chinese investment.

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