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Securitizing Chinese economic dominance dooms policymakers to failure and displaces a focus on legitimate risks—single minded focus and discursive feedback loops locks in false threats.

Igor Rogelja ‘20, Max Weber Fellow at the European University Institute and a Teaching Fellow at the Lau China Institute, King’s College Londo, 2-17-2020, "Narrating the China Threat: Securitising Chinese Economic Presence in Europe", OUP Academic, Vol 13, Issue 1, https://academic.oup.com/cjip/article/13/1/103/5739302?login=true //AW *ableist language omitted

The first step is to identify the role and space of think tanks in a securitisation move. In this regard, Sjöstedt11 proposes an empirically observable conceptualisation of the securitising move as ‘the public framing of an issue as a national threat, accompanied by a strategy for action’. She further draws our attention to the initial stages of this framing process12—what Kingdon calls the elusive ‘pre-decision processes’ that led to policy-makers’ adoption of proposals.13 Sjöstedt and Kingdon thus offer a more nuanced view of the securitisation process which permits us to pin down the think tanks' role and importance. Think tanks are not decision makers, yet participate as securitising actors in the process of idea formation and bidding, ultimately helping to articulate a securitising frame of reference that resonates with decision makers. In our case, think tanks operate as securitising actors to an audience of EU and national-level decision-makers, whose involvement is necessary for the securitising move to be carried forward. The success or failure of such a securitising move depends, according to Sjöstedt, on decision makers ‘internalising’ idea-frames that constitute something as a threat.14 Here, she gainfully redeploys the concept of ‘idea entrepreneurs’ who use their authority to give credence to the idea frame and insert it in the discursive space around an issue initiating the internalisation process by decision makers.15 Sjöstedt’s understanding of the securitisation move, however, is somewhat linear and can, therefore, miss the complexity of agency involved. In Balzacq’s analysis, the success of securitisation depends on the audience’s predisposition to a securitising narrative on one hand, and the securitising actors’ competency on the other.16 For both these processes to work, therefore, the ‘idea entrepreneurs’ must not just ‘say’ security, but also possess a recognised level of expertise and have access to an audience that is positively predisposed to their message—in our case the institutional cachet accorded to top think tanks and their inclusion in internal briefing papers for MEPs. What is more, the ‘idea entrepreneurs’ of the ‘China threat’ argument do not operate in a vacuum, nor are their audiences passive recipients of their message. Instead, we identify a process of securitisation that is bidirectional and discursive, involving agency by both decision makers and securitising actors. This allows us to conceptualise the securitisation move not only as a final outcome of a linear process, but as a dialectical construction of a common frame of reference. In this frame, policy entrepreneurs and decision makers sharing a certain predisposition to an issue start to discuss it in the same language, what Balzacq conceptualises as ‘congruence’.17 Essentially, think tanks offer specialist narratives that enable decision makers to crystallise their policy preferences, so explaining the credence given to the European ‘China Threat’ variant. That several European leaders, including Angela Merkel, Emmanuel Macron, Sigmar Gabriel, and Jean-Claude Juncker, have made pronouncements congruent to the output of the think tanks does not mean they were ‘convinced’ by a unidirectional process, but that a common interpretive platform is emerging that understands Chinese economic presence as a threat requiring extraordinary responses. As a result of this congruence, the European ‘China threat’ discourse is already legitimising policy initiatives targeted against China. It also continues to fuel policy debates in Brussels and other European capitals that call for further action, in the form of economic protectionism, or more direct interventions by security apparatuses to Chinese companies, in effect producing what Hanneman and Huotari call ‘downward convergence’18 with China. But the most disquieting element in this discursive congruence is that it is becoming increasingly axiomatic, and thus ‘[deprives]’ the parties involved to alternative explanations that empirical evidence may suggest. The screening mechanism’s single-minded focus on security and public order19 also ignores legitimate areas of concern such as environmental protection and sustainability. We believe that the emergence of such a unidimensional discursive space around Chinese investment is ultimately harmful to the EU’s ability to respond to the challenges arising from China’s expanding economic presence, and may have negative implications for its traumatised cohesion.

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