Conflating the rationality of Chinese economic actors with the CCP’s political aims lead to serial policy failure—obfuscates the real motives that drive effective policymaking.
Igor Rogelja ‘20, Max Weber Fellow at the European University Institute and a Teaching Fellow at the Lau China Institute, King’s College Londo, 2-17-2020, "Narrating the China Threat: Securitising Chinese Economic Presence in Europe", OUP Academic, Vol 13, Issue 1, https://academic.oup.com/cjip/article/13/1/103/5739302?login=true //AW *ableist language replaced in brackets
Pillar 1: Centralising Agency The rapid rise in Chinese outward FDI into Europe has reached a historic point and surpassed the reverse annual flows of capital since 2010, yet in cumulative terms, EU-held investments in China exceed those of Chinese entities by a factor of 2.6, while US-held FDI stock in the EU dwarfs China’s by a ratio of 35:1.30 Rather than size, what the ‘China threat’ discourse problematises is the nature of Chinese investment, which is said to be centrally controlled and subject to the Chinese state’s geostrategic considerations.31 Moreover, as Tingley et al., have shown, opposition to incoming Chinese FDI on grounds of national security is often a vehicle for other grievances,32 while Nyman explains that the securitisation of US energy policy relies on similar, simplistic accounts of strategic competition.33 In this manner, Chinese investment as a whole is transformed into a security threat even when the evidence to support security concerns in individual cases is scant. Establishing privatisations and foreign acquisitions as a threat to economic security in a liberal economic context that promotes the role of businesses vis-à-vis the state in economic activity can be ‘intellectually incoherent’, as BWW note.34 Therefore, securitisation depends on identifying or constructing spill-over effects on politics, military security, society, and environment by ascribing the agency of various actors involved in these deals up the command chain to Beijing. This is not to say China, especially under Xi Jinping, has not promoted narratives of Chinese exceptionalism and reassertion of the party’s control, but such propaganda should not be taken at face value, as it obscures the complex decision-making processes in China proper. ‘Centralising agency’ involves two discursive tactics: (i) subsuming all commercial rationality of Chinese firms into a political frame, and (ii) negating informed rationality on part of the host states or host business partners. In the first instance, centralising agency allows securitising actors to attribute all Chinese economic activity to the machinations of the CCP, so obviating the need to establish factually such a link on a case-by-case basis, and without considering the full set of relevant contingencies, interests, and dynamics. Chinese firms, regardless of ownership status, are cast as agents of the Chinese state, unable to make their own financial decisions and beholden to their political masters in Zhongnanhai. This view of China as a singular entity does not take into account a growing body of literature that understands the Belt and Road Initiative as an inherently decentralised endeavour wherein state-owned enterprises (SOEs), local governments, different bureaucracies, and private companies pursue their own interests, often competing with each other for the centre’s attention.35 The assumption that initiatives such as the Belt and Road constitute a centrally executed conspiracy has a major impact on the way we analyse Chinese economic presence abroad. Because the securitisation of investment relies on establishing ‘spill-overs’, so-called critical infrastructure is especially prone to such a biased interpretation. Thus, in the field of maritime logistics, companies like COSCO are presented as CCP agents taking over Europe’s port infrastructure,36 while emphatically ignoring alternative business explanations. The focus on security achieved through centralising agency, no matter how tenuous, differentiates Chinese from other (state-led) port investment companies, such as Dubai’s DP World, without proposing comparative insights between the effect of investment from different authoritarian states such as the United Arab Emirates or Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, one should consider that during a time of falling profits for shipping operators, port operations remain a highly profitable aspect of the logistics business. In addition, significant overcapacity is predicted for terminal operations globally in the coming years,37 signifying fierce competition among European ports for market shares. Therefore, as the top eight big carrier groups largely determine global cargo flows, a tie-in with a large carrier/port operator like COSCO, particularly for less established ports, presents a viable strategy. Italy’s IAI (Istituto Affari Internazionali) accurately notes that Piraeus’s takeover will increase competition for ports in ‘Northern range’ countries such as Belgium and the Netherlands, but nevertheless frames it as a ‘political and commercial threat’.38 Seen from Piraeus, however, both the 2008 (concession of container Piers II&III) and 2016 (Piraeus Port Authority privatisation) deals had a clear commercial logic.39 COSCO got involved in Piraeus because it was looking for a faster transportation channel for Chinese products, and gradually solidified its commitment to the Greek port, especially since its investment in Naples became unsustainable. An even stronger attempt at securitisation is seen in comparisons of Piraeus to Chinese-run ports outside Europe where the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has occasionally been granted access—with the host country’s permission.40 Absolutely no indications that Piraeus will become a ‘double use’ port hosting the PLAN exist, but framing a Chinese takeover of a port authority as an existential threat to Europeanness is less plausible without linking it to a military (‘a base for Chinese warships’) or political (‘control over host government’) issue. What these reports disregard is that Piraeus often hosts foreign navies, both from NATO and third countries, including Russia, and that the latter have no access to facilities or services that could sustain military action of any kind. The PLAN visits in Piraeus have taken place either under the UN anti-piracy mandate or as part of the evacuation of Chinese civilians from Libya. In addition, the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)’s 2017 report41 makes the unsubstantiated claim that Japanese ships have experienced difficulties when docking in Piraeus, arguing that there is no clear distinction between taking over the management of the Port and sovereign control over it.42 The logic of centralising agency paints any Chinese investment at worst as a security risk and at best as a political one. The creation of such intersubjective meanings in the representation of Chinese companies as agents of a malevolent state blurs the boundaries between ‘technical’, ‘economic’, ‘environmental’, and ‘political’ matters, as well as between sectors and regions, in effect politicising any and all incoming investment. This is especially important when there are clear and valid concerns about the entry of Chinese investors who might fail to comply with EU laws on competition, labour standards, or environmental protection, for example. Yet the securitising logic which lumps disparate Chinese investments and projects together obfuscates rather than illuminates their contingent and complex nature. For example, when Croatia awarded the €270 m Pelješac Bridge contract to China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC) in early 2018, it did so not due to direct political pressure or by circumventing public tender rules. Quite the reverse, this moment marked the first successful bid by a Chinese company for an EU-funded project and the culmination of the CRBC’s decade-long effort to progress to public bids in developed countries. The Croatian authorities rejected the losing parties’ allegations of price dumping because even the Chinese offer was significantly higher than the expected tender value set by the Croatian road authority.43 More than the issue of price dumping—a longstanding concern of European industry—what is curious about the case is that the Austrian complainant specifically cited as a key argument in its complaint the interest of the Chinese state in entering the EU market. Accordingly, the bridge regularly features in articles discussing China’s attempts to ‘divide’ the EU44 or spread its influence to Western Balkan states.45 CRBC’s choices, however, seem consistent with the literature on Chinese outgoing investment, which emphasises the efforts of companies to leverage their firm-specific assets to gain market share in advanced economies46—a relatively typical pattern of behaviour with few discernible security aspects. Similarly, COSCO obtained gradual control of Piraeus following two international tenders (in 2008 and 2016), both scrutinised by EU institutions. In fact, COSCO was the sole contender for the 2016 privatisation of the Piraeus Port Authority, one of Greece’s commitments under its 2015 bailout agreement with the EU. China’s construction and infrastructure acquisition spree in SE Europe was thus more about Chinese actors pursuing their business interests within the legal framework of the EU than changing the rules of the game. This is not to say that the entanglement of politics and economics in China is irrelevant, yet denying Chinese firms’ economic rationale provides a singular account of what is a complex form of decision-making. The second thread of centralising agency concerns the role of European states, companies or other actors and treating them as naïve or selfish, dismissing their rational calculations as insufficiently considering China’s ‘true’ intentions. In this vein, the 2016 acquisition of German robotics firm Kuka by the Chinese Midea caused a stir in the German political class, and is heavily used in think tank narratives as an example of technology-stripping by Chinese actors, with the ECFR report even calling it a ‘raid’.47 However, Midea and Kuka executives emphasised the business rationale for the deal giving Kuka access to a huge market ripe for automation in manufacturing.48 Still, in a meeting with German industrialists, Chancellor Merkel reportedly told them that they were ‘naïve’ about Chinese intentions.49 Essentially, by negating the business rationale of the deal the German state politicised competition. In the race towards ‘Industrie 4.0’, both corporate and state actors pursue strategies to ensure their continued competitiveness; these strategies may come into conflict but they are decided by autonomous and rational European actors. The Belgrade–Budapest ‘high-speed’ railway is another case of allegedly naïve governments being ‘duped’ into paying for China’s grand schemes. In this narrative, the railway, built using preferential loans from Chinese banks to Serbia, serves the purpose of creating a logistical corridor from Piraeus to the markets of central Europe at Serbian and Hungarian taxpayers’ expense.50 However, Serbian authorities had scheduled an upgrading of the rail line in question before the idea of a Chinese corridor from Piraeus even existed.51 The importance of the line to Serbia is traceable to decisions made not in Beijing but in Brussels. The TEN-T corridor from Athens to Hamburg bypassed the direct route via Serbia and Macedonia to favour member states Bulgaria and Romania. Imminent isolation from EU-funded infrastructural connectivities explains why Belgrade had been advocating a rail upgrading since the mid-2000s. China wasn’t even the preferred lender, given that plans originally envisaged World Bank participation, while the current upgrading is partly financed by a Russian loan. Rather than being naïve, Balkan countries are using what leverage they can muster in suboptimal surroundings, namely, the flexibility to accommodate bilateral deals by balancing Western and other funders. Unable to rely on EU support, Serbia is a prime case since it should be particularly susceptible to Chinese pressure and could so become a ‘Trojan Horse’ in Europe.52 Yet Chinese influence has so far resulted in just one symbolic gesture53 which illustrates the limitations of Chinese ‘sharp power’54 rather than its reach. Elsewhere, the ‘selfishness’ of European entities is emphasised, as with Italy’s premier shipbuilder Fincantieri. Using suggestive language, a report by the ECFR attempts to construct a conspiratorial web out of Fincantieri’s takeover of French shipyard STX, its joint venture in Shanghai, and a Chinese SOE’s acquisition of a minor Italian yacht maker (Ferretti) without putting forward a shred of evidence. It correctly points out that Fincantieri agreed to share cruise ship production technology, but does not make clear why the business decisions of one Italian firm should subsequently be linked to the takeover of another (Fincantieri was not a shareholder in Ferretti), nor why Fincantieri’s takeover of a French shipyard should be considered a ‘still apparently unrelated development’55 rather than a genuinely unrelated one. The report then goes as far as to characterise Fincantieri’s takeover bid for STX as being done ‘… in a very Chinese way’.56 While we deal with the rhetorical tool of ‘othering’ in a subsequent section, the ECFR report questions the economic rationality of this major (and, incidentally, state-owned) Italian shipbuilder by suggesting that it is selling out cruise ship technology in pursuit of corporate profits. But as this charge is not sufficiently alarmist, the issue of Ferretti’s military speedboat arm is loosely associated with Fincantieri, and the securitising loop is thus complete: European corporate profit-seeking leads to the leaking of military technology to China. Kuka, Serbia, and Fincantieri were following their own agenda—as were the Greek ship-owning elite and the Greek government. Greek ship-owners promoted the idea of COSCO’s presence in Piraeus to both sides, lobbying the Greek government in favour of the 2008 Concession, and playing a crucial role in its successful conclusion.57 The appeal of Piraeus for COSCO increased due to the active support of this key constituency, who were clients of Chinese shipyards and banks,58 and trusted providers of services for COSCO and other Chinese companies.59 The financial benefits for Greek ship-owners, the Piraeus Port Authority, and the Greek economy have since been considerable.60 Similarly, for all Greek governments since 2008, companies like COSCO constitute an important source of investment, especially at a time of financial crisis when privatisation tenders run the risk of low offers. A Chinese company’s bid in such international tenders creates additional competition, which raises the value of the deal for the Greek state. What is more, COSCO’s diversion of container traffic from other European ports to Piraeus could lead to technological upgrading of the Port’s facilities, job growth, and spill-over effects in other economic sectors.61 Issues of reciprocal market access are a longstanding and valid concern of European businesses operating in China. Indeed, the future of EU–China relations will be largely defined by the ability of the two sides to resolve these issues, either through bilateral negotiations or dispute resolution instruments. Yet the discourse presented in the analysed reports does not stop there, rather advocating the upgrading of such concerns to full-blown panic about Europe’s strategic industries and assets being bought, stolen, or neutralised by actors associated with the Chinese Communist Party. This level of analysis conveniently ignores the agency of firms, interest groups, and host states by instead concentrating agency in the hands of the Chinese state. Yet Chinese companies have adapted to dealing with the many practices, voices, legal and business environments, and individual agents across Europe. In a similar vein, European states, companies, and elites have shown a remarkable propensity to think about their own bottom line or national interest. Paradoxically, the centralising agency narrative portrays Chinese actors as subsuming their economic rationality to the state’s political concerns, while European actors are faulted for following particularistic economic concerns instead of collective political interests. As the next section will clarify, the identification of ‘collective’ interests vis-à-vis China is a contested field, and we [cannot afford] to assign the spectres haunting the politics and economy of Europe to Chinese agency or present them as a threat to European security through a one-size-fits-all contextualisation of Chinese investment.