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Securitizing against the China threat is reductive and self-defeating—‘China threat’ paradigm risks overreaction.

Abdur Shah 21, Professor at Department of International Relations (IR), National University of Modern Languages, Islamabad, Pakistan, 4-8-2021, "Revisiting China Threat: The US’ Securitization of the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’", Chinese Political Science Review , https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s41111-021-00179-0 //AW

The National Defence Strategy (2018, p. 2) cautioned that China (along with Russia) is “now undermining the international order from within the system by exploiting its benefits while simultaneously undercutting its principles and “rules of the road””. According to this line of argument, Beijing’s policies—including its Belt and Road project—are antithetical and harmful to American vision, values and interests at global level (White House 2019; US Department of State 2019b). Simultaneously, the Trump administration insisted that China seeks global predominance by displacing the US as a sole super power (National Defence Strategy of the US 2018; Lynch 2019). Beijing does so by promoting its “repressive vision of world order” (White House 2017, p. 45) and model of “authoritarian capitalism” (Director of National Intelligence 2019, p. 25) as “a “new type” of global governance” even if “the existing system has served the world—China included—very well in the seven decades since World War II” (US Embassy & Consulate in South Korea 2019). In retrospective sense, the US’ portrayal of China’s ambitions under the Trump administration is a revisit to decades-old ‘China threat’ paradigm thriving in the US from time to time. An analysis of the narratives of Trump administration vis-a-vis BRI reveals that the US’ approach actually reflected the ‘China threat’ mindset (Interviews with diplomats from Central Asia and South Asia, June–July 2019, researchers working for Pakistan government, July–December 2019, Douglas Paal, July 2019, Eyck Freymann, August 2019, Li Xing, August 2019, Yiwei Wang, November 2019). Chengxin Pan (2012, p. 23) aptly explains the paradigm. The ‘China threat’ is a fundamental image that casts China’s rise and its international implications primarily in a negative, alarming, and threatening light. It is more than a particular argument, or a singular ‘China threat theory’, as many of its Chinese critics often call it. Rather, it represents a paradigm that, as a lasting normative concern and cognitive habit, both informs and lends coherence to otherwise divergent ways of looking at China in scholarly analysis, government documents, popular culture and mass media. Eminent analysts, researchers, and academics (i.e. Kishore Mahbubani, Fareed Zakaria, Suzan L. Shirk, Danial Drezner, Taylor Fravel et. al., Stapleton Roy, Michael D. Swaine, Susan A. Thornton and Ezra Vogel etc.) believed that under Donald Trump administration, American perceptions of and actions towards the challenge posed by China were increasingly guided by the ‘China threat’ or ‘China scare’ or ‘Red scare’ thinking (Economist 2020; Swanson 2019; Fravel et al. 2019; Waldman 2019; Wong 2019a; Zakaria 2020). There was a palpable understanding running across both the parties (Republicans and Democrats) in Congress and all the departments of government (the State Department, Department of Defence, Department of Justice, Pentagon, FBI and other spy agencies etc.) in Washington concurring that China poses a threat to US on multiple fronts (Reuters 2019b; Economist 2019a, b, c). The Trump administration was at the forefront of stimulating and building on this thinking both at discursive and policy levels. The threat personification at this level was rather sweeping and oscillating and any pattern of China’s foreign policy behaviour could be interpreted as an ultimate threat. Accordingly, a diverse range of China’s policies and initiatives were identified as part of the broader China problem: unfair trade practices; subsidising Chinese businesses and state owned enterprises; 5G technology and risk of espionage; theft of intellectual property and trade and corporate secrets; ‘Made in China 2025’; and off course the BRI reify the threat posed by China to US’ interests. Policy Responses to Counter the Threat BRI The discourse of BRI securitisation was complemented by a set of policy actions adopted by the US government aimed clearly at the containment of expanding Chinese footprints and influence. First, the Trump administration employed the policy of diplomatic and rhetorical dissuasion to cajole and pressurise other countries not to join the BRI (Wong 2019b). Washington’s warnings against the negative consequences of BRI’s infrastructure-based investments aimed to deter the states like Ukraine, Italy, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Kazakhstan from opting for Chinese money. Besides this direct pressure, discursive characterisation of the project itself has profound repercussions on the potential appeal of BRI investments to other countries. As a consequence, China’s soft power image, which is an important component of BRI (Li 2019, p. 42), is time and again put to the test to convince international community that Beijing does not harbour any malign designs with regard to BRI. At second level, the US tried to tackle this challenge through acts of institutional balancing. Washington came up with its own aid programs to outcompete the reach of BRI. In 2018, the US government increased the portfolio of its development finance institution Overseas Private Investment Corporation from $30 billion to $60 billion and passed the Better Utilisation of Investments Leading to Development (BUILD) Act as counter response to China’s Belt and Road project. A new US aid agency International Development Finance Corporation with $60 billion funding was launched to counter BRI in Asia (Lo 2020). Similarly, the US reached out to like-minded countries in the Asia–Pacific to balance China’s increasing influence across the region. Hence, US, India, Australia and Japan revived the “Quad” with this particular policy objective. Finally, Trump officials incessantly tried to undermine China’s BRI diplomacy at the international fora such as the United Nations (Lynch 2019), Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (Guardian 2018) and as recently as Munich Security Conference in February 2020. How Far is the Securitisation of BRI Warranted? During the last six years of its implementation, BRI has exhibited ample reasons to question different aspects of this initiative and its methods of functioning. From ballooning debts to unviable projects etc., a familiar pattern of undesirable outcomes has trailed the BRI projects across many of the countries. The US’ viewpoint does identify these issues with BRI rightly but only partially. A critical cross-examination of securitisation approach towards the BRI and ultimately China’s international role as adopted stridently by the Trump administration shows that American approach is far-fetched on many counts across conceptual, empirical and policy spectrums. In addition to general observations, discussions and communications with diplomats, academics, researchers and analysts from a range of countries with links to Belt and Road project help develop the following critique of the US’ approach. Unlike the American Perspective of Zero-Sum Game, BRI is Generally Viewed as an Opportunity by Many, Though Not Without Concerns for Some Strategic, Political and Economic Implications Most of the countries view BRI investments as opportunity to develop critical infrastructure so direly needed across the Asian countries (Interviews with diplomats from Central Asia and South Asia, June–July 2019, researchers working for Pakistan government, July–December 2019, Ngeow Chow Bing, August 2019, Harris Zainul December 2019). In response to American assertions that BRI holds grave risks to the sovereign integrity and economic development of recipient countries and should therefore be shunned, a Central Asian diplomat (2019) observed. Geography is an unalterable force for states. We cannot change our neighbours and the geopolitics of surrounding states even if the US wants us to do so. So we have to work with this OBOR model…The potential significance of OBOR for regions like Central Asia and South Asia is undeniable for us. This thinking stands diametrically opposite to American narratives proclaiming the BRI as ‘predatory economics’ and ‘debt-trap’ diplomacy. There is a genuine reason for that: Most of the BRI members suffer from acute deficit of development infrastructure. According to a much-cited report by the Asian Development Bank (2017), Asia needs whopping annual $1.7 trillion investments in infrastructure through 2030 or $26 trillion from 2016 to 2030 in order to maintain its growth momentum, tackle poverty and respond to climate change. American observers also agree that BRI investments have the potential to bring ‘win–win’ outcomes for both the parties (Interviews with Douglas Paal, July 2019, Joshua Kurlantzick, July 2019, Eyck Freymann, August 2019, James Schwemlein, September, 2019). However, there is an understanding that BRI with all its promising prospects might also hold some economic and strategic implications. Member countries are conscious of the fact that China has likely pinned strategic interests and goals with certain BRI investments in South Asia (Interviews with South Asian diplomat, August 2019, researcher working for Pakistan government, August 2019) or the BRI might further tip the trade balance in favour of China (Interviews with a Central Asian diplomat, June 2019). Still these countries perceive the project primarily as an economic opportunity. The ‘agency’ of Member Countries and Their Domestic Politics has Played Key Role in Evolution and Dynamics of the BRI. The US’ Perspective Ignores that The US’ perspective stands on the assumption that China holds predominant position of “dictating” (Hindustan Times 2017) and “leveraging” (US Senate 2019) its model “in a more muscular manner, demanding other nations become tribute states kowtowing to Beijing” (U.S. Department of Defense 2018b). This notion is flawed both on conceptual and empirical bases. First, the argument that China unilaterally dictates the BRI reduces the ‘agency’ of member countries and their domestic politics to that of a ‘black box’ playing to the sweet wills of Beijing. The argument therefore is reductive at best. In fact, in many cases the incumbent governments of the member countries approach China for investments and assistance. The cases of Pakistan’ Gwadar port and Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port are notable in this respect. In addition, these governments are quite egoistic in assessing the costs and benefits of Chinese money though their interests are more likely parochial in the sense they prioritise their own political capital or survival (Interviews with Eyck Freymann, August 2019, researchers working for Pakistan government, July–December 2019 and Harris Zainul, December 2019; Brautigam 2019). Therefore, it also depends a lot more on the ruling government’s priorities while discussing the terms and conditions of BRI projects with Chinese. (Interviews with a Central Asian diplomat, June 2019, Hong Zhang, December 2019). In similar vein, these countries have adroitly manoeuvred relations with both China and its rival powers, seeking to get aid form both groups while they compete against each other (Markey 2020). Sri Lanka opened its arms to Indian and Japanese offers in the aftermath of Hambantota port deal. Similarly, Pakistan has been warming lately to US and even reportedly tried to assure the latter that Islamabad attaches great significance to ties with Washington and will not allow Beijing to use Gwadar port for strategic purposes (Siddiqa 2019a, b). On the empirical side, BRI does not function as a linear model steered or imposed all the way from Beijing. Member countries enjoy great deal of leeway in implementing, delaying and even leveraging the Belt and Road projects. Domestic politics are a complex of changing regimes, different interest and pressure groups vying for their respective political agendas and interests. The evidence shows that BRI is not immune to vagaries of domestic politics. One of the top officials of China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) confided that after daily Dawn divulged the details of CPEC ‘master plan’ (Husain 2017), the erstwhile government had to downsize considerably parts of the actual plan due to harsh outcry from media and the public (Interview, December 2019). Changes of governments after elections in Malaysia, Pakistan and Maldives had a great deal of impact on the implementation of BRI projects across these countries. Malaysia even halted the BRI projects and then renegotiated the deals with China. In Pakistan, the government of Pakistan Tehreek e Insaf (PTI) explicitly questioned the terms of CPEC deals signed by the previous government of Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (Anderlini 2018). The Chinese side developed many apprehensions and grievances with regard to PTI’s approach towards the CPEC (Interviews with researchers working for Pakistan government, July–December 2019). Unlike the American assertion that China beguiles other countries into trap, member countries are mindful of ceding too much control to China as a result of BRI projects. For example, Pakistan’s invitation to Saudi Arabia to become the third partner in the CPEC (that some thought was done without taking China into confidence) and its withdrawal of Diamer-Bhasha dam from CPEC in November 2017 were motivated by strategic considerations (Interview with a government researcher).Footnote2 Similarly, the newly elected President of Sri Lanka Gotabaya Rajapaksa said (Xinhua 2019) that his government is “not worried about the commercial aspect” of the Hambantota port deal but is “concerned about the security aspect as to whether there are any security lapses. That is what I am discussing with China.” Many of the intricate details of the Belt and Road falls beyond the tight control of China even if the latter would desire to be on the top of everything. In this way the progression and ultimate success of BRI hinges in many ways on the agency of member countries and their domestic politics. Securitising BRI Outrightly is Erroneous and Self-Contradictory for Many Reasons China’s BRI approach has many limitations but the way Trump administration securitised the subject is questionable for some reasons. To begin with, the US hyped and overstated the challenge of BRI and China’s role (Interviews with a South Asian diplomat, August 2019 and researchers and government officials of Pakistan, July–December 2019). The argument that BRI is “predatory” or “debt trap” is not persuasive as it draws its reasoning from a singular case of Hambantota port deal which is more of an exception than a pattern (Interviews with Douglas Paul, July 2019, Eyck Freymann, August 2019, Ngeow Chow Bing, August 2019 and Harris Zainul, December 2019; Freeman Jr. 2019; Swaine 2019). The facts related to that debt-to-equity swap deal are far more complex than the US or other conventional sources have asserted so far (Moramudali 2020). According to Yiwei Wang (Interview, November 2019), “it is a problem but this is the case of a debt not necessarily a trap.” For others, rather than being a debt-trap diplomacy, BRI is “just globalisation with Chinese characteristics” (Brautigam 2019). The notion that China gains influence over other countries by miring them in massive debts stands on self-contradictory footing. Each failing project brings China profound economic and diplomatic liabilities. After all the China’s BRI mantra is based on ‘win–win’ narratives. Hence, this kind of approach would be self-defeating and unsustainable in the long run. The fallouts of Hambantota port deal—in the form of international backlash—for China’s soft image are too enormous to be ignored. As massive debts and unsustainable projects can make China “a victim of its own lending practice and hubris”, the reasoning of the ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ would be a “misreading” of a complex phenomenon (Ferchen 2018). Patronising behaviour of the US’ approach is another issue. The Trump administration presented countries with a binary proposition that China is an imminent threat and the US is the saviour hence they should forsake China for the US. Even though many of the countries have resisted and countered American assertion with argument that BRI is not a debt trap, the US insists otherwise. For instance, Pakistan and Sri LankaFootnote3 have repeatedly tried to dispel the notion that BRI investments are a trap yet the US is parroting the same line with a missionary zeal. Instead of successfully convincing others to eschew the BRI or Chinese assistance, the US risks overreacting to the issue at hand. Finally, the Trump administration’s policy to identify and counter China threat is regressive and counter-productive. The US approach, according to Chas Freeman Jr. (2019), seems to be influenced by Cold War thinking wherein two superpowers could force other countries to take side with either the US or its rival. A broad range of prominent scholars, analysts, and experts agree that the approach to characterise China as an outright threat and consequently counter it is far-fetched and based on overreaction to the so-called threat of China (Beckley 2019; Feigenbaum 2018; Johnston 2019; Joshua 2019; Swaine 2019; Swanson 2019; Fravel et al. 2019; Zakaria 2020; Interviews with Douglas Paul, July 2019, Eyck Freymann, August 2019 and James Schwemlein, September, 2019).

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