The language that we use matters---it contributes to the way we construct the Chinese threat
Qiana Gilkey, xx-xx-2022, "How do speech acts contribute to the securitization of China?," Malmo University, https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1667683/FULLTEXT01.pdf //jc
[analysis of Dr. Stephen Roach, a senior fellow at the Jackson Institute of Global Affairs and senior lecturer at Yale University]
In Roach’s quote, the language used is quite interesting. It is not brazen to say Roach is being rather presumptuous by speaking on behalf of ‘the world’ and the perspectives it has on China. The international system and particularly the economic system is dominated by American and Western norms, so while this statement may be true for states in the Global North, the same cannot be assumed of states in the Global South. Therefore, by assuming and stating that ‘the world’ is in an uncomfortable position with China’s growing presence, Roach constitutes a securitizing actor and is attempting to securitize China by framing its rise as leaving the world in an uncomfortable place that may further devolve in the future. This relates to the aspects of American strategy by Chengqiu (2020) by preventing China from challenging its hegemony.
5.1.2 Discursive Practice and Substantial Modality In terms of substantial modality, the threat of the BRI and China is largely concerned with the political and societal sectors. These sectors define existential threats as sovereignty, ideology, and large-scale collective identities (Buzan et al, 1998: 22). Melton speculates that if China assists in the economic development of 68 countries it will lead to stability and positive feelings. This can change the collective identity of a state as the political ideology will be influenced by China’s presence. Buzan et al (1998) note that identities will react and change in response to internal and external developments, therefore the BRI and the presence of China in developing countries in Latin America and Africa might shift the political ideology and identity to reflect more authoritarian and communist ideals. These countries may also become allies with China, thus reducing the amount of global influence the US holds. This can present the opportunity for China to challenge American hegemony not only in Asia but now in Africa and Latin America as well. The potential change in identity and ideology may not be amicable and free of discord; Almén et al (2021) hold that China desired a tributary system and may be using the BRI to produce an ulterior debt-trap policy. Relating back to the epistemic terrain and Roach’s speaking on behalf of ‘the world’ concerning the identity of the international system, post-WWII and Cold War the US was in the position to reshape the international system to represent its needs and strategic interests. China’s BRI is perceived to be a threat to the international identity it had shaped and enjoyed 22 for decades. One of Chengqiu’s (2020) aspects include ‘integrating China into a Western dominated international economic system’ so as not to disrupt the current system. It is perceived that if China reshapes the identity of the system, it will perhaps sway norms that are not conforming to US interests. This does not only concern the restructuring of the economic system, but also is expanded to include the political identity of states in which the BRI operates. The US perceives China as an authoritarian and Communist state having expansionist motives concerning the spread of ideology and ideals, which also concurs with Melton’s statement of states developing positive feelings toward China and their domestic ideologies being influenced by authoritarian principles.