The alarmist climate security narrative presented of the 1ac generates massive skepticism – causes emerging countries to reject the plan which crushes solvency
Jeroen Warner, Ingrid Boaswageningen University, Netherlandscorresponding Author, 3-13-2019, "Securitization of climate change: How invoking global dangers for instrumental ends can backfire," SAGE Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2399654419834018//jc
By strengthening the climate security coalition, more pressure was put on those states still needing to make ambitious mitigation commitments during the UNFCCC negotiations on the post-Kyoto Framework. The primary countries the FCO targeted at that time were the US and the emerging developing countries (FCO, 2007: 71). But these emerging countries were precisely those overtly rejecting the security narrative on climate change, criticizing the move to discuss climate change in the Security Council during the UN Security Council debates on climate change in 2007 and 2011, and expressing great scepticism regarding alarmist security framings on climate change. To counter the security discourse on climate change, the Brazilian delegation for instance argued: ‘…utmost caution must be exercised in establishing links between conflict and the utilization of natural resources or the evolution of climate on our planet’ (UNSC, 2007: 20). Similar comments were made by other emerging countries, such as China and India, and received support from other developing countries who see climate change as a matter of sustainable development (Boas, 2015; Sindico, 2007). In particular, emerging giants with no special voting powers in the UN Security Council, such as India and Brazil, have been highly sceptical of these moves and preferred climate change to be discussed in fora where they do have decision-making power. In the 2011 debate, Brazil, Russia, India and China, generally expressing scepticism with respect to a security framing of climate change, showed consideration with the precarious situation of developing small island states (SIDS). The four BRICS countries however accused the West of intending to change the terms of the debate by lifting climate change to the level of the UN Security Council (Boas, 2015) – a clear case of ‘venue shopping’ (Pralle, 2009). In India, for instance, it triggered distrust and a defensive position towards the UK’s intentions, adding to a tense negotiation climate. In the words of the former Indian Prime Minister’s Special Envoy on Climate Change, ‘the security argument put forward by the West is an attempt to deflect attention away from what they need to do themselves’.10 In 2013, the UK together with Pakistan tried to convene another formal UN Security Council debate on the subject, which was however blocked by Russia and China (King, 2013). The debate still happened but in an informal setting under the so-called ‘Arriaformula’. In 2015, another ‘Arriaformula’ debate was held, then initiated by Spain and Malaysia (Werrell and Femia, 2015). Thus while some emerging developing countries continue to oppose the idea, others, such as Malaysia and Pakistan, shifted to the side of the securitizers, suggesting an increasing disagreement on the subject amongst the leading countries of the G-77 group. Whilst the Small Island States actively raise the security argument in the UN Security Council, there is dissent at home as to whether this is the appropriate frame. For instance, small-island state populations resist the associated helpless image of drowning islands producing so-called ‘climate refugees’ (Farbotko and Lazrus, 2012). In addition, the alarmist climate security narrative was also unable to maintain a support base within the UK itself in recent years. The tide turned when the Conservatives came to power in 2010 and gave the promotion of climate action in the UNFCCC a lower level of priority. The focus turned more to other crises, which were experienced more directly at home, such as the economic crisis and Brexit. In the 2010 National Security Strategy and the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review, the striving for a multilateral deal on climate change mitigation was only mentioned once (Cabinet Office, 2010: 18), without employing a security narrative to promote efforts towards such action. The policy constituency within the UK had eroded, making space for alternative and related framings (see Boas and Rothe, 2016, for details).