1ac security rhetoric creates a bunker mentality in which people feel too helpless to create change – fundamentally ignores the crisis depicted by the Aff and crushes solvency
Jeroen Warner, Ingrid Boaswageningen University, Netherlandscorresponding Author, 3-13-2019, "Securitization of climate change: How invoking global dangers for instrumental ends can backfire," SAGE Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2399654419834018//jc
Davoudi (2014) shows how the social understanding of nature moved from nature-as-clockwork (Enlightenment) through nature-as-finite (Club of Rome, 1970s), through nature as risk (1990s) to discourses of global danger and insecurity caused by nature. The author traces the rise of ‘climate securitization’ back to a conference, ‘The Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security’ in Toronto in 1988, which portrayed the consequences of climate change as only second to nuclear war. Since the 1990s climate change has often been presented as a global crisis, an existential threat to human civilization, a planetary catastrophe (Paglia, 2018). Yet, unlike an aggressive force out to conquer foreign territory, climate change is a special domain of emergency, that of ‘threats without enemies’ (Prins, 1993). As argued by Methmann and Rothe (2012: 328), climate is depicted as an external threat, with impacts coming suddenly, ‘from the outside’. Issues of risk and security ‘can provoke strong emotions, legitimise extraordinary practices, and lead to practices that are otherwise indefensible’ (Davoudi, 2014: 371–372). Environmental securitization however is an uncertain domain for securitization (Buzan et al., 1998; Trombetta, 2008). In climate change, the burden of proof to legitimize securitization is especially tricky. While a clear majority of the academic community considers anthropogenic climate change sufficiently proven, its invisibility as a source of anticipated catastrophes that have yet to happen, cannot easily compete with visible weather events in the ‘attention economy' (Hamblyn, 2009). Other publics, then, are not convinced, as has become clear for instance under the Trump administration. Moreover, there is no ready consensus within the academic community on a clear and present nexus between climate change, violent conflict and/or migration (Adams et al., 2018), and if there is, that it can be successfully averted through a particular course of action. The lack of ‘full closure' has not stopped some from trying to securitise climate change. But overstressing the security dimension risks reducing democratic accountability (Coaffee et al., 2008). Some scholars have indeed warned for a security discourse to induce aversive policies, such as a larger role for the military to cope with feared effects of global warming like climate migration (Hartmann, 2010). Indeed, issues that can harm military capability, are more likely to become securitized than those that cannot (Fidler, 2007). Not only is climate a ‘threat without an enemy’ (Prins, 1993) but also lacks a ‘hero’ to save the day. Armed forces can defeat an invading enemy, a SWAT team can neutralise a terrorist, ICT experts can intercept a hacker, civil engineers and water managers can stop the flood, but no single actor can stop climate change. A pitfall of climate securitization therefore is that of instilling a sense of ontological insecurity in the intended audience rather than rallying support. Presenting an apocalyptic picture without a ‘way out’ upsets people’s basic sense of security and trust in the world around them. ‘Insecuritizing’ them (Bigo, 2002) instils a feeling of helplessness in the recipients of the message, a perceived lack of agency, leading people to ignore the issue and hide behind a false sense of security in their home and community (Harries, 2008). The way out becomes the domain of more mundane technocratic practices. ‘[A]pocalyptic climate change is articulated as overstraining the capacity of political actors, and thus as ruling out exceptional measures and passing responsibility to the “political machine” (…)’ (Methmann and Rothe, 2012: 324). The security discourse on climate change has not resulted in successful securitization in the sense of having led to exceptional measures being accepted and implemented (Corry, 2012; Methmann and Rothe, 2012; Oels, 2012). Instead, it ‘is so exaggerated that it prompts the opposite: routine and micro-practices of risk management: mitigation as precautionary risk management, adaptation as investing in preparedness, and security not as pre-empting but as a combination of the former two’ (Methman and Rothe, 2012: 337). In adding to these scholarly analyses, our study interrogates the question of failed climate securitization through an in-depth empirical account. It hereby further contextualizes and situates arguments provided by others, such as Methmann and Rothe (2012), and points to further explanatory factors that thus far have received less attention. Indeed, both cases point to the rather instrumental character of the securitizing moves by political actors to ‘sell' climate policy and explain why this has not benefited their success amongst the core target audiences. The next section will examine such discursive strategies on climate change and security through the case of the UK’s climate diplomacy in the international policy arena in the late 2000s. Thereafter, our second case traces the genesis, ‘marketing' and resonance of a national plan to make the Dutch delta climate-proof. A comparison between the two (see Table 1) looks at the key elements of securitization – an existential threat and the ‘only way out’, the degree to which this resonated and was responded to by key audiences.