Cybersecurity as a threat referent is not an apolitical or objective descriptor---it is used as a means to legitimize overly militarized responses
Joe Burton and George Christou 21, Joe Burton is the Associate Lecturer in the School of IR at the University of St Andrews, George Christou is the professor of chemistry @ the University of Florida “Bridging the gap between cyberwar and cyberpeace,” International Affairs 97, 11/01/2021, https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/97/6/1727/6412439?login=true \\pairie
However cyber warfare is defined—and, just as with the term ‘terrorism’, there is unlikely to be a uniform definition or understanding accepted across all polities—explanations for its emergence as an empirical phenomenon are fairly limited. At the systemic level on which structural realist accounts of international relations tend to focus, cyber capabilities emerge to fulfil political needs within an anarchic system (and a global network of computers), which is ungoverned and ungovernable by nation-states. In this sense, cyberwar capabilities are developed as a natural extension of (and new medium for) existing geopolitical tensions and disputes. The development and use of cyber warfare capabilities by one power drives fear and uncertainty in other states, which invest in similar capabilities themselves. According to this logic, cyber warfare is a strategic chain reaction caused by security dilemmas. That these systemic dynamics are only now receiving sustained and rigorous academic attention,11 and that the second-order effects of cyber deployment (such as arms races) are only beginning to be fully recognized,12 is surprising and disconcerting. A further explanation relates to the nature of the domain of cyberspace itself. Because cyber capabilities can be used covertly, and cyber attacks are difficult to attribute (at least legally and politically, if not technically), they are attractive to revisionist actors, who use them as part of hybrid operations (in combination with special forces operations, disinformation and propaganda, and economic or political coercion) to advance their interests.13
Most of these structural and systemic explanations of the emergence of cyber warfare fail to appreciate the historical, cultural and ideational drivers of cyber conflict, and indeed the cultural, historical and political contexts in which cyberwar capabilities have emerged. Cyber warfare entered the popular imagination during a period of immense historical change and uncertainty. In the 1990s, the fear of hackers, often depicted as cloaked and masked figures, began to displace the fear of the ‘communist under the bed’.14 The instability caused by the disintegration of states in the post-Cold War era and the emergence of complex identity-based conflict was also influential. In Kosovo in 1999, networks of Serbian and Chinese hackers retaliated through cyberspace for the bombing of, respectively, Serbian forces and the Chinese Embassy. This fed into concerns within national security establishments that the modern battlefield was no longer a place in which nations had a monopoly on the use of force, and that a form of warfare was emerging unlike what soldiers had faced before.15 These dynamics were compounded by anticipation of the Millennium (Y2K) Bug, an event which many feared would lead to a global internet meltdown, and which set a precedent for military involvement in cyber-security affairs.16 The ‘war on terror’ perhaps did more than anything to heighten fears around the internet, with fears about cyberterrorism and ‘cyber doom scenarios’ (digital 9/11s) emerging out of acts of real violence by jihadists.17 This period of fear and uncertainty corresponded with an exponential growth in internet users, the formation of social networks, and the use of securitizing discourse to present the internet as something that needed to be managed, controlled and fought over. As Richard Ashley has argued, the conditions of the post-Cold War era—particularly the uncertainty that was inherent in both policymaking and academic communities during this period—created the conditions (a vacuum) for new security narratives (cyberwar in this case) to emerge.18 The cyberwar narrative thus gave meaning and order to a seemingly anarchic international environment. Cyberwar was not, of course, the only narrative that arose to fill the gap created by the demise of the Soviet Union. Fears over environmental and social disintegration, and the threats of civilizational conflict and jihadism, were also prominent; and the destabilizing impact of technology on national and global security became a dominant discourse that was often integrated with other security concerns—the overwrought fear of cyberterrorism, for example.
Importantly, the emergence of cyber warfare has come to constitute an overarching narrative which has been disseminated by and proved beneficial to a variety of actors. In this sense, cyberwar was not just an apolitical tool driven by uncertainty in the security environment, but a concept deliberately constructed and connected to discourses, ideas and behaviours that have permeated, and served the interests of, a host of different security communities. These include the popular and social media, where cyberwar is often depicted in apocalyptic terms—often for commercial reasons (click bait, as it is euphemistically known)— and in military establishments, which have tended to lean on conventional military strategic thought in their attempts to grasp the implications of new technologies. As Alves has argued, the use of ‘battlefield’ analogies to frame cyberspace has contributed to the securitization and militarization of the internet, and helped to dismiss the negative impacts of increasing state control and surveillance, while at the same time eroding trust, freedom and creativity.19 Lawson takes a similar view, arguing that the cyberwar discourse is indicative of ‘an ongoing crisis of effectively identifying and understanding what is old and new, the same and different about cyber conflict’.20 These cultural and discourse-based interpretations of cyberwar exist not solely owing to intellectual lag (the time it takes to rethink strategy when confronted by new security challenges), but because of deliberately constructed narratives about the nature of cyber conflict across a variety of communities that are interested in (and have interests in) cyber security being framed in this way. Cyberwar narratives are thus strategic narratives—rhetorical devices used to package and frame a security issue for strategic benefit. International Relations scholars have also benefited from these framings: creating fear can be used to justify the need for funded research on cyber security, and cyber hyperbole seeks out and draws attention to analyses in popular media and other outlets.
The harms and shortcomings of the cyberwar narrative have crystallized during the last decade. At the geopolitical level, the adoption, development and diffusion of cyber-warfare capabilities, and the diffusion of certain ideas about and characterizations of cyberwar that justify their development and use, have led to destabilizing practices among many of the world’s leading cyber powers. The widespread global damage caused by the WannaCry virus, the continued reverse engineering and widespread diffusion of the Stuxnet malware, the use of cyber attacks to destabilize political systems (as in the case of the 2016 US election) and large-scale cyber espionage on the part of some states all serve as examples. The emergence of ‘cyberwar’ has heightened tensions between world powers, and contributed to the ongoing erosion of the rules-based international order. The latest offensive doctrines of the world’s Great Powers, for example, suggest that it is acceptable to ‘defend forward’ in cyberspace, and continually and persistently to engage your adversaries, regardless of conceptions of sovereignty.21 Russia and China have used cyber attacks against power and energy grids, nuclear infrastructure and other civilian infrastructure.22 Some cyber operations have been responded to with military force, as in the Israeli air strike against a Hamas hacker facility, and the cyber doctrine of many of the world’s leading powers is based on keeping force on the table as an option to respond to network-based attacks. While deterrence and restraint may be important factors in preventing the most damaging forms of attacks,23 significant evidence has emerged that the world’s leading powers are seeking to pre-emptively install malware into foreign critical infrastructure in the expectation of future conflicts.24 Few scholars would argue that the current state of cyber security is anything but risky, dangerous, and harmful to international peace and stability, and increasing attention is being given to the range of other harms caused by offensive cyber operations, including psychological, social/societal, economic, physical and digital damage.25 The recent increase in attacks on health infrastructure and the exploitation of the COVID-19 crisis by hackers to commit cybercrime is illustrative of the connections between wider social instability and cyber operations, and of the need for remedies that don’t exacerbate the problems.
The shortcomings of cyberwar narrative and practice are evident in other areas of policy and intellectual debate too. Cyber warfare is often used to justify protecting the nation-state, even when the protection of people or groups, including vulnerable communities, within the state is not fully considered. Cyber warfare has led to overly militarized approaches to cyber security and the involvement of the military (and intelligence agencies) in traditionally civilian areas of society, even when police, justice or crime-based approaches may be more suitable to countering cyber threats (in the same way that the ‘war on terror’ was an overly militarized approach to a transnational security threat). Often, military involvement is justified by reference to the notions of the permanency and constancy of cyberwar; as the British Chief of the Defence Staff General Sir Nick Carter described it, we are ‘at war every day’.26 And yet, cyberspace is not a controllable or conquerable territory, and is fundamentally ill-suited to the logic of national, defendable boundaries.27 As Lawson argues, the proliferation of these types of narratives leads to ‘the adoption of counterproductive, even dangerous policies’.28