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It’s not just a single instance---their securitization of Chinese 5G or Huawei or cybersecurity is part of a bigger violent attempt at macrosecuritizing China

AT: No Link---AFF will say something like our specific instance in securitization---this card is just like it’s part of broader violent framing

Karsten Friis & Olav Lysne 21, Karsten is a Senior Research Fellow and head of NUPIs Research group on security & defense, Olav is a directed of Simula Metropolitian & professor of Communication Systems @ Oslo Metropolitan University, “Huawei, 5G and Security: Technological Limitations and Political Reponses,” Development and Change, Volume 52, Issue 5, p1174-1179

This changed dramatically as Western states begun preparing for the fifth generation (5G) networks. The United States embarked upon a global campaign to prevent Chinese suppliers — and in particular the company Huawei — from delivering 5G infrastructure. The American claim was that Chinese equipment would represent a national security hazard for those depending upon it — not because of its technical functionality and stability, but because it allegedly could be a gateway for Chinese espionage and sabotage of Western critical infrastructure. In other words, 5G and Chinese suppliers were securitized. The topic was elevated from the realm of ordinary politics and treated as an emergency, thus legitimizing extraordinary countermeasures (Buzan et al., 1998).

How did this happen? In this article we will explore this question and ask if the securitization of Chinese 5G suppliers was simply a subset of the US's broader securitization of China, or if there was something particular about 5G that distinguished it from previous generations of cellular networks. Further, we will ask if the ban on Chinese companies such as Huawei was an appropriate remedy. Could the securitization of 5G have been isolated from the broader securitization of China and Chinese suppliers? Finally, we will ask how the US's European allies and partners responded to this securitizing move. Did European states follow the American approach, and if not, how did they differ?

The article is an interdisciplinary attempt to address both political and technical aspects of the securitization of 5G. We use securitization theory to help frame the empirical analysis, but also engage with the interplay between the material and social dimensions in securitization theory. We argue that the material nature of 5G technology made securitization more likely, but we also demonstrate that Europe, to a large extent, chose a somewhat different approach to the US. By limiting securitization to the 5G technology (‘niche securitization’), rather than applying it to China as a whole (‘macrosecuritization’), European states achieved enhanced 5G security without confronting China more broadly.

SECURITIZATION

Securitization theory is about the social construction of a threat and the response to it. The theory emerged in the 1990s as a reaction to and rejection of rationalist notions in the then dominant theories in International Relations of dangers and risks as objective givens (Buzan et al., 1998). Instead, securitization theory emphasizes the political processes that make something a security issue. The theory has since evolved in many directions, but the key idea is that ‘an issue is given sufficient saliency to win the assent of the audience, which enables those who are authorized to handle the issue to use whatever means they deem most appropriate. In other words, securitization combines the politics of threat design with that of threat management’ (Balzacq et al., 2016: 495).

The theory comprises a securitizing actor (e.g. an individual or a state), securitizing moves (e.g. speeches and practices), an audience (e.g. a society or a parliament), and a referent object (that which is being securitized, e.g. terrorism or migration). In this article, we use a simple model to enhance an empirical study of the row over 5G in the West. We define the United States as the securitizing actor that securitized 5G through speeches and diplomatic practices in an attempt to convince Europe (the audience) to follow suit.

Applying the theory to processes taking place between states rather than inside them has been labelled macrosecuritization by Buzan and Wæver (2009). This aspect of securitization theory has not been explored as broadly as many other facets of the theory. Buzan and Wæver's model is complex and multidimensional, including level of analysis (local to global), degree of comprehensiveness (from niche to inclusive), and degree of success in convincing the audience. Macrosecuritizations, they write, ‘are necessarily launched as candidates for top-rank threats’, such as ‘geo-economics, terrorism, [and] nuclear proliferation’ (ibid.: 258–59). Niche securitizations, on the other hand, ‘get onto the agenda as accepted threats, but do not rise to top priority’; examples include ‘environmental threats, epidemic diseases, organised crime, [and] drugs’ (ibid.). Buzan and Wæver also point out that macrosecuritizations are more vulnerable to breakdown than mid- or micro-level securitizations, as the mid-level units (states) may pull out or reject the securitizing move. A reason for this could be that there are usually weaker relations between the securitizing actor and the audience on the macro/global level than in mid- or micro-level cases.

Inspired by Buzan and Wæver's model, we borrow some of its concepts for our empirical study, but do not apply it in its full complexity. In our case, the US government was not dependent upon European consent to implement restrictions on Chinese 5G suppliers on American soil. This was a domestic securitization process. The securitizing move we study, however, happened after the initial US securitization and was about convincing other states to undertake their own national securitizations of the 5G rollout. This was an American attempt at comprehensive macrosecuritization of China, with a niche securitization of 5G.

Another dimension of the theory that we engage with here is the material or technological dimension. As Buzan and Wæver (2009: 255) point out: ‘In principle, securitizing actors can attempt to construct anything as a referent object. In practice, however, the constraints of facilitating conditions mean that they are much more likely to be successful with some types of referent object than with others’. In our case we argue that the features of 5G technology — its weaknesses and vulnerabilities as well as its expected role as a critical infrastructure in our societies — are important to understanding securitization processes. In other words, these processes were constrained and impacted by the material ‘realities’ of 5G technology. Understanding, for instance, if the dangers pointed to by the securitizing actor (such as espionage) can be addressed or resolved through technological solutions, is crucial. Such understanding can help us navigate the political terrain and enhance our understanding of securitization processes. This does not mean that the technological specificities of 5G telecoms in any way determine political outcomes — but they do affect them. In short, if a simple technical solution could mitigate all the concerns raised by the securitizing actor, securitization would fail.

AMERICAN SECURITIZATION OF CHINESE TELECOMS

Voices calling for the securitization of Chinese telecommunications companies in the US can be traced back to at least 2010. At that time, the FBI, politicians and US experts repeatedly pointed out that Chinese companies could pose a security threat to the United States (Barboza, 2010). In 2012 Congress warned that the ‘United States should view with suspicion the continued penetration of the US telecommunications market by Chinese telecommunications companies’ (US House of Representatives, 2012: vi).

At the time, these warnings did not gain too much traction. The overall political mood when it came to Chine was one of inclusion. Since the 1990s, the US and the West had had a clear strategy to bring China (and others, such as Russia) into the existing world order. In practice, this meant that they were invited into existing regimes, such as the World Trade Organization, and that trade and dialogue were promoted with the hope that authoritarian regimes would open up and gradually democratize. This policy had been questioned and criticized for a while, but as the Trump administration took office in 2016, a distinct shift in both rhetoric and practices could be noted. Trump embarked upon a confrontational approach towards China in many areas, not least in trade, tariffs and industrial production, but also in security. The argument was that the strategy of inclusion and change had failed, and that China had abused American openness to subsidize its industry, manipulate currency, steal technology and position itself in global markets. Increasingly authoritarian political developments in China and growing pressure on neighbouring countries were also referred to by US government officials. The securitization of Chinese 5G must therefore be seen in this broader context of American securitization of China in general.

It was the Chinese telecoms company Huawei that became a particular target (referent object) of securitization in the US. As a world leader in 5G technology, and a provider of the 4G networks in many Western countries, Huawei was a strong candidate to secure many 5G contracts. However, the Trump administration took a robust stance against the company, citing the risks of espionage from China. They claimed that Huawei and other Chinese technology companies represented a serious threat to national security, as their 5G systems could be misused for the purpose of espionage or even sabotage by China (Cartwright, 2020).

Questions were asked about its ownership structure and the influence the Chinese Communist Party had over Huawei (Hawes and Li, 2017; Rühlig, 2020). In particular, critics of Huawei referred to the 2017 Chinese Intelligence Law, which requires Chinese companies to turn over information to, and comply with, China's intelligence and security services (Rühlig and Björk, 2020: 9). As a result, in 2018 the US decided to ban the use of Huawei and ZTE, another Chinese telecommunications company, in the Armed Forces (US Congress, 2018). Furthermore, in May 2019 the US put Huawei on its ‘Entities List’, a list of companies not allowed to buy American products (Federal Register, 2019). This meant that Huawei could no longer use US-made chips and other components in its products.

In April 2020, the then Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, announced that the United States would introduce a ‘5G Clean Path’ system that would ensure that no correspondence from US embassies would go through Chinese networks or systems. This was later extended to the ‘Clean Network’, whose purpose was to ‘secure national resources, including citizens’ computer security and the company's most sensitive information from aggressive intrusions by malicious actors, such as the Chinese Communist Party’ (US Department of State, 2020a). The Clean Network included ‘Clean Apps’, ‘Clean Carrier’, ‘Clean Store’, ‘Clean Cable’, ‘Clean Cloud’ and ‘Clean Path’. The purpose was to exclude Chinese companies from app stores, remove American apps from Chinese app stores, and refrain from using Chinese networks, cloud services and cables.

At the same time that Huawei was securitized domestically, the Trump administration embarked upon a global campaign to make other countries follow suit. The language used by US officials was forthright, with no diplomatic filters. For instance, in 2020 the then Secretary of Defense, Mark Esper, stated that: ‘If countries choose to go the Huawei route, it could well jeopardize all the information sharing and intelligence sharing we have been talking about, and that could undermine the alliance, or at least our relationship with that country’ (quoted in Sanger and McCabe, 2020). In short, the securitization of Huawei consisted of rhetoric focused on risks and dangers, restrictive legislation and a global campaign, which we will return to below.

However, the campaign against Huawei was not restricted to telecoms security. The company was accused by US authorities of racketeering and theft of trade secrets. The conflict peaked in 2019 when Huawei and its chief financial officer, Meng Wanzhou, were indicted for fraud and sanctions evasion. The arrest of Meng Wanzhou in Canada and subsequent — seemingly retaliatory — arrests of Canadian citizens in China contributed to a strained political climate between China, the US and Canada (Blanchfield, 2020). However, none of this had anything to do with 5G security. According to Sanger and McCabe (2020), ‘The Huawei fight is just one part of a bigger US–China battle, as Washington tries to contain Beijing's influence and power and ensure that the world's second-largest economy does not come to dominate advanced industries that could give it an economic and military edge’. Furthermore, they hold, ‘The United States is also trying to limit China's access to American technology more broadly and is considering restricting sales of microchips, artificial intelligence, robotics and some types of advanced software, along with preventing tech companies from teaming up — or even sharing research — with Chinese firms’ (ibid.). Hence, the securitization of Huawei was about more than just 5G security; geopolitics and economic rivalry were also important factors (Inkster, 2019; Mascitelli and Chung, 2019). The securitization of 5G and Huawei was therefore part of a broader US policy of confronting and securitizing China across a spectrum of issues. It was part of a comprehensive and global macrosecuritization of China.

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