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Cyberthreats are intentionally vague and ambiguous as per 1AC “” as a means of increasing false paranoia---turns solvency--it creates fear-induced complacency

---ask them in CX who attacks? How do they attack? The internal link chain for cyberattacks escalating to nuclear war is intentionally made as vague as possible

Sean Lawson & Michael K. Middleton 19, Sean is an associate professor in Communication at the University of Utah, Michael is an associate professor in Communication at the University of Utah, “Cyber Pearl Harbor: Analogy, fear, and the framing of cyber security threats in the United States, 1991-2016,” First Manday, Volume 24, Number 3 – 4, March 2019, https://journals.uic.edu/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/9623 \\pairie

Cyber Pearl Harbor in the securitization of cyberspace

Scholars working within the critical constructivist tradition of security studies have explored the role of language and rhetoric in U.S. cyber security discourse (Bendrath, 2003, 2001; Bendrath, et al., 2007; Betz and Stevens, 2013; Dunn Cavelty, 2007; Eriksson, 2002; Hansen and Nissenbaum, 2009; Lawson, 2012). Much of this work has been informed by securitization theory, which posits that it is not predetermined which security threats will make it onto the political agenda. Instead, security threats are “constructed” because the process of identifying, understanding, and responding to them is the result of political discourse. That process involves a “securitizing actor” (usually a political leader or decision-maker) identifying “threat subjects” (the source of the threat), “referent objects” (that which is threatened), and the prospective impacts of a threat (Buzan, et al., 1998; Campbell, 1998). Additionally, Dunn Cavelty (2007) notes that in the case of cyber securitization, specific and sometimes dramatic events or conditions that she calls “focusing events” can serve to focus attention on cyber security threats.

Critical security scholars have been particularly interested in the construction of cyber threats because they exemplify the emergence of various “new threats” in the post-Cold War period [1]. These have included a host of seemingly ambiguous, uncertain, but dangerous threats related to environmental degradation, poverty, health, immigration, and technology [2]. Cyber threat perceptions have mirrored the ambiguity and uncertainty found in perceptions of other “new threats,” making it difficult to identify and then communicate clearly and precisely what it is that is threatened, by whom, and with what potential impacts, in and through cyberspace. As threat perceptions have shifted, so have claims about the primary subjects (e.g., foreign spies, criminals, terrorists, insiders), objects (e.g., corporate data, state secrets, critical infrastructure), and impacts (e.g., monetary loss, diminished economic competitiveness, physical disruption or destruction) of those threats (Dunn Cavelty, 2007; Bendrath, 2003, 2001; Bendrath, et al., 2007).

From the “wild west” to “space,” metaphors and analogies have been central to attempts to understand the Internet and its meaning for society and culture broadly (Johnston, 2009). It is unsurprising, therefore, that the framing of cyber threats in public policy discourse has also relied (perhaps overly so) on metaphors and analogies of various kinds, including to war, military, weapons, and natural disaster (Betz and Stevens, 2013; Lawson, 2012; Lapointe, 2011; Dunn Cavelty, 2013; Libicki, 1997). Among these, “cyber Pearl Harbor” is one of the most prominent in the U.S. cybersecurity debate [3] and is exemplary of the widespread use of “cyber-doom,” “shut down the power grid,” and “worst-case” scenarios by the full range of participants in these debates [4]. In particular, “cyber Pearl Harbor” is exemplary of the tendency to deploy hypothetical scenarios, but also to appropriate the fear and anxiety elicited by non-cyber events such as natural disasters, conventional military attacks, or terrorist attacks to promote fear of cyber-doom [5].

Existing research has yielded a number of important insights and raised a number of serious concerns about the U.S. cybersecurity debate. Scholars have noted that the ambiguity and uncertainty surrounding subjects, objects, means, and impacts of new threats like those to/through cyberspace can lead to a tendency toward possibilistic thinking and a logic of preventative or precautionary action (Füredi, 2009; Sunstein, 2002). In turn, these characteristics have resulted in increased concern over the possibility of “threat inflation,” defined as “the attempt by elites to create concern for a threat that goes beyond the scope and urgency that a disinterested analysis would justify” [6]. Having been identified as “emblematic of new threats,” [7] a number of scholars, journalists, and even some security professionals have argued that U.S. public policy discourse about cybersecurity has been particularly prone to threat inflation (Brito and Watkins, 2011; Blunden, 2015; Blunden and Cheung, 2014; Dunn Cavelty and Van Der Vlugt, 2015; Gartzke, 2013; Schneier, 2010). Still others have raised the concern that use of cyber-doom rhetoric in this debate may backfire, leading to fear-induced complacency instead of the motivation to act that users of such rhetoric presumably wish to elicit from audiences (Lawson, et al., 2016; Hamre, 2015).

To date, whether cyber terror, crime, or warfare, we have not seen any cyber attack approximate the level of destruction contemplated in cyber Pearl Harbor-like scenarios. For well over a decade, scholars have called attention to the inflated fears of cyber terror (Debrix, 2001; Weimann, 2008, 2005; Stohl, 2006; Conway, 2008). Other studies have pointed to inflated estimates of the impacts of cyber crime (Wall, 2008; Jardine, 2017, 2015; Anderson, et al., 2013; Florêncio and Herley, 2013; Romanosky, 2016; Jardine, 2018). Finally, even though the recent conflict in Ukraine has included the first documented cases of cyber attacks used to take down electrical grids, the immediate effects of these attacks were limited, as have been the effects of cyber attacks on the shape of the military conflict more generally (Kostyuk and Zhukov, 2019; Jensen, et al., 2019).

It is perhaps unsurprising; therefore, that such scenarios have come under increased scrutiny over the last several years. Even before the Russian cyber-interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, some current and former intelligence officials had rejected the use of “cyber Armageddon” or “cyber Pearl Harbor” descriptions of cyber threats facing the United States (Bussey, 2016; Clapper, 2015; Hamre, 2015). After the election, many more have argued that Russian cyber-interference shows that the U.S. had been looking in the wrong direction with respect to cyber attacks (Lewis, 2018, 2017; Lipton, et al., 2016; Nye, 2016; Orcutt, 2017; Pollard and Devost, 2016; Pollard, et al., 2018; Pollock, 2017; Von Drehle, 2017; Rid and Buchanan, 2018; Weinstein, 2018; Wolff, 2018). Nonetheless, some have called Russian election hacking the fulfillment of decades of cyber Pearl Harbor predictions (Carr, 2017; Chang and Osborne, 2017; Graham, 2017; Spring, 2017). In these cases, emphasis is placed on the element of surprise in the 2016 Russian cyber operations, not necessarily the physical destruction, of which there was none.

Existing scholarship, recent developments, and the debate that they have sparked, raise a number of important questions. Where does the “cyber Pearl Harbor” analogy come from? What is such a scenario supposed to entail? How has the analogy evolved during its 25 years of use by cyber security stakeholders? And, is it possible that use of this analogy can have negative implications for cyber security policy-making? In the next section, we detail the sources and methods that we have used to help answer these questions.

The discursive construction of cyber Pearl Harbor: Sources and methods

For over 25 years, Americans have been warned that the United States faces an imminent cyber Pearl Harbor, involving cyber attacks against critical infrastructure leading to mass destruction and disruption, followed by social and economic chaos. In a 1999 article, New York Times reporter John Markoff provided perhaps the most concise definition, noting that the “specter of simultaneous computer network attacks against banking, transportation, commerce and utility targets — as well as against the military — conjures up the fear of an electronic Pearl Harbor in which the nation is paralyzed without a single bullet ever being fired” (Markoff, 1999). Markoff’s definition echoed the doomsday scenario envisioned by computer security entrepreneur Winn Schwartau who, in a 1991 op-ed for Computerworld, first used the analogy (which was repeated in his testimony before the U.S. Congress that same year). Schwartau described the impacts of such an event as “truly crippling,” “devastating,” and “inflicting massive damage” on a scale that would undermine “the continuation of well-ordered society ... [to] function as we know it” (Schwartau, 1991).

Twenty years later, the metaphor was still strongly in circulation when former U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta warned Congress, “I’ve often said that there’s a strong likelihood that the next Pearl Harbor that we confront could ... be a cyber attack that cripples our power systems, our grid, our security systems, our financial systems, our governmental systems. This is a real possibility” (U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, 2011). The following year, Panetta doubled down, declaring that a cyber Pearl Harbor “could be as destructive as the terrorist attack of 9/11,” “cause panic, destruction, and even the loss of life,” “paralyze and shock the nation, and create a profound new sense of vulnerability” (Panetta, 2012).

To unpack both the staying power and implications of the cyber Pearl Harbor analogy over 25 years of cybersecurity discourse, this study combines a rhetorical analysis of key texts that utilize the cyber Pearl Harbor metaphor with a quantitative content analysis of U.S. newspaper articles from 1991 (when the concept first emerged) until 2016 (when Russian election tampering refocused national attention on cybersecurity). Both forms of analysis rely on theoretical insights from the critical constructivist tradition of scholarship in security studies (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010; see also Bendrath, 2003, 2001; Bendrath, et al., 2007; Dunn Cavelty, 2007; Eriksson, 2002; Hansen and Nissenbaum, 2009; Lawson, 2012; Betz and Stevens, 2013).

First, we identified ten key texts that we examined through close reading and rhetorical analysis (see Appendix C). These texts were chosen because they were exemplary of the use of the cyber Pearl Harbor analogy by critical stakeholders, including industry experts, government officials, large media outlets, or others with the ability to shape and influence U.S. cyber security discourse. The kinds of texts chosen included op-eds, Congressional testimony, speeches, a documentary film, and a declassified government document. Rhetorical analysis provides a tool for explaining “the relationship of persons and ideas within a situation” [8]. To arrive at these explanations, rhetoricians cast their net broadly, asking how “written as well as spoken discourse, nonverbal [e.g., images] as well as verbal symbols, movements as well as individual events, and functions other than those implied by a narrow conception of persuasion” and overtly persuasive texts provide a lens through which to understand how ideas and their relationship to both their producers and audiences are shaped and defined (Brockriede, 1974). Rhetorical analysis’ focus on textual features (metaphor, analogy, etc.) and argumentative strategies provides a means to deconstruct these texts, identifying how cyber Pearl Harbor comes to be defined and operationalized in political debates over its importance. In this regard, rhetorical analysis provides a technique for identifying an “unfolding sequence of arguments, ideas, and figures which interact through the text and gradually build a structure of meaning” [9]. For example, rhetorical analysis helps identify how threat subjects, referent objects, and focusing events that constitute cyber Pearl Harbor are discursively constructed through these key texts. However, beyond helping illuminate how these texts function to define cyber Pearl Harbor as a real and viable threat, a rhetorically-driven close reading also helps inform our analysis of 25 years of media discourse about cyber Pearl Harbor because “the close reading of specific texts often provides both data and methods for comprehending larger discursive formations” [10].

Second, for our quantitative content analysis, we collected examples of the cyber Pearl Harbor analogy in U.S. news media by searching the “U.S. Newspapers” category in LexisNexis Academic Universe using the search string “electronic pearl harbor” OR “digital pearl harbor” OR “cyber pearl harbor.” [11] This produced 214 results. After removal of duplicates and irrelevant results (e.g., letters to the editor), the final coded set included 203 articles. Content analysis complements a rhetorical analysis focused on key texts that participated in and constructed the cyber Pearl Harbor analogy in two ways. First, whereas rhetorical analysis focuses on a small number of key texts to identify the specific rhetorical strategies, content analysis provides a means to identify and draw inferences about how those texts circulate in media discourse and to broader audiences. Second, content analysis complements the interpretive and qualitative conclusions of rhetorical analysis with systematic and more objective accounts of how the cyber Pearl Harbor analogy has evolved. While content analysis operates as a method across a variety of disciplines and includes many variations, its essential characteristic is that it offers a methodology for “a summarizing, quantitative analysis of messages that relies on the scientific method, including attention to objectivity, a priori design, reliability, validity, generalizability, and replicability” [12].

When practicing content analysis, the dimensions of texts that are quantified can be identified and defined inductively or deductively [13]. In the case of the former, researchers derive variables to be quantified by developing familiarity with a body of texts to the extent that a set of exhaustive, mutually exclusive categories emerge. Deductive variables, on the other hand, are derived from a theoretical framework that informs the content analysis and which are relevant to the texts under examination based on related scholarship [14]. For example, in the present study, coding categories were informed by the main concepts of securitization theory, including securitizing actor and referent object, as well as the sentiment of the article and the focusing events or conditions identified as reason for taking such a threat seriously (see Appendix A). For each category, we collaboratively coded random samples from our overall pool of articles until intercoder reliability was established (see Appendix B). Once we achieved an acceptable level of reliability, we divided and independently coded the remainder of the articles. While this practice of quantification of the content of texts can offer a variety of measurement possibilities, most content analysis, like the present study, relies on frequency data to support its inferences about texts, the circumstances of their emergence, and the contexts and consequence of their circulation [15].

By combining these two methodological approaches, we are able to make complementary claims about the development of the cyber Pearl Harbor analogy within cyber security discourses. On the one hand, rhetorical analysis offers a “close-up” view of specific exemplars, or key texts, crafted by primary stakeholders in the evolution of cyber security policy and political discourse. On the other hand, the “satellite view” offered by content analysis of a broad swath of texts across a period of time enables us to identify variations in the intensity of discussion of cyber security via the cyber Pearl Harbor analogy, as well as who is participating in that discourse, based on what concerns, and with what aims (Hart, 1990; Hoffman and Waisanen, 2015). By working between these two levels of abstraction and critical insight, our approach to the use of the cyber Pearl Harbor analogy allows us to make inferences about how these two sources of discourse on the subject influence one another, how they are impacted by contextual factors, e.g., terror attacks, cyber security breaches, etc., and how certain dimensions of the cyber Pearl Harbor analogy are strategically given greater presence (or marginalized) to shape cybersecurity outcomes.

The emergence and evolution of cyber Pearl Harbor

There has been confusion over the origins of the Pearl Harbor analogy in U.S. cyber security discourse. In December 2015, former defense official, John Hamre, claimed to have been the first person to use the term publicly in his November 1997 testimony before the U.S. Congress. He further claimed that General Tom Marsh had been “the author of that phrase” as a result of having led the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, the final report from which was published in 1997 (Hamre, 2015). Others have claimed that president of the RSA computer security company, D. James Bidzos, was the first to use the term in 1991. However, as Tim Stevens notes, the weight of the available evidence supports the contention that it was the computer security entrepreneur, and novelist, Winn Schwartau, who first used the term “electronic Pearl Harbor” in 1991 in an op-ed, Congressional testimony, and a self-published novel [16].

Regardless of its likely emergence in the early 1990s from computer security industry experts, the Pearl Harbor analogy did not become widespread until the mid to late 1990s when it was mentioned in a string of Congressional testimonies by government officials, most notably Director of the C.I.A. John Deutch in 1996 and Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre in 1997 and 1998. A close reading of these early sources of cyber Pearl Harbor from the 1990s demonstrates that the seeds of the currently dominant use of that analogy and related themes emerged very early in the discourse. However, it also reveals the existence of subtle differences in early meanings of cyber Pearl Harbor, which were in turn associated in some cases with differing views of how one should respond to such a threat.

In June 1996, Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) opened a hearing of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee on cyber threats by informing listeners and participants that the proceeding would

“focus on the possibility that cyber-attacks on our national infrastructure could be used as a part of a coordinated strategic attack on the United States. How likely is such a scenario? Who has the capacity to launch such an attack? How do we defend against such an attack? Perhaps most important, would we even recognize the fact that such an attack was being carried and be able to determine who was behind the attack in a very timely manner?” (Deutch, 1996)

That is, the hearing would focus on the primary issues of concern for the construction of any threat narrative, including the identification of potential threat subjects and referent objects: Who might attack? What might they target? The answer to the referent object question was already assumed: “national infrastructure.” But, just which infrastructure would be targeted was less certain. What is more, Sen. Nunn raised questions related to evidence and uncertainty, as well as possible responses. How do we know, in the realm of cyber threats, where the real concerns exist and, in the end, what do we do? Beyond the hearing that day, all of the key texts that address the possibility of cyber Pearl Harbor provide answers to most of these questions.

Where threat subjects are concerned, the key texts that we analyzed from the 1990s and early 2000s were focused almost exclusively on non-state actors. Of course, Schwartau’s piece was titled “Fighting terminal terrorism” and contemplated that ”a motivated individual or organization” could carry out “an electronic Pearl Harbor” (Schwartau, 1991). In his 1996 testimony, DCI Deutch and his questioner, Sen. Sam Nunn, both worried about the possibility that not just states, but also “sub-national groups” and “terrorist groups” could obtain the capability to carry out cyber attacks against the United States’ vulnerable networks. DCI Deutch also mentioned the potential, but uncertain threat from “individual criminal elements or individual hacker activities” (Deutch, 1996). Finally, the 2003 PBS Frontline documentary, Cyber War!, which included interviews with prominent cyber security experts, focused entirely on non-state cyber threats, particularly the threat of from terrorists (Kirk, 2003).

Though they continue to mention possible non-state attackers, we see an increased concern with state actors over time in the later texts that we analyzed. Gen. Alexander’s 2012 memo about preventing a cyber Pearl Harbor mentions non-state actors, but is primarily focused on “nation states” (Alexander, 2012). Similarly, Secretary Panetta’s 2012 speech noted the threats from cyber criminals, but said “the even greater danger facing us in cyberspace goes beyond crime and harassment. A cyber attack perpetrated by nation states or violent extremist groups could be as destructive as the terrorist attack of 9/11” (Panetta, 2012). Finally, Hamre’s December 2015 op-ed warned, “Hostile intelligence and military establishments are prepared to wage war now, using cyber tools” (Hamre, 2015).

In both cases, however, specific actors are rarely mentioned, with a few exceptions. In the non-state category, al-Qa’ida is sometimes identified as a potential attacker in the wake of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks (Kirk, 2003). Later, when officials like Secretary Panetta begin to focus more on the threat from state actors, we see occasional mentions of China, Russia, and Iran as potential perpetrators of a cyber Pearl Harbor attack (Alexander, 2012; Panetta, 2012). However, the texts we analyzed far more often identified generic, unspecified state or non-state actors (or both) as the would-be authors of a cyber Pearl Harbor (Schwartau, 1991; Deutch, 1996; Hamre, 1998, 1997; Panetta, 2011). In short, those officials and experts raising the alarm about the threat of a cyber Pearl Harbor were often unclear about exactly who might carry out such an attack.

Far from being a rhetorical weakness, this inability or unwillingness to identify specific threat subjects may serve to heighten fear of a possible cyber Pearl Harbor. One might expect that inability or unwillingness to specify who is willing and able to carry out such an attack would weaken the case that such a threat is indeed real. Instead, the so-called “attribution problem” (Lindsay, 2015; Rid and Buchanan, 2014; Schulzke, 2018) — the idea that one could be cyber attacked without knowing who had carried out the attack — emerged as a consistent theme in the cyber Pearl Harbor discourse that only seemed to heighten the fear. This possibility was first raised by Schwartau, who cautioned that “such an attack can also be launched ... with little or no ability to identify ... the perpetrators” and that “the source of the attack is completely disguised” (Schwartau, 1991). In 1996, the difficulty in determining the source of cyber attack was a concern raised multiple times in Sen. Nunn’s questioning of DCI Deutch (Deutch, 1996). In his 1997 testimony, John Hamre noted, “Our knowledge of the origin of such attacks, and their sponsorship, is likely to be imprecise” (Hamre, 1997). The 2003 PBS documentary used the examples of the Slammer, Code Red, and Nimda malware attacks as evidence of the danger of the attribution problem (Kirk, 2003). By 2012, however, Secretary Panetta was warning would-be cyber attackers that the U.S. had “made significant investments in forensics to address this problem of attribution, and we are seeing returns on those investments” (Panetta, 2012).

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