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Cybersecurity or cyberterrorism are the latest manifestations of over-militarized responses to constructed threat---it feeds into collective paranoia and encourages violent policies

Joe Burton & Clare Lain 20, Joe Burton is the Associate Lecturer in the School of IR at the University of St Andrews, Clare Lain is the Head of International Bodies and Technical Engagement, “Desecuritising cybersecurity: towards a societal approach,” Journal of Cyber Policy, Volume 5, Issue 3, 12/14/2020, p455-460 \\pairie

Reinterpreting cyberconflict – path dependency, securitisation and the national cybersecurity state

If the societal security approach is an effective theoretical tool to understand recent cyber events, and a potentially more salient policy framework, then how is it that national and military security-based approaches to cybersecurity have become so dominant in the previous two decades? In answering that question, this section analyses several events that led to the emergence and subsequent consolidation of national cybersecurity states and undermined the emergence of a more decentralised, societal approach based on identity conflicts and socio-psychological factors. This is not an extensive history of post-Cold War cyberconflict. Nevertheless, these cases provide snapshots of the process by which cybersecurity was ‘securitised’ by many governments in the West and national security agencies obtained considerable power in this emergent domain. Cyberattacks were framed in the discourse of political leaders during this period as an existential threat to nations that would cause major disruptions to national economies and be catalysts for conflict between the great powers. Growing concerns over internet failure and instability and attacks against critical infrastructure were instrumental in creating fear and paranoia, but also served the political and commercial purposes of securitising actors and hindered the emergence of societal approaches. Later in the period, owing partly to the growing influence of social media platforms, the societal effects of disinformation were layered into anxiety-saturated cyber policy. Importantly, these cases also created path-dependencies in which the relationship between government and the societal sector worsened and through which military agencies and structures have taken actions that have intensified societal and cybersecurity dilemmas.

‘Millennium madness’ – Kosovo and the Y2K bug

The conflict in Kosovo in 1999 was one of the first major conflicts in which cyberattacks were used by warring parties for strategic advantage. In March that year, NATO, while conducting strategic air strikes on the forces of Milosevic, sustained cyberattacks from Serbian hackers targeted at its headquarters and digital infrastructure. In response to the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, Chinese hackers also conducted cyberattacks against the White House website, the US departments of energy and the interior and the national parks service, including replacing website content with images and text expressing fury over the bombing. The US military’s response exhibited elements of restraint, but Pentagon commanders considered a variety of electronic measures to respond to Serbian hackers and enhance their own operational and political effectiveness through electronic means. This included hacking into Serbian banks to cause economic problems for the regime, trying to isolate Slobodan Milosevic electronically to harm the continuity and centrality of command, and targeting his own personal wealth to bring him to the negotiating table (Borger 1999). The Pentagon’s restraint at this time was largely due to legal concerns over whether the use of cyberweapons would constitute war crimes, whether they would be strategically successful, whether they would accelerate the development of offensive cyber tools by foreign power (the security dilemma), and whether the tools used could be reverse engineered or at least reveal US military cyber capabilities and methods (Borger 1999).

The hacks created strong incentives to nationalise and militarise cybersecurity and demonstrated to the US and NATO militaries the seriousness of the cyberthreat they faced. However, the social and psychological elements of the conflict are underappreciated. Kosovo was a typical identity-based conflict, where warring parties were from ethnically aligned, culturally adversarial societal groups. The activities were conducted by non-state hackers, including Serbian and Chinese nationalists, and targeted not only military organisations but the societal sector (parks and energy, for example), illustrating the need for (and lack of) attention to societal cyber vulnerabilities, the spillover effects of military conflicts into the societal sector, and the inability of the US military to respond to hacks and provide assistance to organisations that became entangled in the conflict’s electronic dynamics. The hackers involved in hacktivism during the conflict, moreover, were part of global social networks that included traditional anti-war sentiment and groups. It is illustrative of our argument that when NATO intervened in Libya in 2011, 12 years after the war in Kosovo, Serbian hackers conducted similar anti-NATO hacks. In this case, online communities opposed to and influenced by NATO interventions transcended spatial and temporal boundaries. This was not, however, a lesson prominent in those derived from this and subsequent conflicts. The Kosovo cyberattacks also demonstrated the importance of the informational elements of contemporary conflict and the war of narratives that influences public opinion during conflict situations. The aim of the hackers and the effect of the hacks were to deny and prevent the NATO public affairs website from communicating its narrative around the conflict (the public affairs website was inoperable for several days). In this respect, the tactical and operation effects of the hacking operation, including increasing NATO manpower requirements, slowing operating tempo and enlarging the potential for human error in the air strike operations (Department of Defense 2000) were combined with social and psychological effects targeting perceptions of the conflict among identity groups. Ultimately, none of them caused major damage to the alliance or the US and the impact of these hacks should not be overestimated. In this respect, the acceleration of military capabilities and doctrine that occurred after and because of the conflict may have been disproportionate to the actual threat, which is a common feature of the process of securitisation.

Similar societal and psychosocial dynamics were in evidence as the global community, and particularly the financial sector, faced the prospect of an ‘electronic meltdown’ caused by the Millennium (Y2K) Bug at the turn of the century. The bug caused widespread fear about the integrity of the global internet and hundreds of billions of dollars were spent by governments around the world to prepare for, and mitigate, potential effects (Jowitt 2017). The bug was a relatively simple glitch in electronic systems caused by the transition from the four-digit date 1999–2000, but nevertheless, caused widespread alarm. In October 1998, President Bill Clinton signed the Year 2000 Information and Readiness Disclosure Act, which was an attempt to encourage private sector (and societal sector) actors to share information about Y2K-related vulnerabilities by offering them limited indemnity against losses or lawsuits resulting from the potential disruption. These attempts to involve the societal sector were not helped, however, by a wider context of securitisation. An issue of Time Magazine was indicative of both the global hysteria and the securitising discourse, raising the prospect of Y2K causing ‘The end of the world!?!’, citing ‘Y2K insanity!’, ‘Apocalypse Now!’, asking ‘Will computers melt down? Will society?’, providing what it called ‘A Guide to Millennium Madness’ and citing fears of airlines and banking systems going haywire (Ghishal 2017).

These concerns spilled over into the defence sector, with John Hamre, the US Deputy Secretary of Defense from 1997 to March 2000, contributing to the securitising discourse by arguing that ‘the Y2K problem is the electronic equivalent of the El Niño and there will be nasty surprises around the globe’ (Jowitt 2017). References by cyber policymakers to extreme weather events, Armageddon, apocalypse, natural disasters, pandemics, biological agents and previous wartime scenarios were commonplace in the early 2000s and such analogies served to structure thinking and as rhetorical tools to add urgency to the securitising process (Betz and Stevens 2013). This rhetoric was accompanied by several more practical measures which set a precedent for military responses to cyber-related incidents. In the UK, for example, armed forces were put on standby to assist in maintaining vital public services in the event of an internet meltdown, including providing disaster relief in the event of hospitals, water supplies and roads and traffic systems being affected (Waugh 1998). In the US, officials noted the possibility of military responses to Y2 K problems and addressed concerns about effects of the bug on nuclear missile operations (Gershwin 1999). This contributed to a broader process where militaries were searching for new roles in the absence of the Soviet threat and were increasingly planning for involvement in civil crises and emergencies across security sectors. In this way, trends in cybersecurity advanced in parallel with broader securitisation patterns, including in areas such as pandemic response, terrorism and migration.

While the Y2K bug eventually turned out to be a ‘damp squib’, the fear and uncertainty it generated fed into a new era of collective paranoia which further accelerated the securitisation of the internet and its functions. This included the construction of a perception that the internet lacked resilience and underpinned society in a way that was inherently vulnerable and prone to disintegration (Best 2003). This ran counter to the idea of the internet as a democratising technology, facilitating harmonious relations and technological and societal progress, and exposed ‘the fundamental unknowability both of computer technology and of the ultimate value of that technology, its networking capacity, and its generation of information’ (Best 2003). As Kasvio (2000) argues, ‘Even if the transition to the new Millennium did not cause any major collapses of the existing computer systems, the whole process of preparatory measures showed clearly how strongly the vital functions of modern societies depend on the orderly functioning of extremely complicated systems which nobody fully understands’. The Y2K problem also demonstrated a tendency, which was to become a central feature of cybersecurity debates in the 2000s, to overestimate the risks posed by new technologies, and create disproportionate, centralised and bureaucratic responses. In the words of Quiggin (2005), the Y2K bug created a moral panic in which there was a ‘systematic tendency, arising from the nature of the mass media and political processes, to overstate some kinds of threats, particularly those involving new and unfamiliar dangers.’ This was compounded by a media that tended to exaggerate the risk, sensationalise stories and not cover government efforts to mitigate risks involved, burdensome as those efforts were (Quigley 2004, 823).

In line with the argument in this article, the Y2K bug also had broader socio-psychological effects and demonstrated the need for governments to manage these (although little was done in the aftermath of any of these events to reconcile these dynamics). These effects are addressed by Kevin Quigley (2004, 825), who argues:

IT ranks high in the ‘dread factor’ in psychometric terms; it has the power to unleash considerable anxiety. The more government depends on IT to deliver its service, the more vulnerable it is to a public that oscillates from hyper-reaction to hyper-reaction. Indeed, while IT commentators, both professional and amateur, offer IT as the universal solution to social and organizational problems, Y2 K demonstrates that the ‘panacea’ can quickly deteriorate to a paradoxical ‘organized pandemonium’, as in the case of Y2 K. Hence, the government must be sensitive to this potential and must adopt effective communications with key partners, be they suppliers, private industry, the media or civil society at large, to reassure these partners that they are managing IT effectively.

The effectiveness of communication between the government and private sector was not helped during this period by governments’ own securitisation of the incident.

9/11 And weapons of mass disruption

The fears generated by the Y2K problem did not subside after the millennium passed but were compounded and intensified in processes that resulted from the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, DC. The attacks presented a seminal moment in the development of fears around cyberterrorism, especially as enhanced border and aviation security created incentives for non-state actors to try to strike the US remotely through digital networks and digital infrastructure. In the aftermath of the attacks, various measures were taken by the US government to protect the US ‘homeland’, and these extended into cyberspace. Concrete examples of enhanced digital security measures included the Patriot Act, which allowed the US government unprecedented powers to access electronic communications, and the now widely-covered activities of the US National Security Agency, including the Prism programme, which enabled the agency to identify and target illegal and extremist activity online through ‘mass surveillance’. The war on terror served to further nationalise security in the US, created powerful new bureaucracies, including the Department for Homeland Security, which was given strong statutory authority to respond to cyberthreats. The empowerment of the intelligence community was also a feature of the post 9/11 environment and a variety of agencies took on a role in online operations against terrorists and rogue states. This powerful national cybersecurity state was not best aligned to match the challenge of globally connected systems of computers and the debates that emerged within the national security community over deterrence and pre-emption returned to Cold War concepts. There was a tendency, for example, to equate weapons of mass disruption (cyberweapons) with weapons of mass destruction and a close association emerged between digital threats and physical – and even nuclear – threats to American and its allies in the aftermath of 9/11. Former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta’s warning of a ‘cyber pearl harbour’ (Bumiller and Shanker 2012) is perhaps the most famous and widely cited example, but there were many others. These warnings appear to have been unrealistic and fears around terrorism and the capability of non-state actors to mount large scale and sophisticated cyberattacks have largely proved unfounded.

The most fundamental problem here was a failure to identify that ‘cyberterrorism’ – cyberattacks causing equivalent effects to conventional terrorist attacks – was not such a serious threat as feared and constructed by national security agencies. In this sense, cyberterrorism was based on fears that were not accurately assessed and which fuelled securitisation processes. A secondary problem was the widespread conflation between cyberterrorism (a very limited problem by any measure) and terrorist use of the internet (a more serious and pervasive issue). The ‘cyber 9/11’ scenario failed to materialise for various reasons, including the fact that cyberattacks do not create the powerful visual effects that more conventional acts of terrorism do; that the difficulty of attributing cyberattacks does not allow terrorist groups to derive the propaganda benefit of being held clearly responsible for such attacks; and the lack of scientific and technical expertise to pull off more than just nuisance type acts of cybervandalism. Despite these now seemingly obvious dynamics, the term cyberterrorism entered the national security discourse and often went unchallenged. As Sean Lawson (2013, 86) has argued, ‘cyber-doom scenarios are the latest manifestation of fears about ‘technology-out-of-control’ in Western societies,’ and are ‘unrealistic’ and ‘encourage the adoption of counterproductive, even dangerous policies.’ In this context it is worth noting that, in some cases, states have taken military actions against hackers associated with terrorist groups, including the targeted killing by US forces of an ISIS hacker in 2016 and the more recent Israeli military attack against a Hamas cyber facility. These kinetic responses do not appear to have been based on the likelihood of physical damage being caused by cyber operations, but in response to hack and leak operations in the US case (the ISIS hacker has released hacked details of US military personnel), and a Hamas cyber operation which had already been fended off by Israeli cyber defences (Newman 2019). In this respect, and in line with the arguments of this article, terrorism presents an arguably greater societal threat than it does to the military, stems from identity divides that terrorist groups prey on and exploit and has led to over-militarised responses which have fed existing identity-based conflicts.

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