The affirmative relies on fear-mongering tactics — competition is distinct from acts of force.
Dr. Donald Stoker 20, Professor of Strategy and Policy for the U.S. Naval War College program at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. Dr. Craig Whiteside is an associate professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval War College as part of the resident program, Winter 2020, “Blurred Lines: Gr ed Lines: Gray-Zone Conflict and Hybrid W one Conflict and Hybrid War—Two Failures of American Strategic Thinking,” Naval War College Review, V. 73 No. 1 Article 4 [ML]
Tactics, or the tactical realm, deal with how military forces directly fight the enemy. Weapons technologies and methods for using them drive tactics more than any other factor, and the constant roiling of technology means tactics never stand still. Also relevant to this discussion is the so-called spectrum of conflict. This is a commonly used term that seeks to classify the interaction among nations (at war or not), often (but not always) by the scale and type of means being used. 11 Soldier-scholar Harry Summers pointed out that this notion entered the U.S. military lexicon as the “spectrum of war” via the U.S. Army’s 1962 Field Service Regulations. Then the spectrum stretched from cold war to limited war. Summers correctly identified a “serious flaw”: the spectrum fails to delineate between war and peace. 12 This type of defective thinking continues to feed current American misconceptions as we continue to confuse war and peace, something manifest in the discussions of hybrid war, gray-zone war, and so-called cyber war. In a 2016 article, Lieutenant General James Dubik, USA (Ret.), made an argument similar to that of Summers, observing that U.S. leaders are fuzzy about just what war is, a problem fed by the 1994 adoption (really, readoption) of a spectrum-of-conflict approach to strategic analysis. 13 Objecting to using this inaccurate analytical tool does not, as some argue, merely “perpetuate the binary peace/war distinction.” 14 It is in reality an insistence on clear analysis and an embrace of the notion that peace and war are not the same. Their relationship is not binary; it is dialectical. War and peace are best defined in opposition to one another, as one is the antithesis of the other. If a state is engaged in armed conflict, it is at war. The armed conflict can be with another state or not. Clausewitz famously defines war as “an act of force,” one intended to achieve a political object. Lukas Milevski cogently observes that Clausewitz’s definition “elegantly encapsulates the three most important elements of war: violence, instrumentality,” and its adversarial nature. If the state is not in an armed conflict, it is at peace. Thomas Hobbes tells us that peace is the absence of war. 15 War should not be confused with warfare, which usually is defined as the undertaking of the military actions themselves. Understanding this is critical because we begin our analysis with the question whether the nation is at war. One must remember, though, that nations can be in competition with one another and not be at war and involved in killing the soldiers (and usually civilians) of the other state. Competition among all states, friendly or not, is a norm—and to be preferred. But allowing our analysis of wars or competition among states to rest on intellectual constructs that fail to honor the critical distinction between war and peace means we have lost the logical foundation for critical analysis.