NATO poses as the defender of democracy to push narratives and justify unrestrained violence
Gunther Hellman, et. al, 17; Benjamin Herborth, Gabi Schlag, and Christian Weber—Professor of Political Science at Goathe University of Frankfurt, Assistant professor at the University of Groningen, Faculty of the Arts, critical security studies senior lecturer at the University of Tuebingen, Goethe University, Faculty of Social Sciences, “The West: a securitizing community?” Journal of International Relations and Development (2017) 301–330. doi:10.1057/jird.2013.9;
NATO’s strategic discourse and the self-authorisation of ‘the West’ While the first research area dealt with representations of ‘authoritarian regimes’ that are by definition categorised as being outside of the boundaries of ‘the West’, this research area focuses on the transformation of NATO, that is, the military alliance that is considered to be the institutional core of what we usually call ‘the West’ (e.g., Gress 2004; Brzezinski 2009). Obviously, transatlantic security cooperation has been a classical theme in IR, either from a realist vantage point, where NATO is primarily described as a defence alliance subordinated to national purposes (Waltz 2000: 18), or from a liberal perspective, where NATO is understood as an alliance of democracies (RisseKappen 1995: 4). In both perspectives, however, the dynamics of security cooperation between North America and Europe seem unproblematic as long as the allies are convinced of their common interest or their shared values.
NATO’s (lasting) ability to voice in-/securities — for example a ‘Soviet threat’, ‘terrorism’, or ‘new challenges’ — directs our attention to highly institutionalised dynamics of securitisation that, as the subsequent analysis will show, manifest themselves as a self-authorisation of ‘the West’ in order to defend its normative foundation. Such a tendency towards self-authorisation has become visible in different forms since the North Atlantic alliance was founded in 1949. During the Cold War, it primarily enabled a rather deep institutionalisation of military cooperation with an integrated command structure including US nuclear weapons, as well as common strategic planning and defence exercises. After the Cold War, this project was continued but it has certainly changed in form. Out-of-area operations and the development of a globally active alliance is one of the most visible expressions of such self authorising practices. These dynamics were central to re-constitute NATO during critical junctures and have been productive of a highly self-confident Western alliance today (Jackson 2003; Bially Mattern 2005; Behnke 2013).
The North Atlantic Treaty, signed in April 1949 by representatives of nine Western European states, Iceland, Canada, and the US, provided the Western alliance with a legal basis and outlined the key principles of cooperation, that is, consultation (Article 4) and collective defence (Article 5). Although the formulation of Article 5 was highly contested between the US and its European allies, it was perceived as the cornerstone of transatlantic security cooperation (Kaplan 2004: 4). In contrast to such a legal framing of Western security cooperation, the preamble of the Treaty invoked an inherently normative rhetoric when it stated that the parties ‘are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their people, founded on the principle of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law’ (The North Atlantic Treaty 1949). The construction of unity based on a common culture and even ‘civilisation’ (rather than merely a shared threat perception) transferred military cooperation and integration far beyond an interestdriven alliance (e.g., Klein 1990; Jackson 2003, 2006a). During these formative years of NATO, one central aim of formulating ‘strategic concepts’ was to construct a common security interest of the US and Western European states that was metaphorically framed in terms of an ‘indivisibility of allied security’.
Bearing these normative foundations in mind, NATO gradually evolved as a cultural project that was directed against communism — which made the inclusion of an autocratic state such as Portugal possible — rather than as a community of democratic states (Klein 1990; Jackson 2003; Sjursen 2004). The invoked narrative of shared norms, values, and a common heritage provided a sufficiently strong rationale for defending the North Atlantic Area against any potential threat. Moreover, it also legitimised taking whatever measures were deemed ‘necessary’ to defend its members. ‘Forward defence’ and ‘massive retaliation’ turned out to be such legitimate means. Nevertheless, in many ways the strength of Western rhetoric was also intended to polish over and counterbalance many of the underlying political conflicts that persisted throughout NATO’s post-war history. As a matter of fact, over the years it had become a standard formula in political discourse to refer to an alliance in ‘crisis’ as proof of its uniquely transatlantic vitality. In this sense the invocation of a normative foundation of shared ‘Western’ values, heritage and civilisation even against the background of internal political dissent was as much a securitising move as it was an expression of a particular ‘Western’ structure of conflict. One could conclude that transatlantic security cooperation was only manageable by invoking such a normative foundation of shared values, heritage, and civilisation.
The subsequent strategic concepts DC 6/1 (December 1952), MC 14/2 (May 1957) and the amended strategic guidelines were written with the intention to both ‘convince the USSR that war does not pay’ (NATO 1950) and to reassure the allies that continued and even intensified that security cooperation was necessary. Changing strategic concepts, most prominently from ‘massive retaliation’ to ‘flexible response’, restored the reliability of mutual defence because of altered security circumstances (e.g., Haftendorn 1996; Tuschhoff 1999; Kaplan 2004: 100). Although the concept of ‘flexible response’ eventually satisfied all allies and remained valid until the end of the Cold War, different interpretations of deterrence and its operational implications persisted (Daalder 1991: 41; Risse-Kappen 1995: 184–7). Once again a particular structure of conflict among NATO allies was observable in the sense that although a ‘crisis’ occurred, references to the common heritage, shared norms and values of the ‘free world’ restored sufficient coherence among them. In this sense, the decision over West Germany’s membership in 1955, the Suez Crisis in 1956, the withdrawal of France from the integrated military command structure in 1966, or NATO’s double track decision in 1979 were all incidents of alliance disruption that nevertheless did not lead to a break-up of the Atlantic alliance. In these situations strategic concepts turned out to be crucial in re-establishing coherence and unity by reaffirming the authority of the alliance and its ability to (re-)act. The strengthening of consultation mechanisms in the 1950s, the formation of ‘Allied Mobile Forces’ (AMF) in the 1960s, or the deployment of additional Pershing II missiles in the 1980s embodied the institutional consequences of these strategic re-orientations.
With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, many commentators expected that the Atlantic alliance would sooner or later vanish as well. Thus, NATO’s post-Cold War strategies of 1991 and 1999 were primarily aimed at justifying the institutional continuity of the Western alliance against the new setting of a decreasing Eastern threat (e.g., Ringsmose and Rynning 2009: 5). At the beginning of the 1990s, ‘Europe, whole and free’ (The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept 1991) became the obvious new rhetorical commonplace to legitimise a different future for NATO compared with the fate of the Warsaw Pact. It opened up the possibility of Eastern enlargement and paved the way for the institutionalisation of a new relationship with Russia (Wallander 2000; Williams and Neumann 2000; Schimmelfennig 2003; Adler 2008; Pouliot 2008) as well as initiatives for cooperation in the Mediterranean (Masala 2003).
In the same vein of institutional and geographical expansion, the ‘out-of-area’ debate in the mid-1990s rearticulated the necessity for a political and military engagement far beyond alliance territory and territorial defence.7 While the bipolar confrontation of the Cold War had largely constrained the alliance’s global military engagement, ‘safeguarding the freedom, common heritage and civilisation’ now ascribed a global mission to NATO’s members. Instead of supporting a culture of self-restraint and legal formalism, the allies even intensified a tendency towards self-authorisation in the name of defending human rights and the achievements of ‘Western civilisation’. Disregarding United Nations’ formal legal provisions in the case of Kosovo, NATO itself became a producer of a common law where the protection of human rights was deemed more important than respecting state sovereignty and non-intervention. The specific formation of NATO’s strategic discourse made such ‘humanitarian interventions’ intelligible as the new raison d’eˆtre. Public justifications for military interventions in Serbia or Afghanistan, for example, cited the attack on ‘Western’ values as a determining reason for taking military action. Ultimately, in its statement on terrorism, the North Atlantic Council said that ‘the lives of our citizens, and their human rights and civil liberties’ were threatened by terrorism and reaffirmed that the allies ‘condemn terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. We, the 19 NATO Allies, are determined to combat this scourge. Our security requires no less’ (NATO 2001).8
During the Cold War, such a project of self-authorisation was primarily realised by institutionalising an integrated command structure, coordinated defence planning and common exercises. Today, the rhetoric of unpredictable risks and the global war on terrorism assigns an almost universal authority to NATO, in particular when ‘the challenge is not just to make our populations secure, but feel secure’ (de Hoop Scheffer 2009, emphasis added). ‘Europe’ and the ‘transatlantic area’ is the endangered subject of NATO’s strategic discourse justifying a durable and institutionally dense military cooperation of its member states and a nuclearisation of its defence strategy. Whenever allies pursued (national) security policies without consultation, conflicts and crisis within the alliance ensued. It was only through NATO that ‘the West’ could materialise its power position through a specific form of self-authorisation. NATO, respectively Western states, presented ‘democracy’, ‘human rights’, the ‘rule of law’, and ‘market economy’ as normatively unquestioned principles they had already realised. Others had only one choice: to comply or to resist. The normative attractiveness of ‘the West’, thus, also directs our attention to the temptations of securitising practices where a formalisation of IR through law is marginalised by unilateral acts of self-authorisation.