Securitizing through drone usage locks in failure and sanitizes mass violence—the use of drones dehumanizes war and embraces the logic underpinning the War on Terror.
Scott Romaniuk & Stewart Webb 15, researchers at the University of South Wales at the International Centre for Policing and Security and holds a PhD in International Studies, 2015 "(PDF) Extraordinary Measures: Drone Warfare, Securitization, and the "War on Terror"", ResearchGate, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/287215792_Extraordinary_Measures_Drone_Warfare_Securitization_and_the_War_on_Terror //AW
The utility of the WoT securitization, even in spite of its many critics who rebuke its leaders and supporters, has as a result of its attachment with such a universal issue that stands in sharp contrast and opposition to such beloved values, peoples, and ways of life (in principles all that America embodies and stands for) as referent objects led to the establishment of a powerful narrative (McCrisken 2011, 786). At the heart of this narrative lie the dramatis personæ: the US and the liberal democracies of the world, and AQ and the “evil tyrants and murderers that support it” (McCrisken 2012, 786). Such a narrative, linked inextricably to the events of 9/11 has assumed such rich symbolism, emotional value, and representation of a zero-sum game, that the WoT securitization has become “institutionalized and normalized” or engrained as part of American foreign policy (Jackson 2011). “It has,” in Jackon’s (2011, 391) words, “in the years since 9/11 become a powerful social structure (a hegemonic discourse) that both expresses and simultaneously co-constructs US interests and identity.” The WoT and US opposition to the threat of international terrorism has become overly manifest within the US’ national security structure and deep into American culture (McCrisken 2011, 786). If we are to accept the WoT to have become institutionalized by the majority of American society as just plain good sense, then we might reasonably assume that elites have no little or choice but to move stridently forward in addressing AQ and international terrorism as exceptional threats vis-à-vis extraordinary measures only even if an actor would prefer to find a solution through the (normal) political system. Having intertwined the existential threat with American society to such an extend and with such extensive institutionalization having taken place over the previous decade, “it is then,” states McCrisken (2011), “extremely difficult for any policy-maker or opinionshaper in the US, even a new president dedicated to ‘change’, to seriously challenge the underlying assumptions of the ‘war on terror’ and move policy significantly in a new direction” (786). Drone Warfare as an Extraordinary Measure The previous section touched upon the idea of the WoT exerts a degree of influence on the new security environment of the post-Cold War era than that of the post-9/11 environment by acting as a powerful narrative of that dichotomizes the international community according to the understanding of the “West and the rest,” or in the words of Bush, “Us vs. Them” and “Good vs. Evil” (Greenwald 2008; Soblic 2009). The WoT also functions as a normative organization that allows the leadership of the US (both the Bush and Obama administrations) to construct understandings of and sensitivities about security and threats to that security. Within this normative organization we can observe public perceptions of the existential threat and the policy designed and implemented by elites as mutually reinforcing. While many policies that were adopted by the US and other states allied in the fight against terrorism existed before 9/11, its main events and the WoT directly made them easier to introduce to the public and even helped legitimize “their application across a wider set of issues and areas than would otherwise have been the case (Buzan and Hansen 2009, 226). Taking into consideration that this section brings our attention directly to the marketability (to the public) and employment of extraordinary means to confront the existential threat posed by international terrorism, Buzan and Hansen (2009, 226) note: [a]s Realists, Liberals, and critical widening perspectives all point out: in times of (discursively constituted) war, the money and manpower allocated to the military increase, and encroachment on civil, liberal and human rights are more likely to meet with public acceptance. Concerns about terrorism were not entirely new by 2001 (although it was seen more as a peripheral problem in both public spheres and within IR by scholars), 9/11 elevated the prominence of terrorism to a new level. This might be said to have combined with the view that the events of 9/11 drilled the enduring truth into the hearts and minds those at all levels of American society that, “the absence of international conflict was not indication of an irreversible change [about the existence of violent and deadly threats in the world], but [merely] a temporary lapse in the ebb and flow of tensions within an anarchical system (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, 229). The extraordinary measures that have been implemented since 9/11 have served as some of the most explicit characteristics and definers of the WoT securitization program. Neither the Bush or Obama administrations have been enormously open about the use of any of them but when they have, a great deal of support, claims McCrisken (2011), was evident and often referred to the legitimacy of these measures as part of the US’ responsibility to protect its citizens, to defend itself, and act if there exists the imminence of threat. Both administrations have maintained the elevation of international terrorism as an extra-politicized and thus securitized state, subjecting it to measures deemed well beyond the parameters of normal politics. In the last decade, the WoT has provided the institutional framework for putting these extraordinary measures into practice: (a) Abrogation of civil, liberal, and human rights and freedoms of individuals a. Irregular rendition b. Systematic torture c. Military commissions d. Indefinite detention e. Political surveillance (b) US affording itself the right to attack based upon suspicion of further or imminent threat (c) State intervention and military campaigns such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan (d) Long-term military occupations and military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan (e) Acceptability of increasing military losses and collateral damage (f) Use of drones and unmanned military systems as part of an ever-growing TK campaign. The extraordinary measures represent a toolkit of security actions that the US has put to use in its response against the existential threat of international terrorism as part of the WoT’s core. One of the most direct means of defining these as extraordinary measure is simply by noting the extent of publicity as well as criticism and opposition they have received over the past decade, while viewing these actions as extraordinary measures can be achieved further still by signaling the level of discretion with which the US has treated to them. Policymakers and scholars alike have clearly accepted these as security actions in the WoT, many of which would unlikely claim that they do not stick out in the realm of normal politics. The considerable overlapping then seen amongst these various approaches as measures within the WoT can be taken as evidence that the use of drones falls within the field of extraordinary measures, particularly given that it constitutes an action that has both emerged and evolved within the purview of the WoT. We might also link the use of drones and TK more closely to those measures inescapably regarded as extraordinary in measure. With the closing of detention centers and an avowal to indefinitely abandon Guantanamo as a method of tackling (suspected) terrorists, the US invariably took a step back from one of its methods in the WoT. Here, two competing, but equally useful logics are at play and serve to frame the use of drones and TK as extraordinary means. First, viewing the use of detention and rehabilitation centers, not to mention the use of interrogation (whether in extreme forms or not) as an expression of normal politics, we can rightfully claim that this measure (undertaking predominantly by the US) was considerably ineffective in dealing with international terrorism for a number of clear reasons that center, at least in part, on: (a) The difficulty of capturing known and suspected terrorist abroad (b) Mitigating the efforts of those within prisons to radicalize anyone not fully dedicated to the cause of terrorism in the name of AQ or other groups or networks (c) The impossibility of guaranteeing that those released will not endow the existential threat by committing or re-committing themselves to terrorism’s violent cause. Stepping from the first logic considered we might consider this proposition in different light. If the practice of irregular rendition and detainment in such detention and interrogation centers as Guantanamo is taken as one of many extraordinary measures enacted in the fight against terrorism but that has come under increasing fire from domestic and international public spheres, there existed a need to step back from practice that can no longer be officially condoned and to fill the void with another measure capable of engaging with the threat. The rationale presented here is that while the acceptance of a certain degree of encroachment on civil, liberal, and human rights might occur, the continuity of any single measure that does so cannot necessarily be guaranteed or continued ad infinitum. Using drones as a part of the US’ evolving and expanding TK program (Obama’s “Kill-Not-Capture” program) (McCrisken 2011) was ideal for taking the place of irregular rendition and exchanging one set of legal challenges with another – one that might be easier to deal with. Retracting from a program of irregular rendition and the use of extreme forms of interrogation that have become the focus of intense legal debate might even serve to shrink the political, military, and social gap that lies between states and the WoT. The prospect of achieving this and subsequently renders the identity of the WoT far more likely to be deeply internalized and become more stable as a result (Lasmar 2010). The effectiveness of the US’ TK program remains a topic of immense debate. Previously, it was noted that the use of drones has been dragged into the security domain and reasonably tagged as an extraordinary measure given the level of public outcry and criticism attached to it. In hindsight it seems that it might have only been a matter of time before those who actually employ the tactic begin to question its viability for future counterterrorism efforts. It is suggested here that drone warfare has not only become a concrete part of the Bush administration’s 2001 securitization of terrorism and an iconic feature of the WoT, but TK as an extraordinary measure has by its direct effects and impact cultivated an understanding that it has come to represent a threat to toward the very objectives that it seeks to achieve. The drone program has undoubtedly given the US political and military leadership the mindset of having the strategic initiative – the ability to choose where and when to attack without constraint. Director of the Center for Peace and Security Studies at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service Daniel Byman has noted on multiple occasions that the use of drone technology has enabled the US to more accurately strike at terrorists as opposed to conventional weaponry at the US’ disposal (Lafontant, 2013). The marked different between AQ and like-terrorist groups’ offensive capabilities prior to 9/11 and after the establishment of the WoT can be attributed, suggests Byman, to the employment of drone warfare. They are relegated to a defensive position rather than being poised to strike wherever and whenever they like (Lafontant, 2013). Former-Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Leon Panetta, during the first year of Obama’s presidency stated bluntly that, it‘s [drone warfare] the only game in town in terms of confronting or trying to disrupt the al-Qaeda leadership,” and noted that AQ leaders no longer regard the tribal regions of Pakistan as “neither safe nor a haven” (Cable News Network [CNN] Politics, 2009). David Kilcullen reported to a congressional hearing in 2009: [s]ince 2006, we’ve killed 14 senior al-Qaeda leaders using drone strikes; in the same time period, we’ve killed 700 Pakistani civilians in the same area. The drone strikes are highly unpopular. They are deeply aggravating to the population. And they‘ve given rise to a feeling of anger that coalesces the population around the extremists and leads to spikes of extremism (McManus 2009). Although the claim is often made that the drone strikes are having a significant impact on the operationality of AQ and present a clear practical effectiveness, their use compromises the ability of the US and its allies in the WoT to gain valuable intelligence information from the eliminated target. Despite his support for the use of drones in the fight against terrorism, Byman (2009) reported a darker reality related to drone warfare that has raised concern regarding the idea that drones now pose a threat the US achieving its own objectives in the WoT, noting that, “[e]ven when they are effective, TK can create strategic complications. They create martyrs that help a group sell itself to its own community” (Byman 2009, 100). To build on the previous point: [a]fter an arrest, security forces can interrogate the suspect and learn about future plots and additional operatives, who can then be arrested too. Killing suspects prevents them from striking, but dead men also tell no tales (Byman 2009, 98-9). Collateral damage in these drone strikes also cultivates an environment where the indigenous civilian community will enlist or engage favourably with the targeted insurgents. An insurgency requires the indigenous populace’s “sympathy, acquiescence, silence, reaction to provocation, or fully active support” (Kilcullen 2010, 8). The collateral damage incurred by the drone strikes in Pakistan has become a relentlessly reoccurring issue between the American and Pakistani governments and has damaged bi-lateral relations. After numerous drone strikes, there have been protests with hundreds of protesters burning American flags and holding signs displaying anti-American slogans (Williams 2010, 872). Although the debate on whether anti- American sentiment is heavily instigated by the (collateral) damage incurred by the strikes continues, but there is a correlation to numerous temporary spikes in anti- Americanism. Anti-American sentiment in Yemen has been fuelled by the US drone strike program (Al-Haj & Batrawy 2012). The debate regarding the efficacy of the use of drones given the negative impact it might have within the WoT even in spite of its positive impact raises a certain set of assumption regarding, not that it can reasonably be considered an extraordinary measure but rather to what extent has it become too extraordinary a measure in the securitization of international terrorism by the Bush administration. Rather than being considered purely a response or a security action set-up in the defense of the reference object in the face of an existential threat, it might well be taken as a sort of threat in and of itself. The view, while shown to exist within the US among political elites, has become overtly evident given widespread opposition that has formed in multiple societies beyond the US, including those Western liberal democracies that they are used to defend. The secrecy of the drone program also creates a situation where it is difficult for the WoT to be desecuritized by the majority of the American population. States are permitted to securitize an issue through the consent of the population, even though the securitization message is controlled by in large by the government through the media. Five years after the 9/11 attacks with American forces deployed both in Afghanistan and Iraq, only three percent of Americans believed that that terrorists were a great threat to the US (Bobbitt 2008, 7). There is hubris in American mentality when it comes to the drone strike program (Gardner 2013, 212-34). There are a couple of factors that are instrumental in maintaining this hubris. With the drone program, no American lives are directly at stake by being in a hostile theater of operations as the drone pilots are hundreds (even thousands) of miles away. Therefore, there is a lack of domestic protests to bring the troops back home as they are at home or at safe operational bases. A second factor is that there is a general lack of widely distributed reports and images of the collateral damage incurred by the drone strikes in the Western media. This is in stark contrast of the desecuritization, (i.e., protest and opposition) movements in the Vietnam and Second Gulf Wars. The drone strike program not only allows for the strategic initiative to strike whenever and wherever deemed necessary, but also severely reduces the conversation within American discourse.