Attempting to save the economy is a justification for securitization and retaliation which results in a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Bulman 2021 (David Bulman, Assistant professor of China Studies and International affairs at the John Hopkins School of China Studies and International Affairs,” The Economic Security Dilemma in US-China Relations” https://muse.jhu.edu/article/787893/pdf) //sethlee
China and the United States are caught in an economic security dilemma. In response to perceived economic aggression, both countries now feel impelled to bolster domestic economic security through protectionist and retaliatory measures that the other side perceives as threatening. In game theoretic terms, a mutually beneficial “Stag Hunt” coordination game devolved into an uncooperative “Prisoner’s Dilemma” after the global financial crisis. In the economic security dilemma that emerged under Trump and Xi, both sides unsuccessfully attempted to coerce opponent behavior, further harming both economies. Using a game framework—as opposed to a structural or leadership-based account—helps demonstrate that China’s recent reform reversal and revisionist approaches to the international economic order were not unavoidable parts of a long-term strategy, but rather developed partially as a response to perceived US aggressions. Two contrasting narratives now define the economic relationship between the United States and China. US policymakers perceive China as a revisionist economic power using “state-driven protectionist policies and practices” to threaten US economic vitality (White House 2020). Chinese policymakers in turn argue that the United States will “do everything in its power to use bullying measures” to prevent China’s rise and keep China from accessing key technologies, thus requiring a strong state sector to support technological self-reliance (Wang 2019; Wang and Xin 2018). The evolution of these contrasting narratives reflects an economic security dilemma: In response to perceived economic aggression, both countries now feel impelled to bolster domestic economic security through protectionist and retaliatory measures that are in turn perceived as threatening by the other side. The resulting downward ited degree, financial fronts, significantly harming both economies. In game theoretic terms, a mutually beneficial “Stag Hunt” coordination game prior to the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC) devolved into an uncooperative “Prisoner’s Dilemma” over 2009–2016, in part due to growing misperceptions and faulty assumptions regarding domestic economic security. By the time of Donald Trump’s election, both sides thought the game had switched to “Chicken” and sought to force the other side to swerve. The actual payoff matrices still reflected a Prisoner’s Dilemma, however. Misidentification of the game led to coercive threats rather than attempts at reassurance, ensuring a further downward spiral. This game-theoretic framework helps interpret changes in US-China economic relations over the past three decades, enabling an understanding of the emergence of current economic tensions more nuanced than structural or leadership-based approaches. According to structural arguments, economic conflict is part of an unavoidable zero-sum great power conflict (Allison 2017; Walt 2018; Jin 2015; Li J. 2019). In contrast, leadership approaches blame economic tensions on Xi Jinping’s economic reform reversals, external aggression, and domestic repression, which necessitated a US response (e.g., Economy 2018), or Donald Trump’s (avoidable) decision to instigate a trade war in 2018 (e.g., Yang 2016). These frameworks explain part of the story: great power competition has become more prominent, with direct consequences for the economic relationship, and Xi and Trump indeed made choices that Li Keqiang and Hillary Clinton may not have. But structural arguments imply an inevitably that seems misjudged, and leadership accounts often underestimate or ignore the structural dimensions that constrain and inform leader decisions. A dynamic game framework is a more fruitful way of understanding developments, combining aspects of both of these frameworks: Structure and structural shifts help set payoff matrices, and leaders choose how to play the game given their own perceptions and the existing payoff distributions.