The desire to perpetuate the hegemonic identity seeks to construct false threats for the justification of retalitatory and pre-emptive action
Yuan and Fu, 20, Zhengqing Yuan, Senior Fellow at the Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Qiang Fu, Associate Professor at the School of Foreign Studies of Central University of Finance and Economics.“ Narrative Framing and the United States’ Threat Construction of Rivals” The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2020, 419–453 doi: 10.1093/cjip/poaa008 Advance Access Publication Date: 10 July 2020/ekc
Rather than the rationalist approach to national security, we adopt a narrative approach to unravelling the narrative process whereby national threats are constructed. Having encountered three successive national rivals since WWII, the United States has constructed three distinctive threat stories to safeguard its hegemonic identity. The Soviet threat consists in the story of two ideologically opposed rivals competing for world domination; the Japan-bashing narrative tells a victimhood story stemming from Japan’s unfair competition. China threat stories, however, are now more complex, conflating a story of US victimhood at the hands of China’s unfair competition, advocated by President Trump, with a widely embedded but malleable epic tale of power competition between a rising power and the ruling power, and a new, ‘deep state’ defence community-propagated Cold War script. All these threat stories have framed what is perceived and what should be done, but they are merely those from among other alternative narratives that eventually gained a dominant position at critical junctures. These so called national threats are hence no more than narrative constructs in a self-other manner of articulation rather than one of objective existence. Upon examining the narrative templates of US threat stories, we find striking differences among them. The Soviet threat spectrum ranges from the ideological to the political and military domains, and economic challenge is the focus of the Japan threat. But China represents the full spectrum of threats that previously featured in both the Soviet threat story and the Japan-bashing narrative. Upon zooming in, we further find that an ideological conflict constitutes the main thread of the Soviet threat storyline, but that the economic challenge of the China threat outweighs the ideological and political ones. On the political front, the Soviet Union’s totalitarian dictatorship is the polar opposite of liberal democracy, while China is often styled as an authoritarian state—a far less antagonistic wording. As to military threats, the Soviet threat is urgent and global, but the China threat is only a rising and regional one. To counter the economic challenge emanating first from Japan and then from China, the United States adopted different strategies to construct its victimhood story, namely, coining new concepts for Japan, and cashing in on stereotypes for China. In spite of the above-marked differences, however, we can also clearly discern continuity in the United States’ national threat stories. This is reflected not only in the United States’ consistently resorting to the victimhood narrative to counter economic challenges from both Japan and China, and unremittingly cashing in on its widely-shared mythologies and images regarding the Self and Others to achieve resonance, but also, more revealingly, in the underlying logic of US national threat-making. The United States will invariably adopt a zero-sum mindset in making a diametrical self-other story for any country—be it a formidable power with an antagonistic ideology like the Soviet Union, an ally like Japan, or a rising peer competitor like China—that might threaten its hegemonic identity. According to this logic, the American Self is always superior to Others, and articulating the threat confirms its superiority. Not surprisingly, when Others, like Japan or China, challenge its economic primacy, the United States, rather than examining its own problems, will always blame such others for playing an ‘unfair game’. This paper also provides us with a vantage point to appreciate the current debate on Sino–US relations. Clearly, we are in the second half of the critical juncture wherein the question is not whether the United States and China will compete with each other but in which way the competition will unfold, for the bankruptcy of the liberal international order discourse makes it unlikely to revert to yesteryear’s policy of engagement. As the three narrative threads of the China threat stories all point to competition and conflict, and can be self-fulfilling, we may witness increasing tensions between them. Specifically, the Japan-bashing victimhood story can shed considerable light on our understanding of Trump’s China policy. We find that the story President Trump advocates to a large extent matches the victimhood story that the revisionists concocted to deal with Japan in the 1980s. Trump’s rhetoric regarding unfair trade and industry targeting, slapping of trade tariffs amounting to blackmail on both China and US allies, results oriented approach to trade negotiation, and the US high-tech stranglehold that curbs or bars investment in the industry by US competitors can all be found in the Japan threat story toolbox. Having pivoted China policy towards conflict, however, there are few indications that Trump wants to act out a Cold War script. In accordance with the storytelling logic, should Trump retain his presidency in the coming election, the trade war will probably not end in a ‘fair’ trade agreement until such time as the US economy far outperforms China’s, because US superiority entails outperformance, failing which the blame must go on unfair play. That is what happened to Japan, that is to say, successive rounds of sanctions and negotiations until Japan drifted into the Lost Decade. China may, moreover, face even greater US hostility to its high-tech industry and investment, as happened in 1980s. These are issues that China’s political nature and growing military may further complicate. But it should be noted that China is not Japan and will neither give in easily as Japan did nor pose a solely economic challenge to the United States.