NATO forms its alliances by securitizing for its own selfish protection—results in the threat generation and allying with powerful states
Schlag 15--- (Gabi Schlag- Associate and Research Fellow at the Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg, Germany, and holds a PhD from the Goethe University, "Securitisation theory and the evolution of NATO", 2015, Taylor & Francis, https://www-taylorfrancis-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315658001-8/securitisation-theory-evolution-nato-gabi-schlag)//mishelle
Many scholars would probably state that much has changed since the early 1990s. Eastern enlargement has made NATO’s membership and strategic discourse more diverse, disputes over the Iraq war in 2003 were regarded as the most serious crisis in NATO’s history and the conflict in Ukraine and the progress of ISIS in Syria and Iraq symbolise the sorts of challenge the Alliance will have to face in years to come. Statements that NATO is in crisis, the ‘alliance crisis syndrome’ as Thiess (2009: 2) has aptly named it, are nothing new but do direct our attention to more substantial questions: what is NATO (for) – and why has it endured for so long despite its history of crisis? ST’s examination of NATO’s past provides some helpful insights in these regards. In a strictly positivist sense, ST does not explain the foundation, transformation and/or continuity of the Alliance where norms, interests or common threat assessments might be described as the major causes of cooperation. What STdoes, however, is provide a conceptual toolbox for describing causal mechanisms (Guzzini 2011) – what happens, in other words, when actors speak security and move political questions on (re-securitisation) and off (de-securitisation) the security agenda. It shows the specific regional patterns of de-/securitization in the transatlantic regional security complex with its unique and overlapping institutions (NATO, EU, OSCE). Thus, ST might be a critical resource for (neo)realist accounts of NATO. Alliance formation, as Walt (1985: 4) has prominently argued, can be regarded ‘as a response to threats’, either in terms of balancing the source of danger or allying with the most powerful state. As simple as this argument may sound, it leaves open the question of who poses a danger to whom, and how and why insecurities might change over time. ST is able to give an empirically grounded answer to these questions. Accordingly, a comparative study on patterns of securitisation/de-securitisation across time and institutions would be highly valuable in order to understand how different NATO is. Threats and insecurities have not ceased to exist even if North America and Europe are zones of peace(ful change) among states. The main puzzle, then, is not the continuity of the Alliance after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, but rather its ability to invoke and often hegemonise what security means while consolidating non-violent relations internally. Addressing NATO’s future, ST also suggests some conclusions. Although reliable predictions are always difficult and risky (as neo-realist claims of NATO survival show),13 it is possible to argue that the Alliance will endure as long as actors (member states as well as NATO officials) succeed in articulating insecurities of different kinds and thus legitimise NATO as the central institution where these problems are negotiated and dealt with. The example of NATO’s post–Cold War re-orientation through its 1991 Strategic Concept and subsequent strategic discourse illustrates how the Alliance has navigated this challenge. At the Cold War’s end, the Alliance seemingly confronted a situation of de-securitisation as its erstwhile Soviet adversary disappeared from the stage. Indeed, de-securitisation was the premise of policy as NATO embraced former Warsaw Pact states through enlargement and embarked upon a structured partnership with Russia. But in parallel, NATO securitised other issues by widening its remit of responsibility, an act given authoritative expression in the Strategic Concept and then extended in successor documents in 1999 and 2010. These strategic articulations were manifest in a wholesale shift of mission evidenced most obviously in interventions in the Balkans in the 1990s, as well as later in Afghanistan and Libya. The culmination of this process is the re-securitisation of Russia which has occurred as a consequence of the crisis in Ukraine. As for the question what is NATO (for), an answer here is more complicated and might contradict assumptions that the Alliance has retained its relevance through securitising (or, indeed, de-securitising and re-securitising) specific threats. NATO has been more than a military alliance from its very beginning, symbolising a special bond between Europe and North America. Continuous articulations of threat assessments make NATO members work and even fight together but they are not the foundation of the Alliance as such: it is, rather, the invocation of a community of like-minded states (and societies) which share something important (democracy, human rights and a market economy) in common and deemed worthy of protection. Thus, Thomas Risse-Kappen (1996: 4) has argued that the Alliance is not based primarily on common interests and threat perceptions, but on a collective democratic identity symbolising an ‘alliance of democracies’. His claim is persuasive but it needs qualifying (Sjursen 2004). Since the foundation of NATO, its members have invoked the Alliance as the cornerstone of Western security cooperation based on common symbolic values. Whenever these values have been endangered, the allies have been able to mobilise and legitimise new policies in order to (re-) affirm NATO’s unity, including a lasting institutional structure of political and military cooperation, coordination and even integration. It is the capacity of the members to articulate the values they stand for as universal and the alliance they form as legitimised to defend them at home and, if necessary, to realise them abroad, which attaches true value to NATO. In other words, the presumed ‘democratic identity’ of each member and of NATO itself cannot be taken for granted but is the performative effect of a shared security discourse which changes its content over time. As Behnke (2013: 1) has argued ‘the continued existence and political relevance of the Alliance rests on its ability to repro-duce “the West” as a geo-cultural space that serves as its security referent object’. Processes of securitisation and de-securitisation are the symbolic, yet powerful expression of this community.