Modern, post-apocalyptic governments are forced to counteract imagined threats like solar storms --- citizens expect to be sheltered from unimportant or unlikely scenarios
Beatrice de Graaf 16, Chair of History of International Relations & Global Governance at Utrecht University and 2019 Distinguished Professor at Utrecht University with a PhD from Utrecht University, 2016, “An End to Evil: An Eschatological Approach to Security”, Philosophia reformata, Vol. 81, Issue 1, p. 70-88 /lg
Those who, with Beck, Adam, and others, consider our present-day timescape to be a secular apocalyptic one, also have to acknowledge the fact that today’s security policies are completely imbued with this way of thinking and living (Beck 1986, 1999, 2002; Adam and Van Loon 2000; Mythen and Walklate 2006). Governments and international institutions have to deal on a daily basis with the control paradox that calls for human and technological resources to solve problems that are themselves caused by new scientific discoveries and techno- logical innovations or at least come to us via that route. Terrorist organizations, such as isis, which inundate the world ‘24/7’ on YouTube and Twitter with images of death and destruction, quickly appropriate new technologies to fur- ther their cause. These wreakers of havoc and horror are, of course, themselves products of modern times: they use the most modern weapons and means of communication and they are, as in the case of isis, sometimes the product of human intervention and military mismanagement in the Middle East.
An important characteristic of contemporary safety thinking is the expan- sion of security in time and space into the realm of the imaginary. Security is a linear concept. Old-fashioned security policy assumes a concrete threat, somewhere on the horizon, the harm of which can be assessed using all kinds of calculation and planning resources. How long will it take before the hostile army is at the gates, the rocket has reached its goal, the water level has risen so high that the dam will break those kinds of calculations. A risk relates to probability and imagination. A risk cannot always be calculated, or the risk is so small that it is statistically insignificant, yet bad enough that it must surely be included in the plan, such as a terrorist attack or a solar storm. The current safety culture is more a risk culture in which imagined futures and worst-case scenarios are visualized, using the latest computer simulation techniques. This then leads to all kinds of exaggerated expectations that governments need to respond to with equally comprehensive and proactive measures because before you know it, ...3
This brings us back to the definition of the beginning: security is not just about a physical state of being, but also about our future expectations and there- fore about our feelings and the things that capture our imagination. And in the current timescape these feelings and images tend to get overheated quickly. The criminologist Hans Boutellier explained that today’s feelings of insecurity and uneasiness are bolstered up by our post-Cold War condition of living in a ‘network society’. This is a society that is characterized by the loss of familiar social settings, by increased diversity, and complexities greater than ever be- fore (Boutellier 2002/2005; Castells 1996). Boutellier then states, following the sociologist Zygmunt Baumann (Baumann 2001a, 2001b), that the moral uncer- tainty that these shifting sands engender is exactly what generates additional calls for security (Oppelaar and Wittebrood 2006, 34). The disappearance of familiar hierarchies and institutions has made citizens more sensitive to inse- curity sooner. The aforementioned Ulrich Beck likewise made the case that the post-materialistic citizens of the free West simply have difficulty coping with personal mishaps, failures, or setbacks. Individual development and manufac- turability have a downside: breakdown and tragedies are no longer accepted. Modern citizens work harder at insuring (‘protecting’) themselves against damage, inconvenience, or misfortune. But they also increasingly demand of the state that it shelter them from threat and harm. Even though many neoliberal governments are not in a position to provide that level of security, all the while the reported number of threats (real and imagined) is increasing.
One security expert wrote cynically that the only thing left for authorities in this post-apocalyptic modern timescape to do is ‘to feign control over the uncontrollable’ – as though the only thing that seems to matter nowadays is the appearance of security and effective risk management (Beck 2002, 41; 1999). Risk management has thus also become a mode of governance; risk researchers speak of ‘risk governance’, (Van Asselt 2005; Van Asselt and Van Bree 2011) or of risk management as a paradoxical (because it is per defini- tion uncontrollable) ‘taming of the future’ (Aradau and Van Munster 2008). In fact, primary risk management (trying to control the actual risk) is, as a result, increasingly being replaced by secondary risk management: a form of deci- sion-making aimed at covering (up), or at least hedging, the secondary risk of administrative failure. What happens then is that a lack of clarity regarding who is accountable in uncertain situations – which is a typical characteristic of the ‘new security thinking’ – tends to reduce decision-making to a set of stan- dard protocols and security scenarios, which in effect offers a formalized, but often highly superficial, short-sighted and façade-like grid to allocate political responsibility for ‘decisions which must be made in potentially undecidable situations’ (Power 2004, 10). Although this may present itself as accountable and effective decision-making and control, the primary risk of the impending threat has, of course, not properly been addressed.