Space infrastructure is securitized by European policymaking --- it’s viewed as essential for military defense and causes European agencies to feel threatened
Nina Klimburg-Witjes 21, Department of Science and Technology Studies at the University of Vienna and post-doc researcher at the Munich Center for Technology (MCTS), elected member of the Council of the European Association for the Study of Science and Technology (EASST), and member of the German Expert Network on Space and Security and founding member of the international Social Studies of Outer Space Network, 03/07/2021, “Shifting articulations of space and security: boundary work in European space policy making”, European Security, Vol. 30, Issue 4, p. 526-546 /lg
4.2. Boundary expansion I: Galileo merging science and politics
The first attempt of a jointly developed space infrastructure by both organisations was the navigation satellite constellation Galileo. For the EU, Galileo had been driven by worries that Europe would be overly dependent on the US American Global Positioning Systems (GPS), with user requirement standards and certification schemes for the security-relevant equipment being set outside of Europe (EC Communication ). EU policymakers had just made the experience of what techno-political dependence means for decision-making processes in conflict situations: During the Balkans conflicts in the 1990s, US authorities denied European actors access to US satellite data of conflict regions. As Darnis et al. () have argued, this was a “wake-up call for Europe” in many different ways: not only was an armed conflict taking place on European soil after decades of peace, but satellite capabilities for data gathering and communication could be easily disposed of by the US and Europe was lacking its own.
Space technology was now seen as critical enabling infrastructure for defence, leading several EU members to increase or create space capabilities also for security and military usages. Most notably, after the Balkan wars, “space for security” had emerged as a powerful paradigm in EU space policymaking (Darnis et al. , p. 4).
However, the different actors involved in setting-up Galileo began to draw boundaries around its security and military usage. Galileo is owned and funded by the EU, but designed and operated by ESA. Despite its technopolitical legacy, Galileo is defined as “a civil program under civil control” which does, however, not exclude military usages of its encrypted regulated service (Hoerber and Stephenson ). According to the EC, Galileo, “constitutes sensitive infrastructure, the deployment and usage of which are susceptible to affect the security of the European Union and its Member States” (EC ). As a form of doing techno-politics – “the strategic practice of designing or using technology to constitute, embody, or enact political goals” (Hecht , p. 15). Galileo and European (space) security were now much more closely tied to visions of European integration in a changing world. In addition, space development was now framed as “the concrete translation of a common democratic European political project”, with applications like Galileo being “directly linked to Europe’s role in the world” (Giegerich ). Galileo was seen as a collaboration between the EU’s political interests in using space for security and ESA’s scientific and technical expertise in the field of navigation, and it laid the foundation for ESA’s involvement in military space activities and subsequent boundary work. Interestingly, both actors framed Galileo’s purpose in different ways.
The EU emphasised that Galileo as a “European system for European citizens” would give “Europe freedom in its security missions” (Darnis et al. ). In turn, ESA aimed at downplaying the crucial military components of Galileo in public accounts and instead stressed the benefits for the general public, such as environmental protection and its use for science (Slijper , p. 40).
Yet, the experiences from collaborating with the EU on Galileo and the subsequent need to adapt to EU security regulations when handling classified information started a long and controversial process of “institutional soul-searching” (IP2) about ESA’s involvement in military and security-related space activities. Several debates were held at ESA’s ministerial Space Council – the forum where ESA members meet to discuss the agency’s future direction – about the questions whether ESA’s mission and the vision of its founding fathers of an exclusively peaceful organisation for space would be compromised by taking part in military-related European space activities (IP 4; IP 12; cf. Sheehan ). A senior ESA employee remembered that it was a “very tough discussion in the mid-2000 when the question (of security tasks) was formerly raised in the Space Council: What does exclusively peaceful mean in the convention?” (IP8).
4.3. Protection of autonomy: security should pose (no) problems
In this debate on where to draw which boundaries concerning ESA’s partaking in security and military space activities, the agency’s director-general commissioned a group of “Wise Men” to explore these questions further (Bildt et al. ): The former Swedish prime minister Carl Bildt, the then-president of Credit Lyonnais, Jean Peyrelevade, and Lothar Späth, the CEO of Jenoptik AG, a major German Arms and Space company, concluded that ESA should evolve into an organisation capable of developing both civilian and military flight hardware to ensure that space would and could be part of the evolving common European foreign and security policy (Hobe et al. , p. 540). In the words of Bildt, this was just “logical” and “should pose no problem” (Slijper , p. 34). Interestingly, the group of Wise Men represented the fields of politics, economy and industry, but not science or engineering – the major pillars of ESA’s work. This is also reflected in an article which appeared in the magazine Science on the report, and that summarised the findings as follows:
Space is too important to Europe to be left to scientists alone, according to a report on the future of the European Space Agency (ESA) (that) concludes that better coordination between ESA and the business and defence sectors is essential to Europe’s development. (Watson , p. 1287)
This statement also highlights what was seen as necessary boundary work, namely that it was less a question of whether ESA should build different space technologies for security usage, but rather if their intended use by EC agencies in fields such as border security or defence policy could be aligned with ESA’s mission statement. More precisely, it was a question of legitimacy – what were legitimate “security tasks” to which ESA could contribute to? And it was, according to an interviewee who was involved in the process, a wicked question: The boundaries between military and civilian space Earth observation satellites, for instance, was blurry from the outset (IP5; cf. Neufeld ). The operation of navigation and communication satellites was already overlapping with more traditional defence activities – such as using encrypted satellite communication during military missions, so “that one could not be achieved without the other” (IP4, cf. Peter , p. 290). Another interviewee reflected on this process of negotiating institutional boundaries by stating that the pressure on ESA to stay “relevant” in the changing European space-scape and vis-à-vis a more active EU gradually increased with the number of commissioned reports. At a certain point, he mentioned, “it was then more or less accepted by the ESA leadership that security-related aspects could be dealt with, but no armament and arms procurement, and nothing aggressive of course” (IP 5).
The involvement of the military in European space activities – even if only through the backdoor – was not what ESA’s founders had envisioned for the agency (cf. Sheehan ), yet ESA’s boundaries as a civilian organisation were set in a different period of European integration and global political orders (Slijper ). When asked about his opinion on that, a senior ESA member told me: “Well, then the founding fathers should have been clearer about what they meant with exclusively peaceful!” (IP8). This statement points to the core of expansionist boundary work at ESA regarding its involvement in military-related activities, that is, the dynamically changing interpretation of the first paragraph of its convention that eventually allowed ESA to “move into policy areas previously denied” (Sheehan , p. 32).
4.4. Boundary expansion II: “Space has a security dimension, and security has a space dimension”
The securitisation of space in Europe was further spurred by adopting a White Paper on European Space policy in 2003 by the EC. The paper’s title “Space: A New European Frontier for an Expanding Union – an Action Plan for Implementing the European Space Policy” (EC ) signals that while space might be a new frontier for the EU, it is a call to action to implement one European Space policy instead of aligning what have so far been multiple policies. What is particularly interesting here is how the paper strategically uses expansion as a mechanism of boundary work by calling for all stakeholders
to mobilise behind new goals and to rise to new challenges as the time has come to place (space activities) on the Union’s political agenda and at the heart of the European construction process by putting space applications linked to inspirational goals at the service of the enlarged Europe. (EC , p. 5)
For the first time, space is now fully recognised as a horizontal policy of the enlarged European Union to “support the Union’s key policy goals”: economic growth, sustainable development, or stronger security and defence.
Linking the need for further European integration to the objective of securing Europe’s strategic independence by maintaining autonomous access to space, the paper stated what later became a common saying: That “space has a security dimension and security has a space dimension” (EC , p. 19). The White Paper can thus be understood as a form of boundary work par excellence: It includes, first, novel political practices – the implementation of a single European Space Policy. Second, we see the accession into a particular collective (the space sector as dominated by ESA) or paradigm (that space activities in Europe are civilian) by what was previously outside of it (the European Commission). Lastly, it shows how new fields and activities (space for security and defence) get incorporated into existing practices.
What is more, the White Paper directly links the envisioned European integration in space to the broader project of European political integration. It does so by framing space as a catalyst of European integration that preserves the security of the EU and mentioned space security technologies as providing “a linchpin of European policy” and contributing to the building of an ”EU political project” (Silvestri ).
As one interviewee stated about the White Paper, it seemed that if Europe was to be further integrated through common security policy, then ESA had to be part of that, too (IP 1, cf. Sheehan ). The White Paper postulated that “Standing still is not an option” for the European space sector (EC , p. 21), urging ESA to expand its boundaries towards more security-related space activities while simultaneously challenging the agencies’ autonomy. This process intensified with the framework agreement of 2003 between the EC and ESA as a strategic partnership between the supply-side of space systems (ESA) and the demand-side for space systems (the EU). The agreement established the Space Council that merges the Council of the EU and that of ESA at the ministerial level (cf. Reillion ). As a coordination forum, the Space Council has the mandate to provide broader political views to the formulation of space programmes and to deepen their security aspects (cf. Pasco ). Therefore, both the Framework Agreement and the Space Council can be seen as attempts to reorder the messy European space-scapes once more by drawing boundaries line between ESA’s and the EU’s responsibilities and tasks.
When the Lisbon Treaty entered into force in 2007, the EU reinforced its aim to become the “natural point of reference for a European space policy driven by demand” (EC , 36). On a broader level of EU policy formation, the Lisbon Treaty confirmed the European Union’s commitment to the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy mainly through the so-called space clause that gave the EU a space competence and the possibility to develop and implement an industrial policy in the space sector. However, while this is often discussed as a novelty with fundamental consequences, von der Dunk () has argued that this competence is rather formalising practices of jurisdiction regarding outer space activities which the Union had exercised since the 2000s, albeit in a somewhat “accidental” fashion. An ESA senior staff member describes the process of boundary expansion by the EU follows:
So typically, the EU does the following; It has a treaty which defines its perimeters and from day one after adopting this Treaty, they transgress their boundaries and try to grab the next piece. And they do so until de facto they have it, and then the following Treaty comes and more or less puts that into a legal text what has already been done in practice. (IP7)
ESA, according to the Framework Agreement of 2003, should formally become the implementing agency of the Union. As such, ESA would have to integrate into the EU framework and modify its convention accordingly – a step that was seen as having profound consequences for those ESA member states that are not members of the EU (von der Dunk ). What is more, ESA interviewees saw this as an unnecessary multiplication of actors responsible for space, as plans had already been circulated that the EU is eventually planning to set up its space agency.
At the latest with the Lisbon Treaty, this “arm twisting between two organisations that are different in membership, are different in scope but responsible for space” started (IP1).
A result of such “arm twisting” was the European Space Policy (ESP) that ESA and the EC jointly adopted in 2007. Although celebrated by both as a milestone achievement, the ESP covers the same priorities as previous regulations and communications, except for a stronger focus on security while maintaining the peaceful exploration of outer space. Thus, it is consistent with the securitisation framing of previous documents that all emphasised the need for increased synergies between the space sector’s civil and defence communities. However, seven years later, we see an interesting shift in the ways that ESA leadership extends the boundaries of the agency in public representations. In 2014, following a cooperation agreement with the European Defence Agency to “better support Europe’s security and defence needs” (ESA DG), the then Director-General of ESA was asked in an interview if he foresees a militarisation of space in the next decade. Departing from the principles on which ESA was founded and which had been at least publicly rehearsed and stabilised for many decades, he stated:
(…) as concerns military space activities, this represents so far the largest deficit of Europe as compared to other space powers (…). However, there is an increasing number of programs that, even though civilian, may have military or security-related users – such as Galileo or Copernicus. The ESA itself is not a civilian agency. It is an agency for peaceful purposes and may have programs with a security component. If and when Europe needs space as an enabling tool for its security and defence policy, ESA will be prepared to develop the required programs.
These statements can be understood against the background of ESA’s attempt to stay relevant for both its non-EU members as well as for an EU increasingly integrated in the fields of defence policy. In 2016, however, the European Defence Action plan was adopted by the Commission which proposes in a press release “to promote the contribution of sectoral policies, such as the EU Space Program to common security and defence priorities” (EC , p. 3).
Some interview partners described the securitisation of space in Europe as an “unpleasant spiral”. (IP5). With Europe so heavily relying on a functioning space infrastructure, now fears would grow that this infrastructure is being attacked, leading to calls for increased defence measures. As IP 3 mentioned, “this is now only the beginning of an arms race in outer space (…) where you say: I feel threatened, I have to aggress”. According to two interviewees, it is not so much a question if Europe will at some point set-up a Space Force, “like it or not” (IP4), but rather if this is to be left on the national domain of individual member states such as France and Germany or if “we can Europeanize it” (IP5).