The liberal international order is just military orientalism---it causes Asian war---Korea military occupation proves
Inderjeet Parmar 18, Parmar is a professor of international politics @ the University of London & an honorary research Fellow @ then university of Manchester, “The US-led liberal order: imperialism by another name?”, 2018, International Affairs 94 \\pairie
CFR and State Department wartime planning was therefore driven above all by a vision of global–imperial leadership exercised by US elites, strongly supported by Britain’s ruling elites, via an international order of organizations and relationships.61 The aim was, acting in concert with Britain’s elites, to resurrect European Great Powers by means including the restoration of shattered colonial trading and economic and financial linkages. The Marshall Plan viewed European reconstruction in just that global context.62 The UN was envisaged as a key international agency for American imperial internationalism, at least in its earliest days63—and, as its role in the making of South Korea shows, it remains the official basis of America’s role in that country today. And, as I will show below, the building of a hegemonic multilateral order indicates the significance of a Gramsci–Kautsky synthesis.
The UN and Korea
The manner of America’s division of Korea, including its military occupation, its foundation of the republic in the South and the war to sustain the division, is highly instructive as to the character of the new world order that the superpower sought to build and of its actual conduct as opposed to its publicly stated claims. Observable behaviour fell far short of the tenets of human rights, the rights of civilians, and the rule and due process of national and international law. The building and consolidation of a South Korean ruling elite and its narrow but important base in civil society—incorporating critical friends and friendly critics—undermines liberal explanations and supports the Gramscian–Kautskyian perspective.
Shortly after detonating two atomic bombs over Japan in August 1945, the United States divided the Korean peninsula at the 38th parallel, offering the Soviet Union the northern sector and claiming the southern for itself. At that time, the Soviet Union chose not to take control of the entire peninsula, despite American forces’ unreadiness to effect an occupation of any portion of the Korean peninsula. Upon subsequently occupying southern Korea several weeks later, however, the United States declared it ‘semi-hostile’ territory and applied military law, using Japanese colonial laws and police methods, reinforcing the national police and bringing in the extreme right-wing, anti-communist Syngman Rhee, who had been absent from the country for decades, as putative leader to head the fight against the popularly established people’s committees that had declared a provisional government.64
In brief, popular uprisings in support of an independent unified Korean government led to massive repression even before the outbreak of the (civil) war. The violence preceding the outbreak of war in June 1950 saw the deaths of 100,000 people. Thereafter, the United States, going into action even before the UN had passed a Security Council resolution authorizing military action, waged a military campaign against North Korea of rare ferocity. Obliteration and saturation bombing led to millions of deaths. The American mission in Korea was formally undertaken under the banner of the UN, but the UN had little or no voice in the ‘police action’.65
The creation of South Korea as a separate independent state resulted from extreme US pressure on the UN Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) which was authorized by the UN to hold national elections in the whole of Korea (North and South).66 The United States effectively forced UNTCOK to go ahead with elections in the South in 1948 against the will of the majority of its inhabitants, apart from Syngman Rhee’s conservative party and the national police, the two most extreme right-wing organizations in southern Korea. All other organizations from across the political–ideological spectrum—including labour organizations, farmers, women, students and youth groups—had opposed elections on the grounds that right-wing violence had made free and fair polling a virtual impossibility. Hence the declaration by UNTCOK that elections were fairly held in South Korea was used as a pretext by the United States in the UN to win recognition of the Republic of Korea as a sovereign state. UNTCOK observed a mere 2 per cent of polling stations during the 1948 elections.67 After the declaration of the Republic of Korea, the North also declared itself a sovereign state as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Thus the very creation of South Korea entailed a violation of agreements made at the UN and between the United States and the Soviet Union.68
American military violence in Korea has been characterized as ‘military orientalism’,69 in which racist attitudes about the character of Koreans and Chinese and assumptions of their general inferiority play a prominent part.70 According to Bruce Cumings, Anglo-American atrocities outnumbered those carried out by North Korean and Chinese troops by a proportion of six to one.71 Reginald Thompson, the Daily Telegraph correspondent in Korea, noted that US marines considered Koreans apes, not humans, and rained death on them on an unprecedented scale. It was machines versus men, warfare reminiscent of colonial-era wars, with liberal use of napalm in obliteration bombing by B-52s that inflicted ‘holocausts of death’, eliminating distinctions between combatants and civilians.72
General MacArthur ordered relentless bombing to create ‘“a wilderness of scorched earth”’. North Korea was carpet-bombed for three years with 635,000 tons of bombs (half the total dropped on Germany in the Second World War, and more than in the entire Pacific theatre between 1941 and 1945) and 32,000 tons of napalm. Massive casualties resulted: deaths of somewhere between 2.5 and 4 million Koreans, 900,000–1,000,000 Chinese, 54,000 Americans and nearly 700 66 The UNTCOK papers in the UN archives in New York show, among other things, the near-total lack of legitimacy of the foreign occupation and of any elections planned by the US military government. 67 UNTCOK papers, UN archives, New York, S-0684, box 2, file 1. 68 The UNTCOK papers for 1947–8 catalogue right-wing repression and violence, the control of UNTCOK by the US military government, the anti-communist framing of Korean conditions by US Commanding General Hodge, the violation of election laws, intimidation and murder. The forces of repression were policing the elections. See also interview with Harding Bancroft, UN Political Affairs officer in the State Department, UN Oral History Project, 17 Dec. 1990 (UN archives). 69 Tarak Barkawi and Keith Stanski, eds, Orientalism and war (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012). 70 UNTCOK papers, S-0684, box 2, file 1. 71 Journalist James Cameron reported atrocities committed by South Korean troops at a concentration camp in Pusan: ‘I had seen Belsen, but this was worse. This terrible mob of men—convicted of nothing, un-tried, South Koreans in South Korea, suspected of being “unreliable” had been starved and chained while US officers took photographs.’ When Cameron took the report to UNTCOK, he was told: ‘Most disturbing, yes; but remember these are Asian people, with different standards of behavior’: Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings, Korea: the unknown war (London: Viking, 1990; first publ. 1988), pp. 92, 146. 72 Reginald Thompson, Cry Korea (London: MacDonald, 1951). The US-led liberal order: imperialism by another name? 165 International Affairs 94: 1, 2018 Britons.73 Almost from the very beginning of the war, Truman and MacArthur threatened to use atomic weapons;74 MacArthur advocated dropping 20 small atomic bombs across Korea to create a no-man’s-land between South Korea and China. There was a general belief that Asians were weak and could not possibly stand up to relentless high-technology American firepower; but also a feeling of humiliation among military and civilian leaders that the weakest ‘communist satellite’—North Korea—was beating the United States. US military operations in Korea cost around US$70 billion. A small, largely rural country saw between 40 and 90 per cent of all its urban areas destroyed; even after just a few months, North Korea had no targets of any worth to bomb.75
Military orientalism prolonged the war and increased casualties.76 It also created the main barrier to ending hostilities by preventing an agreement on the return of prisoners of war. As this was defined as a war between races and cultures as much as between freedom and slavery, barbarism and the rule of law, both Truman and the military commanders on the ground wanted to make Asians pay for their resistance.77 Hence, in violation of the Geneva Conventions on compulsory and swift return of enemy prisoners of war, the Anglo-Americans demanded all prisoners be ‘screened’ to see whether they wished to return to North Korea or China, thereby prolonging the war.78 The veil of ‘voluntary repatriation’ allowed the torture and punishment of Chinese and North Koreans in prison camps run by Syngman Rhee and Kuomintang forces, leading to thousands of killings, as reported by numerous press agencies, the International Commission of the Red Cross, and British, Canadian and US troops who had policed the PoW camps.79 Anglo-American allegations of torture of western troops in Chinese and North Korean camps were undermined by later US Army studies of released US PoWs who reported generally good treatment rather than torture.80
After the ceasefire of 1953, the United States helped build a repressive state in South Korea with consistently high levels of military and economic aid that sustained a dictatorial regime headed by Rhee until his overthrow by popular rebellion in 1960. Simultaneously, but at a highly restricted level—in contrast to generous aid for police and military institutions, training, arms, etc.—the 73 Halliday and Cumings, Korea, pp. 201, 115. 74 Truman ordered Strategic Air Command to dispatch atomic bombs to the Far East (30 Nov. 1950) and authorized dummy runs from waters off North Korea: see Halliday and Cumings, Korea, pp. 123–4. 75 Parmar, ‘Racial and imperial thinking’. 76 ‘As soon as those North Koreans see an American uniform . . . they’ll run like hell’, was the general belief. See Russell A. Gugeler, Combat actions in Korea 3, Army Historical Series (Washington DC: Center of Military History, 1970). Military historian Walter Karig called Korea an example of ‘Indian warfare’ because the foe ‘scorns all rules of civilized warfare’: Bruce Cumings, ‘Occurrence at Nogun-Ri Bridge’, Critical Asian Studies 33: 4, 2000, pp.509–526. The war’s racist character was clear to State Department officers at the UN; see interview with Harding Bancroft. 77 John Dower, War without mercy (New York: Norton, 2000). 78 Wilfred Burchett and Alan Winnington, Koje unscreened (Beijing: Britain–China Friendship Association, 1953). 79 David Morgan, ‘AP: US allowed Korean massacre in 1950’, CBS News, 5 July 2008, http://www.cbsnews. com/news/ap-us-allowed-korean-massacre-in-1950/, accessed 15 November 2013. For more on the 138 massacres by US forces, see Dong Choon Kim, ‘Forgotten war, forgotten massacres—the Korean War (1950–53) as licensed mass killing’, Journal of Genocide Research 6: 4, 2004, pp. 523–44. 80 Eugene Kinkead, Why they collaborated (London: Longman, 1959). Over 20 Americans chose to live in China; not a single soldier tried to escape; large numbers collaborated with their captors. Inderjeet Parmar 166 International Affairs 94: 1, 2018 social basis was laid of a narrow elite democracy, or at least a ‘liberal’ leadership: a modernizing elite in a parastatist civil society (state-sanctioned/approved/ permitted), working within the system as friendly critics or critical friends of the regime.81 In effect, this was an elite fostered in preparation for a period in the future when repression and dictatorship would become unsustainable in a radical nationalist populace with leftist tendencies and a desire to reunify the country. Indeed, by the 1980s, as popular unrest grew, US strategy had shifted towards ‘democracy promotion’ (the initial move in this direction actually beginning with the end of the Vietnam War) as the basis of ‘stability’.82