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Turns case---their fear of a Russia war is self-reinforcing and is just part of a broader narrative of US exceptionalism

Kari Roberts 16, Kari Roberts joined the Policy Studies Department in 2009. She received her BA (Hons) and MA in Political Studies from the University of Manitoba and her PhD in Political Science from the University of Calgary in 2004, “Why a Normal Relationship with Russia is so Hard: Russophobia in Clinton-era American foreign policy discourse and the decision to expand NATO,” Mount Royal University, 05/21/2016, p7-9 \\pairie

Lieven speculates that the intellectual basis for this Russophobia may stem from 19th Century British propaganda regarding Russian expansionism and its inherent wickedness. Lieven notes that this demonization of other peoples, sometimes taking on a racist tone, has long been present within Western, and American, foreign policy making. 34 Moreover, there is a tendency to assume that what was once assumed about a nation and its peoples shall forever be true about them, even in the absence of supporting evidence. This sort of historical determinism denies a nuanced appreciation for cultural evolution and very much denies the potential for American leaders to view post-Soviet Russia’s disappointing struggles with democracy for what they are. Instead, they have been viewed against the backdrop of Russia’s Tsarist and Communist experiences and are therefore “wicked.”35 This is evidenced by Henry Kissinger’s 2000 remark that Russian imperialism has continued for centuries, characterized by subjugation of its neighbours and “overawing those not under its direct control” and in Zbigniew Brzezinski’s assigning of blame for Stalinist-era policies to present day Russians.36 For Lieven, to view past conduct as less a product of history and more a product of culture or “national DNA” of sorts, comes perilously close to racism. There is a certain essentialism in the American discourse on Russia that equates these acts with “Russianness.” Perhaps, as Tsygankov suggests, demonizing Russia continued to help justify US strategy toward the USSR in the Cold War. For Lieven, this legitimized the military buildup, the containment, the worldview and actions that stemmed from the need to balance Soviet power.37 Yet, as Lieven importantly notes, even those who demonize Russia for its past seem to have little problem embracing Communist China, 38 so perhaps it is not communism in Russia’s past the Western leaders fear, but rather something cultural, something innately “Russian.”

Lieven concurs about the self-reinforcing nature of Russophobia, noting the US’ “need for enemies”39 as an instrumental component of its own narrative of exceptionalism. Perhaps the result of viewing Russia as the enemy for so long is the reason it has become one. Russophobia has enabled the judging of Russia “by utterly different standards than those applied to other countries.”40 Tsygankov and Lieven are correct to suggest a linkage between Russophobia and America’s own mythologies about its place in the world. America’s destiny is to be a cultural hegemon atop the global hierarchy of nations. The perception of American superiority seems to require an “other” to assume a position of inferiority. Russia has long represented a new cultural frontier and a divergent history, one that was assumed to be far less “exceptional” than the American experience. Challenges to the presumption of American hegemony have often been met with not simply disagreement, but a de-legitimizing of the very existence of the ‘other.’ Russia is not immune from ideas of exceptionalism and the two nations have perpetuated a soft rivalry that possesses “nationalist phobias” 41 that can be mutually reinforcing.

Gertan Dijkink acknowledges that this “gross distinction between East and West as opposite cultures” is part of the US discourse on Russia.42 For Dijkink, this does not have to be addressed directly, or be part of a public discussion, because it has become “naturalized,” or considered to be common sense. He notes that experience and discourse create an imaginative geography of the outside world, which contributes to the construction of visions of the world.”43 Dijkink notes that, after all, “American foreign policy aims to perpetuate, serve and affirm the American way of life,” 44 thus helping to explain why Russia’s alternative to “the American way,” presents a challenge. Georg Lofflman confirms the impact of 32 Ibid., pp.. 67, 71. 33 Anatol Lieven, “Against Russophobia,” World Policy Journal 17:4 (Winter 2000-2001), p. 25. 34 Ibid., p. 26. mythology on discourse and the influence on foreign policy outcomes.45 Myths shape identity, become themselves part of identity, and influence action. It is reasonable to suggest that American exceptionalism influences Russophobia. If the US is unique, its values superior, and therefore its preeminence in the international system assumed, and if Russia fundamentally challenges these values – America’s very identity – in some way, then fear of what Russia represents may be a consequence. Putin himself famously warned Americans in 2013 of the dangers of seeing themselves as exceptional.46

Richard Sakwa notes the difficult time US leaders have had accepting Russia as an equal.47 Russia did not see itself as a defeated power after the Cold War and conducted itself as such, a view in opposition to the prevailing Washington narrative. Sakwa notes that Russia as a democratic state was no less revisionist than Russia as a communist state and that this was threatening to the existing world order that presumed the hegemony of western liberal ideas. 48 Even though Russian foreign policy was actually fairly unthreatening, and could even be characterized as collaborative for many years, it was not universally viewed this way because of the geopolitical threat it was perceived to represent.49 Sakwa also claims that some of the anti-Russianism has a strong basis in history, as Russia has never really been considered to be a part of Europe. Its very presence has motivated European integration; post WWII European identity was constructed on the basis of Russian exclusion, a reality that was confirmed by decades of the Cold War. That the fear of Russia and the exclusionary attitude toward Russia persist, driven largely by the United States and the derivative suspicion of Russia from the Cold War period, is problematic but not surprising.50

Russophobia in Western discourse has been written about, by Russians themselves - poets and writers - for nearly two centuries.51 Some have suggested that Russian fears of American Russophobia fuel a siege mentality present within Moscow since the end of the Cold War. Russophobia has had an impact; it has influenced the manner in which Russia approaches its own relations with the West. Valentina Feklyunina confirms that the assumption of American Russophobia by Russians themselves has shaped Russia’s self perception, and more importantly it has shaped Russia’s expectations for how foreign nations will engage with them. 52 Russian leaders anticipate anti-Russianism in their dealings with the West, which shapes and perpetuate an “us vs. them” discourse among Russian decision makers that may be reinforcing the narrative of fear in Washington.

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