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Realism fails — neglect of psychological elements.

Tuomas Forsberg 21, Professor of International Politics at the University of Tampere and Deputy Director of the Centre of Excellence on Choices of Russian Modernization at the Aleksanteri Institute of the University of Helsinki; Christer Pursiainen is Professor of Societal Safety and Environment at the Department of Engineering and Safety, Faculty of Science and Technology, Arctic University of Norway, 2021, “The Psychology of Foreign Policy,” Palgrave Studies in Political Psychology, https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-79887-1 [ML]

Realism, in its various formulations, has always had a somewhat ambivalent relationship to psychology (Donnelly, 2000, pp. 43–80; Edinger, 2021). Hans Morgenthau (1955), the founder of political realism, warned against the search for the clue to foreign policy exclusively in the motives of state leaders because it was both futile and deceptive. Yet many political realists have still paid a great deal of attention to major figures in international politics and their actions, starting from some implicit psychological analysis on the basis of the leader’s experience or moral characteristics. Political realism assumes rationality as the methodological starting point for analysis, yet Morgenthau (1946, p. 154) himself fundamentally doubted the extent to which foreign policy decision-makers or any human being can be rational; indeed, he called the idea of human rationality a “rationalist superstition.” To the extent that rationality in realism would be tantamount to basing one’s actions on power alone, Reinhold Niebuhr (2013, p. 4; see also Meinecke, 1957, p. 433) in turn admitted that in reality this is not the case: “Politics will, to the end of history, be an area where conscience and power meet, where the ethical and coercive factors of human life will interpenetrate and work out their tentative and uneasy compromises.” Yet neither Morgenthau nor other classical realists provided a clear account of the psychological aspects of foreign policy other than the general deficiency of human nature. Structural realism (neorealism) shifted the angle of the older political realism away from state leaders to the structural conditions of the international system (Elman, 1996). In a vulgar reading of structural realism, it is sometimes maintained that any statesperson would behave in a similar way in given structural conditions. The most visible scholar of offensive realism in the past twenty years or so, John Mearsheimer, argues that Russia’s actions in Ukraine in 2014 should be seen as a self-evident reaction to the West’s aggressive grand strategy: “No Russian leader would tolerate a military alliance that was Moscow’s mortal enemy until recently moving into Ukraine. Nor would any Russian leader stand idly by while the West helped install a government there that was determined to integrate Ukraine into the West” (Mearsheimer, 2014, p. 82, italics added). Hence, the psychological idiosyncrasies of individual decision-makers are completely neglected. Yet Mearsheimer titles his article ‘Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions that Provoked Putin’, revealing the clear psychological microfoundations of the author’s overly structuralist argument.

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