Realism can’t explain complex interactions — omits every domestic variable.
Jeremy Garlick 16, Director of the J. Masaryk Centre of International Studies and Associate Professor of International Relations and China Studies at Prague University of Economics and Business, 2016, “Not So Simple: Complexity Theory and the rise of China,” SAGE Publications, DOI: 10.1177/0009445516661884 [ML]
For Waltz, states in the anarchic international system are, according to the well-worn metaphor, like billiard balls bouncing off each other and jostling for position in order to serve their own interests. Waltz’s theory implies that China, like all other states, will compete for power, territory and resources amid the Hobbesian anarchy of the Westphalian system of sovereign states. Waltz’s neorealism is a parsimonious theory which depends on a structural analysis of the international system to predict a dog-eat-dog world of competing states. However, the very parsimony of the theory means, as Humphreys (2006) points out, that its explanatory power is limited and unsatisfactory. For Humphreys, the main problem with Waltzian neorealism lies in the fact that it inexplicably attempts to reduce the complexity of the international system to a single independent variable (anarchic structure). This means that Waltz perceives the international system in a linear fashion, with the independent variable of anarchy (i.e., the ‘war of all against all’) exerting a direct causative effect on states’ behaviour in the international system, leading them to pursue strategies of self-help. The linearity of Waltz’s theory may appear parsimonious and compelling, but, as neoclassical realists and complexity theorists point out, fails to account for complex phenomena in terms, for instance, of how foreign policy impacts upon and is impacted by developments in international affairs (see for instance Bousquet and Curtis 2011; Kavalski 2007; Rathbun 2008; Rose 1998). In the specific case of China’s rise, Waltz’s focus on anarchy tells us that China will compete with other states, but not how. In essence, he does not tell us enough to enable us to see anything beyond a vague picture of China and self-help, undifferentiated from all the other ‘like units’ (states). Waltz’s neorealism cannot predict in what direction China’s rise will take both it and the world in general, beyond a general expectation of competition and increasing influence as China’s capabilities increase. Thus, it does not provide us with any detailed or useful explanation or prediction beyond what is already quite obvious. This is largely because of what Waltz consciously leaves out. He claims that the logic of his structural analysis necessitates omitting ‘attributes and interactions’, by which he means ‘questions about the cultural, economic, political, and military interactions of states’, as well as ‘the kinds of political leaders, social and economic institutions, and ideological commitments states may have’ (1979: 80). Questions concerning ‘environment, situation, context and milieu’ are, according to Waltz, ‘vague and varying systemic notions’ which can be entirely replaced by the analysis of structure alone because they have no explanatory value in a theoretical sense (1979: 80). Waltz does attempt to account for differences in the sizes and capabilities of states, but does not satisfactorily build these factors into his states-as-like-units model. For understanding a rising China, then, there is ostensibly little more that can usefully be gleaned from Waltzian neorealism beyond the general expectation of Hobbesian self-help in an anarchic international system. Because Waltz believes that the international level of analysis has to be sharply demarcated from the domestic, and so he thinks it is necessary to omit all information about China’s culture, economy, politics, and so on, his theory cannot reveal anything about the detailed mechanics of China’s rise on the international stage as the nation interacts and develops its relationships with other actors. On the other hand, neoclassical realism offers an interesting development of Waltzian neorealism, in that it attempts to analyse the complex impact of domestic policy on international affairs. Neoclassical realists such as Rose (1998), Christensen (1996), Wohlforth (1993) and Zakaria (1999) base their theorising on Waltz’s emphasis on structure and anarchy, but attempt to develop his theory further by giving more weight to domestic factors in foreign policy decision-making. Christensen’s (1996) study is particularly interesting for students of China because it attempts to apply a ‘two-level’ analysis of international and domestic factors to Sino-US relations between 1947 and 1958. Neoclassical realists, in essence, claim that neorealism, by focusing exclusively on the international level of analysis, does not account for ‘domestic politics and ideas’ (Rathbun 2008: 294) in its analysis of states’ behaviour at the international level. However, there is disagreement about the value of neoclassical realism, and also about whether neoclassical realists are really doing something different to neorealists in general or just expanding on its ideas about structure and anarchy (see Legro and Moravscik 1999; Rathbun 2008; Vasquez 1997). Two notable neoclassical realists (Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder) have even further muddied the waters by going so far as to decline to take part in a debate about whether they are neorealists or not; they do this on the basis that they neither want to be ‘apologists for neorealism’ nor to attempt to ‘reconcile the heterogeneous arguments’ of scholars who are generally labelled ‘neorealist’ (Christensen and Snyder 1997: 919). The other major weakness of the neoclassical realist project is that it has not yet come to fruition in terms of being fully expounded in theoretical terms. To be specific, while there is value in pointing out that domestic variables need to be incorporated into realist theory, neoclassical realism has not yet managed to convincingly posit an explicit theoretical framework within which this can be done. It is for this reason perhaps that neoclassical realism has been criticised for being ‘an ad hoc and theoretically degenerative effort to explain away anomalies for neorealism’ (Rathbun 2008: 294), ince neoclassical realists’ ‘use of whatever tools are necessary to plug the holes of a sinking ship’ results in ‘paradigmatic incoherence and indistinctiveness’ (Rathbun 2008: 295). There, therefore, remains an obvious need to develop a clear and convincing theoretical framework for neoclassical realism’s attempt to take neorealism in a direction which systematically accounts for the effect of domestic variables on foreign policy. Thus, the possibility that CT might be able to provide the missing link from neorealism to neoclassical realism, by supplying some conceptual tools with which to study the way in which foreign policy interacts with international phenomena, is an intriguing one. In this article it is not possible to do more than point out the need for more research into the possibility of CT providing a set of tools for filling out the internal mechanics of neorealism and neoclassical realism, and to suggest that this could be done in order to attempt to develop a more complete theoretical framework within which to analyse complex international phenomena such as China’s rise.