Collapses in on itself.
Tuomas Forsberg 21, Professor of International Politics at the University of Tampere and Deputy Director of the Centre of Excellence on Choices of Russian Modernization at the Aleksanteri Institute of the University of Helsinki; Christer Pursiainen is Professor of Societal Safety and Environment at the Department of Engineering and Safety, Faculty of Science and Technology, Arctic University of Norway, 2021, “The Psychology of Foreign Policy,” Palgrave Studies in Political Psychology, https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-79887-1 [ML]
The key problem with thin rational choice theory is that it cannot be directly tested. The very meaning of rationality is too broad, and open to post hoc formulations. If the idea of utility is subjective, any action can be explained rationally. Self-interest understood as utility may mean whatever one wishes, including altruism or self-destruction. However, the more open the concept of utility is rendered, the less useful it becomes. When preferences are deduced from the action, they are tautological as explanations and rational choice loses its celebrated predictive power. If rational choice theory explains everything, it explains nothing (Nicholson, 1996; Smelser, 1992, p. 403), in which case it is of little help in explaining human choices. Some IR rational choice theorists think that rational choice is only a partial theory insomuch as it explains states’ behavior when they are behaving rationally (Glaser, 2010, p. 27), but this reasoning becomes circular. The logic is reminiscent of Hans Morgenthau’s (1955) view of political realism concerning the life sphere of a ‘political man’, but not that of a ‘moral’ or ‘religious man’. Further, rational choice theory’s popularity is not necessarily based on rational reasons. Its theorists have not been open to criticism and have been reluctant to consider alternatives to their theory. For example, Donald Green and Ian Shapiro (1994, pp. 6–7) have argued that a large number of rational choice propositions have not been tested empirically. They contend that empirical research applying rational choice has been theory-driven rather than problem-driven, and they suspect that rational choice hypotheses are often formulated in ways that are inherently resistant to genuine empirical testing. Even if they have been tested, they have not been compared with other possible explanations. Hence, proponents of rational choice theory have not followed their own doctrine in weighing the available alternatives and choosing the best among them. In order to be more than a formal theory of modeling, rational choice needs to be modified to a middle-range theory. In this way, it can be part of a larger conceptual toolbox upon which a social theorist can draw when devising tractable theoretical explanations of social phenomena (Rutar, 2020a, 2020b). Yet in order to be a middle-range theory, providing testable hypotheses to begin with, it has to assume more than the idea of utility maximization in the abstract (Wolbring, 2020). In security studies, scholars such as Stephen Walt (1999, p. 8) have seen little value in the increasing volume of very technical research based on rational choice. In his view, “while the formal techniques have facilitated the construction of precise and deductively sound arguments, the problem is that rational choice theorists have generated comparatively few new hypotheses and have for the most part not been tested in a careful and systematic way.” An interesting question arises as to when states rely on a rational choice type of decision-making in practice. A cost–benefit calculus and a probability assessment make sense when the alternatives are numerical. This is the case in trade policy and economic bargaining where the alternatives are known at least with some certainty and can be compared. If there is considerable uncertainty about the expected consequences, a decisionmaking calculus becomes more abstract and various cognitive factors start to play a more significant role. Many rational choice theorists have assumed that the theory is universal; any individual would behave similarly in a similar situation. Positing that this is not literally true—as in reality the adoption of a rational choice type of decision-making depends on the cognitive styles of individuals, or the organizational culture—but an abstraction, rational choice theorists do not see that sensible scope conditions were available. However, Brian Rathbun, Joshua Kertzer and Mark Paradis (2017) have argued that there are individual differences that are traceable to psychological microfoundations, at least on a sliding scale: rationalist foreign policymakers are ego-centric and possess high epistemic motivation. The instrumentally rational archetype, homo diplomaticus, is reflective, engaging and active. In Rathbun’s (2019) view, an instrumentally rational leader relies on an objective analysis of the situation, including taking how the adversary interprets one’s own actions seriously, and conducts careful deliberation before making decisions. Although such leaders do not necessarily have to be realists, a policy of Realpolitik is not possible without such rationality. Rathbun believes that very few state leaders or advisors actually follow such a model of instrumental rationality with any consistency